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“The robots are taking our jobs!” 
Not long ago, this worry was the stuff of science fiction. Now, as 
self–driving cars take to the streets and robots fill our warehouses 
and factories, it is entering mainstream political debate around the 
world.
This raises important questions for all of us. How society uses 
new technologies is not a foregone conclusion. It depends on 
political decisions, cultural norms and economic choices as much 
as on the technologies themselves.
This book looks at the phenomenon of new robot technologies, 
asks what impact they might have on the economy, and considers 
how governments, businesses and individuals should respond 
to them. Because technological change is a complex business, it 
includes views from a range of disciplines, including economics, 
engineering, history, philosophy and innovation studies.
THE ROBOT HYPOTHESIS
Few technologies have captured the human imagination like 
robots. People have been fantasising about robots since long 
before they became technologically possible. Medieval romances 
feature a wide variety of walking, talking automata. Androids 
have been a mainstay of science fiction since the early twentieth 
century. And now they’ve entered the public debate in a new role: 
as agents of profound economic change.
Robots, the argument goes, are learning to do work once only 
done by humans. This is destroying jobs, 
and making the rich richer and the 
poor poorer. Let’s call this the Robot 
Hypothesis.
The Robots Hypothesis ties 
together two powerful themes in 
popular culture: the rapid advance 
of IT, and the startling growth in 
inequality that has taken place 
around the world. It’s perhaps no 
surprise that it has become big news: 
in the last year it has been covered in the 
New York Times and the Financial Times, 
and made it onto the front cover of The 
Economist, Newsnight and 60 Minutes.
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The robots at the centre of the Robot Hypothesis are not 
traditional tin men. In his essay in this book, Nick Hawes, Senior 
Lecturer in Intelligent Robotics at the University of Birmingham, 
defines a robot as “a machine that automates a physical task”. This 
include nonhuman robots like self–driving cars, inanimate machines 
like self–service checkouts and potentially even computer 
technologies that aren’t really robots in any real sense of the word, 
like software that can analyse medical x–rays or translate English 
texts into Chinese. Such is the power of the idea of robots that 
they’ve come to stand for the whole lot.
FIGURE 1: HEADLINE MENTIONS OF THE WORD 
‘ROBOT’ IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWS, 1999-2013
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The idea that new technologies are increasing inequality isn’t new. 
In the 2000s, economists began to observe that machines were 
having an unusual effect on labour markets. Ken Autor, another MIT 
economist, observed in 2003 that technology was more likely to 
destroy middling jobs than high–end or low–end ones. In a paper 
with Frank Levy and Richard Murnane, Autor noted technology was 
more likely to replace routine work, like bookkeeping or lathing, 
than non–routine work, like nursing or investment banking, and 
that routine jobs were more likely to be middle–income ones. So 
if the machines are doing the routine jobs, we would be left with 
greater inequality among the jobs that remain. We’d be left with 
‘lovely jobs’ and ‘lousy jobs’, in the words of Alan Manning, an LSE 
economist. 
And interest has heightened in the current decade. 2011 saw the 
publication of a bestselling e–book, Race Against the Machine, 
by MIT academics Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, making 
the case forcefully. Foxconn, the giant Taiwanese manufacturer 
of Apple products, announced it was planning to deploy a million 
robots in its factories in China. The next year, Amazon acquired 
a robotics firm, Kiva Systems, raising the prospect of robots 
managing the firm’s vast warehouses. 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee followed up their research with a full–
length book The Second Machine Age. A striking piece of research 
from Oxford University suggested that 47 per cent of American 
jobs might fall prey to technology in the future; the figure for the 
UK is a not particularly less alarming 36 per cent. And Google got 
in on the act too, acquiring Boston Dynamics (a manufacturer of 
military robots whose captivatingly sinister robot dogs and walkers 
have become a YouTube mainstay) and working to commercialise 
the self–driving car. The Robot Hypothesis seems here to stay.
ROBOT SCEPTICS
But not everyone agrees that the coming of the robot economy is 
a problem – either because they see it as a good thing, or because 
they don’t believe it is actually happening.
One argument is that the economy will adapt fairly painlessly 
to big changes in employment caused by automation. Just as the 
sons of agricultural labourers made redundant by seed drills and 
tractors got jobs in factories, and the daughters of factory workers 
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made redundant by faster assembly lines and lean production got 
jobs in the services sector, so new jobs will arise to make use of the 
talents of those whose jobs have been taken by robots. Pundits 
like Tim Worstall are positively enthusiastic about this, arguing 
that we work to live, not live to work, and should celebrate greater 
efficiency (although they give relatively little consideration to how 
this promised land will come to be).
Other sceptics argue that the Robot Hypothesis identifies the 
wrong culprit: that rising inequality is caused by social and political 
choices, not by new technologies. Dean Baker, an American 
economist, argues that the root of American inequality is not 
automation but “the rich writing the rules to make themselves 
richer”, by lowering taxes, scrapping worker protection and 
cracking down on unions. French economist Thomas Piketty’s 
much–discussed analysis of inequality, Capital in the Twenty–First 
Century, highlights the importance of a class of ‘supermanagers’ 
who receive dizzyingly high pay, often as a result of the 
financialisation of the economy.
What’s more, robot sceptics can point to earlier, failed 
predictions of a robot revolution. People have often worried that 
technology would lead to the end of work. But as Geoff Mulgan 
has observed, neither the fears of the Luddites in the 1810s nor of 
Wassily Leontief in the 1970s, nor of Jeremy Rifkin in the 1990s 
have actually come to pass. By this logic, we should be relatively 
untroubled by the Robot Hypothesis, since it could be a false 
alarm.
But just because inequality has social causes does not mean that 
technology has not played a role too. And just because previous 
predictions of job losses from automation have been exaggerated 
does not mean that robots will not destroy large numbers of jobs 
in the future.
Frederick Guy’s essay in this book points out that technology 
has played an important role in rising CEO incomes and falling 
pay for the average worker. The computerised till makes it easier 
to monitor and discipline a cashier, while the Bloomberg terminal 
helps enable an economy where the cashier’s CEO can claim multi–
million pound share options. 
Likewise, even if it is true that some or even most of the recent 
rise in inequality has had little to do with technology, this does not 
mean that emerging technologies like driverless cars or warehouse 
robotics will not have major effects on the labour market.
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It has become a cliché in some circles to talk about the 
accelerating pace of improvement in semiconductors and 
telecommunications, and the rapid adoption of technologies 
like smartphones, but it is no less true for all that. Information 
and Communication Technologies look very much like previous 
general–purpose technologies such as steam power and 
electrification that transformed the world’s economy in the last two 
centuries.
THE UK: REVOLUTION POSTPONED?
There is one further objection to the Robot Hypothesis that is of 
special relevance to the UK. It seems that the impact of automation 
has been lower in Britain than in the United States and perhaps 
other countries. It may be that the UK has unwittingly become a 
temporary hold–out against automation. This may not, however, be 
a good thing.
It has been widely noted that UK median wages have fallen 
significantly since the 2008 crisis, much more so than wages in 
the US. At the same time, UK employment has recovered relatively 
rapidly from the recession, but output has recovered much slower, 
with the result that productivity has scarcely increased since 2008. 
Ryan Avent, one of the contributors to this book, has argued that 
this is a sign of the UK failing to invest in new automation, and 
instead hiring more workers at lower wages. 
This is part of a much older story of UK underinvestment in 
new technology, which has been widely debated for years, and 
which many commentators believe is caused by endemic short–
termism and poor managerial incentives. But it puts the UK in an 
unusual position with respect to the putative robot revolution: our 
employment rates have held up relatively well, as if we had taken 
a conscious choice to reject out of hand (at least some of) the 
benefits of automation. But this choice has been far from conscious 
– indeed, it runs exactly counter to Government aspirations to 
encourage businesses to invest in innovation – and the net result, 
less unemployment but woeful productivity, is nothing to be 
pleased about.
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HOW SHOULD SOCIETY RESPOND TO THE ROBOT 
HYPOTHESIS?
So how should we respond to the possibility that new 
technologies will make large numbers of workers redundant and 
increase the gap between haves and have–nots?
FACING THE ROBOTS WITH OPTIMISM 
We can start by adopting an optimistic frame of mind. 
Technology is not destiny, even though some of its more breathless 
prophets claim it is. The effect that technology has on society is 
as much a function of human choices – about politics, business 
organisation, and social norms – as it is a function of the properties 
of the technologies themselves.
The distinguished innovation scholar Carlota Perez argues that 
when a major new technology comes into the world, what really 
shakes things up is the change of “techno–economic paradigm”, 
the suite of principles, rules and institutions that society puts in 
place around the new technology to make use of it.
Consider electric power: the impact of electrification was a 
huge technological breakthrough, but it depended on countless 
social decisions and deployments to have any real effect. From 
the redesign of factories so that each machine had its own power 
source, revolutionising industrial organisation, to the deployment of 
labour saving devices in the home and the effect on women’s work 
and women’s rights, these were profoundly social phenomena, and 
depended on people’s conscious choices.
People face similar choices when it comes to robots. As voters, 
customers and workers, our actions influence how institutions will 
respond to new technologies of automation, what measures are 
taken to protect those put out of work by them and how society 
shares the rewards. 
This theme emerges in several of the essays in this collection 
– Noah Smith and Frances Coppola both stress the importance 
of political decisions in the impact of automation. Georgina Voss 
shows how the relative position of women and men in a robot 
future will depend on social as much as on technological decisions. 
The importance of the social context of technology emerges even 
more strongly when we look at accounts of the distant past and 
the future. ER Truitt’s piece shows that social discussions about 
robots abounded in the Middle Ages, long before modern robots 
existed, while Jon Turney’s account of robot economies in science 
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fiction novels shows how different sci–fi authors worked through 
the social possibilities of automation and abundance.
The message from all of this is that technology may change the 
solution space within which we operate, but it is humans who make 
the ultimate decisions – and you should distrust anyone who tells 
you otherwise.
So proceeding in a spirit of optimism, we can identify a few areas 
where public policy can help us make the most of the promise of 
automation – and avoid a robotic dystopia.
MAKING THE MOST OF THE UPSIDE
It’s fashionable to mock mainstream economic models of 
technology change, which often imply that technology is 
homogeneous and always beneficial, but they have some things 
going for them. All other things being equal, it would be very 
welcome if we could automate large amounts of drudgerous work 
and free people up to do more creative, enjoyable, ennobling 
things with their time. A major aim of government policy with 
regard to automation should be to help make this happen.
And there will surely be things left for humans to do. Several 
of the authors in this collection make the point that there will 
certainly be important work left to be done even if large swathes 
of the economy are automated. Frances Coppola makes the point 
that activities like social care and the creative industries are likely 
to rely on skills that robots find hard to emulate. Izabella Kaminska 
and Edward Skidelsky highlight the opportunity to make the work 
that remains more intrinsically rewarding.
There are two challenges to achieving this, at least from a 
British perspective.
The first is how to make sure underinvestment and 
short–termism do not cause the UK to miss out on 
the robotic revolution entirely. The low–wage, low–
productivity trap identified by Ryan Avent is a 
way of avoiding a robot dystopia, but a 
very unsatisfactory one – the UK might 
resist a short–term rise in inequality 
from automation, but we will suffer in 
the medium term as our productivity 
stagnates, the traded parts of our 
economy lose out to foreign competition, 
and everyone becomes poorer.
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Encouraging the adoption of new technologies will require us to 
tackle British investors and managers’ reputation for short–termism 
– most likely by better corporate governance – and to increase 
the availability of long–term patient capital. If the private sector 
cannot provide this, it may have to come from the public sector, 
after the manner of the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
development bank or the US Small Business Administration.
It will also require a sensitive approach to regulation. We must 
be willing to experiment with regulations, perhaps in designated 
areas or for limited times, to understand how new technologies 
can be deployed safely and effectively. Several governments have 
announced self–driving car test–beds; we also need test–beds and 
trials for artificial intelligence medical diagnostics, automated fraud 
detection, drone traffic enforcement, and so on. Government’s 
role here is to create safe spaces to experiment, to fund or co–
fund research in the public interest, and to stop incumbents from 
stonewalling new, high–tech competition.
Public policy also has a role to play in making sure that the new, 
non–robot jobs emerge, and that people have the skills necessary 
to do them.
Human jobs in a robot age are those that require skills that are 
hard for robots to develop, such as creativity, empathy and social 
skills. Many of these jobs exist in sectors that have a mixed track–
record at innovating, or which face their own challenges from 
technology. How do we create high–skilled, fulfilling social care 
jobs, given the public funding of much of the social care sector and 
constraints on public finances? Will the difficulty of making money 
from creative content in an age of free online copying make it hard 
for people to find work in the creative industries?
One response to this is to improve our education system. Children 
should be learning to work creatively with technology, to be 
‘digital makers’ (schemes like Make Things Do Stuff and the Studio 
Schools movement offer examples of what could be achieved). The 
demands of a robot economy also lend support to the growing 
movement to teach non–cognitive skills, like determination or 
resilience, which inform social interactions.
Government should also consider drafting industrial strategies for 
sectors likely to create jobs in the robot age, such as the creative 
industries and social and personal care. Like the Government’s 
existing industrial strategies, these strategies would consider skills 
needs, access to finance, the role of public procurement, and 
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research and development funding. It is ironic that, while all three 
main UK political parties are supportive of the idea of industrial 
strategy, we have strategies in various manufacturing and logistics 
sector, but not in the creative industries (where the UK is genuinely 
distinctive) or in health and social care (where government 
procurement and regulation play a very significant role).
SPREADING THE BENEFITS
Of course, distribution matters too. If the benefits of robot 
technologies go mostly to a small minority, it is legitimate for 
voters and government to demand a fairer division of the spoils. 
Steve Randy Waldman notes that societies where a few people 
own the majority of the wealth have a nasty habit of developing 
bad political institutions – the so–called resource curse that crops 
up time and time again in history of oil–rich states.
The essays in this volume address a number of possibilities for 
how the proceeds of a robot revolution might be redistributed. 
Notably, Noah Smith’s piece argues for a universal basic income 
for everyone, paid for from the proceeds of robot–enhanced 
productivity.
What is clear is that if automation necessitates a big shift in how 
we tax, it offers an opportunity to start taxing more sensible things. 
Economists have long argued for taxing land, carbon emissions 
and other bads, rather than taxing work. If there is less work about 
in the future, this may be the chance to make a change.
There is also the question of how we share out the rewards 
of a robot economy. We may not yet be ready for a universal 
basic income, since at least for the time being so many people’s 
conception of (their own and others’) value to society is bound 
up in work. But it is surely worth making policies to encourage 
ownership of robots is widely dispersed. The simplest way to make 
sure everyone has a stake in robots is to encourage widespread 
pension ownership – so that people own shares in the companies 
that own the robots.
But if the riches of automation are really as abundant as some 
people think they are, we could go further, and learn a lesson from 
the few countries that have dealt well with natural resource riches, 
like Norway and Alaska, by establishing a national endowment 
to hold wealth on behalf of citizens. The proceeds of this could 
be used to pay an annual dividend to citizens (as in Alaska) or to 
invest in future productivity (as has been proposed in Norway).
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WATCHING THE DOWNSIDES
The third role for government is to be wary of uses of automation 
that are downright bad. Most of the examples of robot technology 
we have considered in this book are good for society in aggregate, 
but bad for some people – typically the people whose jobs they 
replace. But there is of course a subset of technologies whose 
overall impact is negative.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that innovations like 
tetraethyl lead were on the whole bad for society. In an age 
of increasingly intelligent machines, it’s easy to imagine more 
innovations that bring small benefits to a few but large downsides 
to an equal or greater number. Fixed–odds betting terminals and 
high–frequency trading algorithms have both come under scrutiny 
recently; enabling these and similar technologies with greater 
intelligence and power could lead to even greater and more 
justified concerns.
It is hard for governments – or indeed for anyone – to accurately 
diagnose whether an innovation is sufficiently bad to ban. But 
politicians should encourage an open and informed debate about 
it, backed up with the capability to regulate effectively if necessary, 
and approach that researchers like Richard Owen and Jack Stilgoe 
have called ‘responsible innovation’.
What all of this comes down to is that the UK and its government 
should approach the challenge of the robot economy with 
optimism, on the condition that we engage with it on two fronts. 
On the one hand, we should enthusiastically support investment in 
new technologies of automation, and challenge both British short–
termism and the vested interests of incumbents who might oppose 
technological competition. On the other hand, politicians should 
vigorously engage with the human side of the robot question, 
aggressively working to encourage job creation in fields where 
human skills still reign supreme, and reforming our tax and pension 
system to spread the wealth created by the robot economy widely.
In short, we must embrace the robots, but do so with humanity.
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PART 1.
THE 
ECONOMICS 
OF A ROBOT 
FUTURE
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 Part 1. The Economics of a Robot Future
THE REVOLUTION WILL 
BE UNCOMFORTABLE
RYAN AVENT 
Pessimists of the 
innovation potential 
of modern economies 
often cite something 
called the kitchen test to 
sway the casual sceptic. 
Think of kitchens a half 
decade ago, the thought 
experiment runs, and 
one comes up with a 
recognisably modern 
image. There is indoor 
plumbing, certainly, 
refrigeration, basic 
appliances, and perhaps 
a microwave and a television. Productivity in the kitchen in the 
1960s was about what it is today. Go back another half century, 
however, and the typical kitchen looks vastly different. There were 
no electrical appliances to speak of. Refrigeration might well have 
come in the form of an icebox, and water, in many cases, had 
to be brought in from outdoors. One need not dig into rates of 
patenting or productivity statistics to know that innovation has 
slowed, the experiment suggests: simply trust the evidence of 
one’s own senses and the absence of life–improving new gadgets.
But there is another way of looking at the kitchen test. In 
an important way, innovation sceptics have sold the kitchen 
innovations of the first half of the twentieth century short. The 
biggest impact of kitchen productivity enhancements came not 
inside the kitchen but outside of it.
Just 25 per cent of married women worked outside of the home 
in 1950. By 2000 that figure had risen to 60 per cent. According 
to one estimate nearly half of that increase can be attributed to 
the labour–saving effects of household appliances. Freed from 
the need to specialise in what economists call ‘home production’, 
married women could move into the wage economy: a shift with 
momentous social consequences.
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Many of those consequences were unambiguously positive. 
It began a process in which women were extended the same 
opportunities in the labour force as men. That meant terrific 
improvements in the individual welfare of women long stifled by 
the economic and cultural demands of early twentieth century 
society. It also helped unleash an important boom in the economy’s 
stock of labour and human capital: particularly as rising female 
labour–force participation encouraged rising female educational 
attainment. 
But change did not occur easily. For those whose positions of 
privilege were challenged, the entry of millions of women into 
the workforce was an uncomfortable experience. Domestic life 
changed, requiring much of society to reset its expectations about 
who should do what where. And the rise of the working woman 
required institutional change that often occurred slowly, and after 
long struggles: changes to laws and regulations, to company 
policies and office norms.
While the kitchen gadgets whirred, their arrival echoed across 
society as the world adapted itself to the new possibilities 
those gadgets enabled. The kitchen test suggests a rule of 
thumb: the placid society is stagnating technologically. Powerful 
technologies bend society around them, as people and institutions 
adjust to maximise the potential of the new inventions. Those 
adjustments disturb old societal patterns and break old links. Rapid 
technological change leaves a tell–tale residue of social disruption.
This dynamic is most plain in the great era of industrialisation 
in the early nineteenth century. To say that Western Europe 
in the era before the Industrial Revolution was a 
paradise of working–class autonomy would perhaps 
be overstating matters. State, church, and culture 
limited independence, as did economics. Yet at the 
time society in places like Britain and the 
Netherlands was free in ways that you or I 
have never really known. Workers were free 
in the sense that they were, to a remarkable 
extent, the fundamental units of production 
in the economy, a status that gave them a 
surprising amount of choice about how to live 
their lives.
Production was organised in several 
different ways on the eve of the revolution. 
There were independent producers, including 
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skilled craftsmen. There was cottage industry as it is commonly 
understood, in which individual workers produced goods for a 
business–owner, from the comfort of their home and for piece 
rates: they were paid, in other words, by the quantity of a good 
produced. There were even ‘manufactories’, where workers 
gathered in one place to use resources and equipment owned by a 
single firm or capitalist.
Yet within these organisational forms the individual worker and 
the tools that worker used embodied the whole of a particular 
production process. As a result the individual worker enjoyed 
enormous freedom. He or she could work from home, for instance: 
could rise whenever it suited, work as hard or as lackadaisically 
as desired, even drink or indeed get drunk on the job. Dutiful or 
productive workers would earn more than lazy workers. But ‘dutiful 
and productive’ did not equate to behaving in a particular and 
prescribed way. Nor was it a major work requirement.
Between the late eighteenth century and the late nineteenth 
century that sort of industry was almost entirely swept away. It 
took with it a conception of society vastly different from what 
you and I now know. The Industrial Revolution turned man from 
wielder of machine to part of the machine. To be more specific, 
work began to involve the coordinated use of capital equipment in 
order to operate at significant scale, the better to reap enormous 
productivity gains: big buildings, big staffs, big machines, big 
cities, big money.
By the end of the transition production was overwhelmingly 
done outside the home. It was done in plants, in which ownership 
of building, capital 
equipment, and 
material used was 
all concentrated in 
the hands of one 
or a few capitalists. 
Commuting to 
work became the 
norm. Workers worked set 
hours at a pace set by the 
factory owner, and they 
were paid according to the 
time worked rather than by 
the finished piece. What’s 
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more, production required precision: in terms of skills applied and 
sobriety, as well as in the quality of the finished product. Capital 
demanded it, the better to wring the highest return out of massive, 
expensive new machinery, and to produce as much of a uniform 
product as possible as efficiently as possible.
These forces generated profound social and cultural changes. 
The capitalist class required a large pool of docile, sober, and 
reasonably well–educated (meaning at least literate and numerate) 
labour. Such concerns drove broad societal pushes for regularised 
and public education, for moral instruction and temperance, even 
for a sense of pride and belonging to something greater than the 
individual.
The social milieu of the typical worker also changed enormously. 
Daily routines became far more rigidly constructed. Commuting, 
eating and drinking, and other entertainments were increasingly 
subjugated to the workweek. Home work was replaced by tightly 
scripted line–work in a plant, where tasks were monitored and 
goofing around strongly discouraged. And industrial economies 
operated at a vastly different metropolitan scale. The expense 
of moving goods and the value of vast labour pools militated in 
favour of great cities, with populations in the millions rather than 
the tens of thousands.
These changes took place over the course of a century. 
Nevertheless, the transformation of modern society was sufficiently 
rapid and dramatic to generate great social and political upheaval: 
above all a sense of alienation that facilitated profound social 
change, to benign ends in some cases – in art, for instance, and in 
the development of political movements aimed at improving the 
lot of society’s worst off, investing in education, and protecting the 
environment – and highly unfortunate ends in others. Ambitious 
and deadly political innovations like communism and fascism took 
as their fuel the tens of millions of new residents of industrialised 
metropolises.
It is remarkable, when one reflects on it, to consider the social 
power of a thing like the steam engine. A few fundamental 
inventions created the opportunity of higher productivity. But to 
take best advantage of that potential society had to transform 
itself from top to bottom. And with scarcely a moment’s hesitation 
it did it, knocking new institutions and norms into place along the 
way, as if they, too, were a part of the machinery on the factory 
floor. 
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No single invention may be as powerful, on this metric, as the 
car. For thousands of years cities were constrained in size by the 
distance an individual could walk on his own two feet. Horse–drawn 
conveyances could take a man farther, faster, but horses needed 
significant care and food and left piles of dung everywhere they 
went. City boundaries stretched outward with the introduction of 
streetcars and urban rail in the nineteenth century. But most transit 
was slow and limited in geographical range, while faster subways 
were hugely expensive to build.
Then along came the automobile. But not all at once. An 
automobile like the Model T was a device with enormous potential. 
But much of that potential wasn’t easily realised. A top speed of 
40 miles per hour was all but useless on urban streets thronged by 
pedestrians. Without hard, flat roads to drive on, a potential range 
of 170 miles was meaningless; there was nowhere to go. Reliability 
was reassuring but scarcely mattered without easy access to 
affordable fuel. The technological power of the automobile was not 
an inherent part of its design but resulted from its ability to bend 
society around it until it conformed to its preferred shape.
That process began immediately but unfolded over a century. 
Markets did some of the work. The automobile’s demands led to 
development of broad new swathes of economic activity. Gas 
stations sprouted up, as did auto repair shops, tyre merchants, 
roadside inns and diners, and drive–in theatres. The government 
took action, building roads and highways, and providing rules of 
the road and traffic enforcement. 
Society’s very shape began to change. Cities grew outward to 
take advantage of the automobile’s range. Homes and yards grew 
in size, no longer constrained by tight urban environs. New cities 
grew up well away from the rivers and harbours that had once 
been indispensable to metropolitan economic life. Business models 
changed. The rise of trucking forever altered the economics of 
domestic freight transport. Big box retail outlets surrounded by a 
sea of parking created huge efficiencies and passed the savings on 
to consumers. 
The automobile altered American culture. It changed conceptions 
of individual independence. It normalised society to the death or 
injury each year of tens of thousands of people behind or under 
the wheel. The rapid suburbanisation it fuelled supported a high 
middle–class quality of life – but also enabled segregation: de 
jure in the South, de facto across America. And through these 
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alterations and others the automobile bent American history and 
politics and economics into the form we now recognise (with more 
limited but still profound change resulting elsewhere in the rich 
world).
The car’s power as an invention was not in its performance 
advantages relative to the carriages and streetcars it displaced. 
The car’s phenomenal power is in the way those advantages 
generated a societal response: economically, culturally, 
geographically. The evidence of technological stagnation in 
transport is all around us; we continue to live in the world we made 
for the car. 
Comparing one invention with another, rather than the forces 
they exert on society, can lead one astray. Economist Robert 
Gordon, a sceptic of the transformative potential of recent 
innovations, poo–poohed the possibilities of autonomous vehicles 
in a 2012 Wall Street Journal essay, writing:
People are in cars to go somewhere, whether from home 
to work or from home to shop. Once they are inside the car, 
there is relatively little difference between driving the car 
on their own or having it drive itself. Greater safety? Auto 
fatalities per million miles traveled have already declined by  
a factor of ten since 1950.
In setting out the case for pessimism, I have been accused 
by some of a failure of imagination.
Gordon is right: making a car driverless 
does very little for its performance 
relative to the non–autonomous 
version. But that is the wrong way 
to assess the importance and 
potential of the driverless vehicle.
It is no stretch of the imagination 
at all to think that within a few 
years more the dream of a 
stupendously reliable driverless 
car will have become a reality. 
That reality would represent 
a revolutionary improvement 
over the status quo. Driverless 
cars could travel faster, farther, 
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with many fewer accidents. Gordon’s dismissiveness regarding 
the safety improvements possible under autonomous technology 
is wildly off–the–mark. Some 30,000 people die in car accidents 
each year in America alone. Many more are injured. The cumulative 
economic cost is astounding. 
But while safety improvements are economically important, 
they fall short of revolutionary. Few people stay off the road now 
because of the danger of driving. 
Autonomous vehicles can manage much more than life–saving, 
however. They could eliminate traffic. They could, in fact, eliminate 
traffic signals. Both road and car designs could change in response, 
minimising their footprints and expense. Driverless cars could take 
many more journeys than people alone demand (or could take 
journeys without people that people would otherwise need to 
take). Cities may well become a hive of drone activity, with delivery 
vehicles of all types and sizes ferrying goods around. People too, 
but mostly goods.
It is difficult to know how human behaviour might change as a 
result. When the cost or inconvenience of something falls, people 
tend to do much more of it. Driverless cars could bring out the 
recluse in all of us by allowing us to have a world of goods at our 
door, double–quick at the touch of a button. But it might also or 
instead make us more social if, say, the marginal trip is a night out 
or a visit to the city, which we decline as a result of the hassle of 
driving, sitting in traffic, and parking. Or perhaps people will work 
more, as commuting loses its sting.
The power of autonomous vehicles could be multiplied by 
the emergence of complementary technological systems. The 
combination of 3D printing with driverless 
vehicles could make warehousing obsolete. 
Robot fleets of autonomous vehicles – and 
flying drones, perhaps – may move in parallel 
with a complex online world, responding to 
or even anticipating the desires we express 
across apps and social networks. They 
may connect directly with our offices and 
houses; our refrigerators 
may remain fully stocked, 
seemingly of their own 
accord. 
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As these changes occur the physical geography of the world 
will be altered. People will live in different ways and in different 
places. The use of land across large portions of metropolitan areas 
may be rendered obsolete. As these developments occur societal 
norms will adjust. Some of that adjustment will be fuelled by the 
alienation that inevitably accompanies so dramatic a change in 
our world. New economic and political movements will arise, to 
reckon with the new world, to help us accommodate ourselves 
to it, and because some people see profit or power to be had in 
the interaction between economic and social change. We can 
speculate about what that world will look like, so long as we don’t 
mind being wrong.
What is fairly certain is the inevitability of great societal change 
in response to great technical change. From one perspective the 
world of driverless vehicles seems gravely in doubt, threatened 
on all sides by incompatible rules and regulations. From another 
it seems mostly boring, not much more important than cruise 
control or the automatic transmission. Both perspectives are 
almost certainly mistaken. Because it is not boring, its future is 
not imperilled by unfriendly institutions. The great innovations 
insinuate themselves into our lives, combine with their peers, and 
warp society like a powerful gravitational field.
Correspondingly, a society in the throes of rapid technological 
and economic change is one in which old orders rapidly and 
chaotically give way to new ones. It has been long enough since 
the most dramatic years of the industrial era that most of us 
cannot remember what that is like. The generation of retiring 
baby boomers came of age as the social tumult unleashed by the 
industrial revolution shuddered its last. 
Accelerating technological progress means that an unfamiliar 
process awaits us. The economic transformation will be exciting, 
carrying the possibility of great improvement in living standards. 
But we will measure its progress in our own discomfort.
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THE END OF LABOUR:  
HOW TO PROTECT 
WORKERS FROM THE 
RISE OF ROBOTS
NOAH SMITH 
Technology used to make us better at our jobs. Now it’s making 
many of us obsolete, as the share of income going to workers is 
crashing, all over the world. What do we do now?
Here’s a scene that will be familiar to anyone who’s ever taken 
an introductory economics course. The professor has just finished 
explaining that in economics, ‘efficiency’ means that there are no 
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possible gains from trade. Then some loudmouth kid in the back 
raises his hand and asks: “Wait, so if one person has everything, 
and everyone else has nothing and just dies, is that an ‘efficient’ 
outcome?” The professor, looking a little chagrined, responds: 
“Well, yes, it is.” And the whole class rolls their eyes and thinks: 
Economists.
For most of modern history, inequality has been a manageable 
problem. The reason is that no matter how unequal things get, 
most people are born with something valuable: the ability to work, 
to learn, and to earn money. In economist–ese, people are born 
with an ‘endowment of human capital’. It’s just not possible for one 
person to have everything, as in the nightmare example in Econ 101.
For most of modern history, two–thirds of the income of most rich 
nations has gone to pay salaries and wages for people who work, 
while one–third has gone to pay dividends, capital gains, interest, 
rent, etc. to the people who own capital. This two–thirds/one–
third division was so stable that people began to believe it would 
last forever. But in the past ten years, something has changed. 
Labour’s share of income has steadily declined, falling by several 
percentage points since 2000. It now sits at around 60 per cent or 
lower. The fall of labour income, and the rise of capital income, has 
contributed to America’s growing inequality.
WHERE IS THE MONEY GOING?
What can explain this shift? One hypothesis is: China. The recent 
entry of China into the global trading system basically doubled the 
labour force available to multinational companies. When labour 
becomes more plentiful, the return to labour goes down. In a world 
flooded with cheap Chinese labour, capital becomes relatively 
scarce, and its share of income goes up. As China develops, this 
effect should go away, as China builds up its own capital stock. This 
is probably already happening.
But there is another, more sinister explanation for the change. In 
past times, technological change always augmented the abilities 
of human beings. A worker with a machine saw was much more 
productive than a worker with a hand saw. The fears of Luddites, 
who tried to prevent the spread of technology out of fear of losing 
their jobs, proved unfounded. But that was then, and this is now. 
Recent technological advances in the area of computers and 
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automation have begun to do some higher cognitive tasks – think 
of robots building cars, stocking groceries, doing your taxes. 
Once human cognition is replaced, what else have we got? For 
the ultimate extreme example, imagine a robot that costs $5 to 
manufacture and can do everything you do, only better. You would 
be as obsolete as a horse.
Now, humans will never be completely replaced, like horses were. 
Horses have no property rights or reproductive rights, nor the 
intelligence to enter into contracts. There will always be something 
for humans to do for money. But it is quite possible that workers’ 
share of what society produces will continue to go down and 
down, as our economy becomes more and more capital–intensive. 
This possibility is increasingly the subject of discussion among 
economists. Erik Brynjolfsson has written a book about it, and 
economists like Paul Krugman and Tyler Cowen are talking about it 
more and more (for those of you who are interested, here is a huge 
collection of links, courtesy of blogger Izabella Kaminska). In the 
academic literature, the theory goes by the name of ‘capital–biased 
technological change.’
The big question is: What do we do if and when our old 
mechanisms for coping with inequality break down? If the 
‘endowment of human capital’ with which people are born gets 
less and less valuable, we’ll get closer and closer to that Econ 101 
example of a world in which the capital owners get everything. A 
society with cheap robot labour would be an incredibly prosperous 
one, but we will need to find some way for the vast majority of 
human beings to share in that prosperity, or we risk the kinds of 
dystopian outcomes that now exist only in science fiction.
REDISTRIBUTION AGAINST THE MACHINE
How do we fairly distribute income and wealth in the age of the 
robots?
The standard answer is to do more income redistribution through 
the typical government channels – Earned Income Tax Credit, 
welfare, etc. That might work as a stopgap, but if things become 
more severe, we’ll run into a lot of political problems if we lean too 
heavily on those tools. In a world where capital earns most of the 
income, we will have to get more creative.
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First of all, it should be easier for the common people to own 
their own capital – their own private army of robots. That will mean 
making ‘small business owner’ a much more common occupation 
than it is today (some would argue that with the rise of freelancing, 
this is already happening). Small businesses should be very easy to 
start, and regulation should continue to favour them. It’s a bit odd 
to think of small businesses as a tool of wealth redistribution, but 
strange times require strange measures.
Of course, not all businesses can be small businesses. More 
families would benefit from owning stock in big companies. Right 
now, America is going in exactly the opposite direction, with 
companies going private instead of making their stock available 
for public ownership. All large firms should be given incentives 
to list publicly. This will definitely mean reforming regulations like 
Sarbanes–Oxley that make it risky and difficult to go public; it may 
also mean tax incentives.
And then there are more extreme measures. Everyone is born 
with an endowment of labour; why not also an endowment of 
capital? What if, when each citizen turns eighteen, the government 
bought him or her a diversified portfolio of equity? Of course, 
some people would want to sell it immediately, cash out, and party, 
but this could be prevented with some fairly light paternalism, like 
temporary ‘lock–up’ provisions. This portfolio of capital ownership 
would act as an insurance policy for each human worker; if 
technological improvements reduced the value of that person’s 
labour, he or she would reap compensating benefits through 
increased dividends and capital gains. This would essentially be like 
the kind of socialist land reforms proposed in highly unequal Latin 
American countries, only redistributing stock instead of land.
Now of course this is an extreme measure, for an extreme 
hypothetical case. It may turn out that the ‘rise of the robots’ ends 
up augmenting human labour instead of replacing it. It may be 
that technology never exceeds our mental capacity. It may be that 
the fall in labour’s income share has really been due to the great 
Chinese Labour Dump, and not to robots after all, and that labour 
will make a comeback as soon as China catches up to the West.
But if not – if the age of mass human labour is about to 
permanently end – then we need to think fast. Extreme inequality 
may be ‘efficient’ in the Econ 101 sense, but in the real world it 
always leads to disaster.
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AUTOMATION AND 
JOBS: COMPETITION 
OR COOPERATION?
FRANCES COPPOLA 
“Robots will take all our jobs! We 
will all starve!” cry modern–day 
Luddites faced with the fastest pace 
of automation since the Industrial 
Revolution. Their argument is that 
humans compete unsuccessfully with 
robots and computers for work. As jobs 
are automated, so humans will become 
redundant.
Those who design, develop and 
operate the automated systems of the 
future may be very well paid. But those 
who are displaced by automated systems face a bleak future. The 
only way they can continue to work is if they are paid less than the 
cost of automation. Therefore, the wages of people whose jobs 
could be automated will fall below the cost of automation. 
But there is an alternative view. Automation offers a real 
opportunity to change the way we work, and even the way we 
live. For the first time in history, people have the real prospect 
of no longer having to work long hours in boring, repetitive and 
physically debilitating jobs to meet basic needs. We can have 
more time to spend interacting with each other, caring for each 
other, and creating beautiful things and clever ideas to brighten up 
people’s lives.
And since abundant production will mean the prices of basic 
goods will be very low, we will be both willing and able to pay 
those with skills in personal service and creative industries for 
their time and attention. People’s remuneration will relate to their 
enhancement of the lives of many people, not their ability to make 
profits for a few.
The Luddite argument appears persuasive. The impact of 
technological change on the labour market is already considerable, 
although offshoring and immigration also play a part. We are 
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already seeing falling real wages for those at the bottom end of 
the income spectrum, coupled with hollowing–out of the middle as 
routine medium–skilled jobs are automated.
People with medium skill sets are forced down into lower–skill 
occupations, in turn forcing out those with poorer skills: it is no 
surprise that the incidence of long–term unemployment is highest 
among the unskilled, even in areas where there are unskilled 
employment opportunities. In fact when faced with a glut of 
labour, employers tend to ‘raise the bar’ by insisting on higher skills 
than are really needed for the job: this reduces the chances of 
employment for the genuinely low–skilled still further. Competition 
for low–skilled jobs, coupled with the need to keep wages in low–
skill jobs below the cost of automation, ensures that wages do not 
rise at the pace of those in high–skill occupations – indeed they 
may even fall, if government routinely ‘tops up’ low wages with 
benefits. 
The disappearance of routine skilled jobs, the scarcity of high–
skilled workers and the substitution of low–skilled workers for more 
expensive machines causes the labour market to bifurcate. Mean 
and median wages gradually diverge, as low–skill wages are held 
down while high–skill wages continue to rise. The employment 
profile across skill sets starts to resemble an hourglass – bulges 
in high–skill and low–skill jobs, with a narrowing waist where 
medium–skill jobs are disappearing. 
As more and more people are forced out of medium–skill jobs 
into low–skilled jobs, working hours decrease: there is more 
part–time, casual and temporary work. Employment becomes 
more insecure as a relative glut of labour at the low–skill end 
of the employment spectrum enables employers to hire and 
fire at will: there is increasing use of temporary, self–
employed and zero–hours contracts as employers 
seek to avoid employment legislation that limits 
their hiring and firing autonomy, and workers are 
forced to accept disadvantageous contracts or 
face unemployment, or – if they are already 
unemployed – loss of benefits. At the low–skill 
end, the balance of power is considerably 
skewed towards employers. 
Conversely, workers with scarce skill sets 
have considerable negotiating power and can 
command high and rising wages. Employers 
30  OUR WORK HERE IS DONE. Visions of a robot economy
 Part 1. The Economics of a Robot Future
express concern that they will not be able to get the skills they 
need at a price they can afford, and lobby government to change 
the education system to provide more workers with the skills they 
require. Universities respond to this need by offering more, and 
more diverse, courses: but the extent of graduate unemployment, 
and the proportion of graduates forced into unpaid internships or 
low–skill jobs suggests that changes in university education alone 
do not meet the need. 
In a free market, falling automation costs and increasing 
competition for scarce jobs would eventually drive down low–
skilled wages to starvation levels, especially in countries that don’t 
have state safety nets. There could be starvation in those countries 
that have built their recent industrialisation on providing cheap 
labour for routine production jobs, as falling automation costs 
make even their low wages uncompetitive. But most Western 
governments have minimum wage legislation that sets a floor on 
wages. As the cost of automation fell, therefore, it would become 
uneconomic in developed countries to employ humans to do jobs 
that could be automated, even at minimum wage levels. We would 
expect this to show up as rising structural unemployment.
Some jobs will indeed disappear for ever. For example, assembly 
line workers are already a dying breed: tomorrow’s assembly 
lines will be remotely operated and require very little human 
intervention. Driverless cars and GPS may make taxi drivers 
obsolete. There may be very few manufacturing jobs in the future, 
and routine service jobs may largely disappear too (supermarket 
checkout operators, for example). 
Those whose skill sets are entirely oriented towards the jobs 
that are disappearing may find themselves both unemployed and 
unemployable. And there could be a lot of these people. As we 
have seen in the past when large dominant industries have died 
(the Sheffield steel industry springs to mind, but there are many 
other examples) it can be very hard for people to accept that their 
skills are no longer required, and retrain for work that is unfamiliar 
or they consider beneath them. 
In previous eras of technological change resulting in traditional 
jobs disappearing, there have been strikes, campaigns and 
lobbying aimed at preventing the technological changes taking 
hold. At the extreme there have been riots and destruction of the 
hated technologies. It is possible that robots could become the 
focus of such action. 
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Such social unrest is likely to elicit a government response. As 
medium– and low–skill jobs become scarcer, governments may 
provide explicit incentives to firms to employ people rather than 
automating. This would be regressive: history shows that in the 
long run, technological change always benefits people. Automation 
of production enabled families to survive without children’s labour, 
because the price of goods produced with the new machinery was 
so much lower than those produced in a more labour–intensive 
way. And automation of housework facilitated the entry of women 
to the workforce.
In the short term automation causes hardship, as people 
whose livelihoods depend on the old way of doing things lose 
their jobs: but in the longer term there is benefit to society in 
the reduced cost of goods that enable many people to work 
less, and in the development of new industries to employ those 
people no longer needed in the old ones. There is no reason to 
suppose that this time would be different. Legislation to prevent 
or limit technological change therefore would be short–sighted. 
An alternative might be for government to provide jobs for 
anyone who wants them, perhaps coupled with a softer line on 
benefits to enable people to do socially beneficial, creative and/or 
entrepreneurial things that don’t necessarily earn them a living. 
But mass unemployment – or mass starvation, in countries that 
don’t have safety nets – is not the only possible outcome of the era 
of automation. There is another way.
Automation itself does not deny people jobs. We are already 
used to using computers as tools to perform dull, long–winded 
and routine tasks. The office administrator does not lose her job 
because the computer is doing things she used to do: on the 
contrary, she becomes more productive because she is 
working in partnership with a computer. In aggregate 
that might mean that fewer office administrators are 
needed – though they are not likely to disappear 
completely. We are a very long way away from 
fully automated offices, and as workforces are 
increasingly dispersed around the world and 
linked by virtual networks, there may even be 
a greater need for people to manage and 
coordinate day–to–day business activities. 
Some jobs may simply change, rather 
than disappear.
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But the unexpected always happens, and 
humans are very much better at dealing with 
the unexpected and thinking up innovative 
solutions to problems than machines are. 
And this offers an exciting prospect. We do 
not have to compete with technology. We 
can work in partnership with it – and the 
result will be greater productivity and more 
innovation.
Working in partnership with machines, 
humans will have far more opportunity to use 
their creative and problem–solving capabilities 
than they do when most of their time is taken up doing boring 
routine jobs. A world where many employees are unhappy in their 
jobs is not as productive as it could be. Studies show that bored 
and unhappy people are less productive at work, more likely to 
take days off sick and more likely to retire early due to ill–health. If 
technological change can enable people to do things they enjoy, 
productivity should increase dramatically. 
Technology makes it easier to work. Technological advancements 
should increase the workforce, as people with health and disability 
problems are able to enter the workforce supported by assistive 
technology and a more flexible approach from employers to 
working hours and places. Many of these people will have skills that 
employers desperately need. It would be extremely short–sighted 
of employers to allow obsolete notions of how people ‘should’ 
work to deprive them of skilled people. Now that the internet 
makes it possible for people to communicate with each other 
instantaneously all over the world, ‘presentee–ism’ (if you aren’t in 
the office you aren’t working) and the standard 9 to 5 working day 
must become a thing of the past. For high–skilled people, virtual 
offices, international networks and flexible hours will become the 
new standard.
The importance of work for human dignity should not be 
underestimated. If technological advancement can make it possible 
for people to work who currently can’t, it is without question a 
good thing. But it is possible that the same technological advances 
that make it possible for high–skilled people with disabilities to 
work, may result in medium– and low–skilled people being unable 
to work. 
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So will technological advances lead to more jobs 
overall? Or will bifurcation of the labour market 
continue to the point where mass unemployment 
and/or starvation wages create social unrest? This 
depends on two things:
1. How willing people are to give up the 
expectation that work will be routine but 
secure, in favour of more exciting and 
innovative opportunities that carry the risk 
of failure.
2. How good the education system is at 
developing the technology–savvy people that will be needed in 
the future.
We are already seeing work becoming more uncertain. No–one 
now expects to leave school, go into a job and stay there until 
they retire, as was commonplace in the post–war generation. Most 
people expect to change jobs frequently during their working life, 
and increasingly people don’t just change their jobs, they change 
their careers, studying and retraining at various stages in their 
life as their interests, needs and opportunities change. Education, 
formerly regarded as a young person’s game (with maybe a 
second flush among the newly retired), is becoming a lifelong 
process. 
The nature of employment is changing, too. Traditional full–time 
jobs are declining, and there is substantial growth in part–time, 
temporary and self–employed work. Many people now rely on a 
portfolio of part–time, temporary and casual jobs to provide them 
with a sufficient income. The distinction between work and leisure 
is becoming increasingly blurred as people make money from 
hobbies and do socially beneficial work for nothing. 
We are perhaps seeing the beginning of a shift in attitude: instead 
of having a job, many people are using their skills creatively in a 
range of activities that collectively generate enough income to 
meet their needs….but are otherwise indistinguishable from other 
activities that are unpaid. 
The future will require people who are comfortable with 
technology. Because of this, there are calls for education to 
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emphasise maths, science, technology and engineering, at the 
expense, particularly, of the creative arts. This is extremely short–
sighted. Excellence in technological design requires artistic talent 
as well as scientific know–how.
Just as humans do not need to compete with robots, so the 
sciences do not need to compete with the arts. Both will be 
required to meet the needs of the technology–dominant society 
of the future. And play, currently undervalued both in primary 
and secondary education, must become a core part of education. 
Becoming really comfortable with both technology and the arts is 
best done through creative play. 
The humanities will also be important. Not everyone can design 
the technologies of the future. The future of work for many people 
lies in service industries. Education must help people develop 
social skills and emotional intelligence: community service may 
become part of mainstream education. The much maligned ‘media 
studies’ will grow in importance as communication technology 
becomes ever more dominant, shaping markets and creating 
demand for abundant products.
The ability to sell, already a skill for which employers will 
pay large amounts, will become even more important. Most 
controversial of all, the three Rs are about to become two. For 
most people, fluent reading and lucid writing will become far 
more important skills than arithmetic. Language studies, too, may 
become redundant as instantaneous translation removes the need 
for fluency in languages other than English.
Personal service will be an important growth area. People 
generally prefer to be served by a human being, at least for high–
value purchases, for personal care such as beauty treatments or 
hairdressing, and for sorting out problems. Mass–market offerings 
will be largely automated, but niche players will be able to charge a 
premium for personal service by a human being. Just as at present 
good sales skills command high salaries, so in the future, good 
social skills will command high salaries. Hand–crafted products 
may command higher prices than robot–produced ones, simply 
because they were lovingly produced by humans – especially if the 
sales offering also involves human service. 
For the time–poor, high–skilled, high–waged elite, the support of 
others is already essential to enable them to function and is likely 
to become even more so in the future. They may rely on robots to 
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clean their houses, do the gardening, walk the dog, manage their 
diaries and organise their childrens’ birthday parties – but it seems 
likely that most will prefer to have some human support, if only 
because it is likely to be seen as higher value. We may see a return 
to Victorian days, with a large proportion of people once more ‘in 
service’, as it used to be called: European statistics already show 
an increase in low–skilled employment in private households. 
It is women who have seized the initiative in the growing 
service industries, and it is probably fair to say that this has been 
encouraged by a common perception that women are better at the 
‘softer’ skills than men. Whether this is innate or simply a matter 
of cultural stereotyping and educational norms is debateable, and 
it seems likely that as time goes on we will discover whether the 
majority of men really can adapt to a more service–oriented work 
ethic.
At present too many men associate ‘work’ with 
‘making stuff’: it is these men who are most likely to 
suffer as ‘making stuff’ becomes the province of 
robots and they are unable or unwilling to adapt 
to work in service industries.
But there are already many men working in 
service industries. The counselling industry 
is dominated by women, but in the related 
world of psychotherapy there are a much 
greater number of men. Personal shoppers 
are almost all women, but a high proportion 
of personal trainers are men. Personal image 
consultancy is dominated by women, but 
motivational training is dominated by men such as 
Anthony Robbins. Massage is almost entirely women’s work, but in 
physiotherapy, osteopathy, chiropractic and Alexander Technique 
the balance is much more even. And increasingly, we pay others 
– still more women than men, though that is gradually changing 
– to care for those who can’t care for themselves. In so doing we 
recognise the value to society of both the carers and those cared 
for. 
Those who bewail the loss of the UK’s industrial base, sniff at 
service industries and think that only ‘making stuff’ is proper work, 
are living in the past. The fact is that the UK is already a service–
oriented economy. Over 75 per cent of UK GDP comes from 
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services, and it runs a substantial trade surplus in services. The 
UK’s strength in services positions the UK better for the future than 
economies in which jobs are more dependent on manufacturing. 
The future of work lies in social activity and caring for people, not 
‘making stuff’ that we can produce for nearly nothing with little 
human involvement.
We have a choice. We can continue with the ways of the past, 
competing with each other and with robots, valuing producing 
over caring, and insisting that everyone must produce in order 
to live. Or we can embrace the opportunities that technological 
changes bring, cooperating with robots and with each other to 
achieve more than we could individually, sharing work and its 
rewards equitably so that everyone has the means to live, and 
learning to recognise and reward activities that are currently 
unpaid and skills that are currently unrecognised. I hope we choose 
the path of change.
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POSSIBILITIES
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THE NEXT BIG THING(S) 
IN ROBOTICS
ALAN WINFIELD 
The second wave of robotics has started. The first wave 
got going around 50 years ago with industrial automation – 
exemplified by assembly line robots – the kind that build cars 
and washing machines. A hugely successful technology, first 
generation robots have revolutionised industrial and warehouse 
automation. And, more recently, first wave robotics technology 
has brought automation to the science lab – think of gene 
sequencing. There are few areas of human endeavour not touched 
by first wave robotics. From undersea exploration to robot 
milking machines, from robot surgery to space exploration, first 
generation robots are hugely sophisticated machines. 
But something even more exciting is happening. Now underway, 
the second wave represents a kind of Cambrian Explosion in 
robotics: an astonishing and bewildering exploration of new forms, 
functions and materials. This explosion of diversity means that 
it’s impossible to characterise the new wave as one kind of robot. 
Many are bio–inspired; together these comprise an extraordinary 
artificial zoo. Any prediction about which of these robot forms 
will successfully evolve to become mainstream is more or less 
impossible.
One thing we can be sure of is that second wave robots will 
be working with people, up close and personal. This contrasts 
with their first wave ancestors that, by and large, are dangerous 
for humans. In the vanguard of this second wave are workplace 
assistant robots like Baxter. This robot doesn’t need to be behind a 
safety cage. Sharing a human workspace, Baxter acts as helper and 
co–worker.
Second wave robots will be networked (no surprise there), made 
of very different kinds of stuff (I’ll have more to say about this 
later), and smarter – although not as smart as some would have 
you believe. 
They will also be ethical. The way we think about robots will be 
different. As a society we will need to decide what robots should 
not do; a good example of how this is already happening is the 
current debate over autonomous robot weapons. We will expect 
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our robots to understand us better, and to behave ethically – even if 
that means a robot occasionally does not do what we ask of it.
Having set out the landscape I will now attempt the 
very thing I claimed impossible: prediction. 
So, with a health warning, here are a 
few areas that I suspect will be very 
significant in the near future.
WEARABLE ROBOTS
Wearable robotics is one of the most exciting current 
developments in robotics – and one that could move from lab to 
real–world application within the next five to ten years. Wearable 
robots are not new – they’ve been around for a while in the guise 
of exo–skeletons, often intended for military applications. However, 
a new generation of wearable robots is beginning to exploit new 
materials and better human–robot interfaces. These wearables 
will, I think, bring huge benefits for the disabled, elderly or those 
recovering from orthopaedic surgery.
40  OUR WORK HERE IS DONE. Visions of a robot economy
 Part 2. Technological possibilities
Wheelchair users, for example, 
experience all kinds of access 
problems, as well as the disadvantage 
of not being eye–to–eye with other 
adults. Imagine instead a simple 
wearable strap–on leg–chair. Light and 
self–powered, the leg–chair (the Right 
Trousers?) senses when its user wants to 
stand up and, well, stands up. Learning from 
its user while continuously adapting to their 
capabilities the leg–chair senses when they want to stand, 
walk, run for the bus, do cartwheels (well, why not..?), or any of 
the things most of us take for granted. Then makes it so, safely and 
intuitively.
An example wearable robot from the Bristol Robotics Lab is the 
hand exo–skeleton, designed as a rehabilitation aid for people 
who have lost hand function because of a stroke. Made from 3D 
printed plastic parts, the exo–hand senses the finger movements 
of its wearer and very gently adds a little extra power to those 
movements, thus reinforcing the user’s efforts and – over time – 
helps to restore lost hand function. This is just a one–off prototype 
to prove the principle but it provides a wonderful illustration of the 
potential of wearable robotics.
IMMERSIVE TELEOPERATED ROBOTS
Teleoperated robots are the unloved poor relations of intelligent 
autonomous robots. Neither intelligent nor autonomous, they 
are nevertheless successful and important first wave robots; 
think of remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) engaged in undersea 
exploration or oil–well repair and maintenance. Think also of off–
world exploration: the Mars rovers are hugely successful – the rock 
stars of teleoperated robots. 
I think teleoperated robots need to be brought in from the cold 
and reinvented for the second wave. Anyone who has teleoperated 
a robot in real–world applications knows it is headache–inducingly 
frustrating; peering at a screen (or even worse, at three) with 
low–resolution images and viewpoints that make making sense 
of where the robot is and what it should be doing is next to 
impossible. It’s no surprise that skilled robot teleoperators are hard 
to find. Immersive human–robot interfaces will, I think, change all 
of this.
41OUR WORK HERE IS DONE. Visions of a robot economy
Part 2. Technological possibilities
Roboticists are good at appropriating technologies or devices 
developed for other applications and putting them to good use 
in robotics: look at WiFi, mobile phone cameras and the Kinnect. 
There are encouraging signs that immersive Virtual Reality (VR) 
is about to become a practical, workable proposition. Of course 
VR’s big market is video games – but VR could revolutionise 
teleoperated robotics. 
Imagine a teleoperated robot with a pan–tilt camera linked to 
the remote operator’s VR headset, so that every time she moves 
her head to look in a new direction the robot’s camera moves 
in sync; so she sees and hears what the robot sees and hears in 
immersive high–definition stereo. Of course the reality experienced 
by the robot’s operator is real, not virtual, but the head mounted 
VR technology is the key to making it work. Add haptic gloves for 
control and the robot’s operator has an intuitive and immersive 
interface with the robot.
DRIVERLESS CARS
Nearly–driverless cars are already a reality. Buy a certain top of 
the range Mercedes and it will be equipped with automatic lane 
control, called Intelligent Drive. It’s like cruise control except that 
the car can also keep its position in the centre of the lane – on the 
autobahn – while also checking and adjusting its speed to maintain 
a safe distance behind the vehicle in front. While in intelligent drive 
mode this car is doing what autonomous mobile robots do: using 
its sensors to continuously monitor its immediate environment, 
analysing all the sensory data, then using its control system to 
decide how to adjust the car’s steering, accelerator and braking 
systems according to a set of rules for safe motorway driving.
Sounds wonderful (if you can afford a top of the range Merc)? 
Well no. The problem is that while the car is in intelligent drive 
mode you can’t read a book, or watch TV, or check your emails. 
That would illegal. This is because even though the car is probably 
better and safer than you on the motorway, you are still in charge. 
In fact the car will warn you if you take your hands off the steering 
wheel for longer than ten seconds. The law demands that you 
watch the road and continuously monitor the situation so that you 
can take over in a second. If there’s an accident it is you who is 
responsible, not the car.
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This illustrates the current problem with driverless cars. The 
technology exists and is pretty well road tested. Contrary to 
popular opinion Google didn’t invent the driverless car. Europe has 
a long history of driverless car research – nearly 20 years ago a 
research group at University BW Munich demonstrated a Mercedes 
500 driving from Munich to Denmark on regular roads, at up to 180 
km/h, with surprisingly little manual driver intervention – about 5 
per cent. The 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge showed driverless cars 
coping pretty well with cluttered urban environments, complete 
with other cars behaving unexpectedly, bicycles, street furniture 
and so on. 
So the technology exists and, in a limited form, you can buy 
it now. The problem of driverless cars has shifted from one of 
engineering and technology, to one of legislation and insurance 
– as well as the human factors of how we all adjust and get used 
to roads on which some cars (initially most of them) are manually 
driven, and others driverless (with occupants who are really not 
paying attention to the road). There is no significant technical 
reason why, in five to ten years, an elderly person without a driving 
licence couldn’t have a small car that takes her from home to the 
local shop to pick up groceries, then on to a friend’s house for tea, 
perfectly safely and automatically.
SOFT ROBOTICS
Soft robotics, as the name implies, is concerned with making 
robots soft and compliant. It’s a new discipline that already has 
its own journal, but not yet a Wikipedia page. Soft robots would 
be soft on the inside as well as the outside – so even the fur 
covered Paro robot is not a soft robot. Soft robotics research is 
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about developing new soft, smart materials for both actuation 
and sensing, ideally within the same material. Soft robots have the 
huge advantage over conventional stiff metal and plastic robots, 
of being light and, well, soft. For robots designed to interact with 
humans that’s a huge advantage because it makes the robot 
intrinsically much safer. 
Soft robotics research is still at the exploratory stage, so there are 
not yet preferred materials and approaches. In the Bristol Robotics 
lab we are exploring several avenues, one is electroactive polymers 
(EAPs) for artificial muscles; another is the bio–mimetic 3D printed 
flexible artificial whisker. A third approach makes use of shape 
memory alloys to actuate octopus–like limbs, as demonstrated in 
the EU OCTOPUS project. One of the most unlikely, but promising, 
approaches exploits fluid–solid phase changes in ground coffee to 
make a soft gripper: the Jaeger–Lipson coffee balloon gripper.
Unlike the three application domains I have outlined above – 
wearable robotics, immersive teleoperated robots and driverless 
cars – soft robotics is a new underpinning technology. A huge 
number of types of robots will benefit from soft, smart materials 
– including the wearable robots described above. One of the 
reasons we need soft, light materials is that robots designed to 
work closely with humans need, above all, to be safe. A way to 
make then intrinsically safe is by making the robot soft, light and 
compliant – so even if the robot were to fall on you it would do 
no more damage than if a young child fell on you. One effect of 
soft robotics is that many future robots will look very different: 
less mechanical and more organic. Most robots in research labs 
are already 3D printed rather than machined from metal; next 
generation 3D printers will enable us to print soft robots. 
WHAT’S NOT COMING SOON
Some will be surprised that I have not written about robot 
intelligence here, apart from suggesting that the second wave of 
robots will be smarter than the first. My omission is deliberate, and 
there are two reasons.
The first is that robot intelligence still has a very long way to go 
before the science fiction dream of android robots with human–
like AI – like Data from Star Trek, or Bicentennial Man – become 
a reality. Some are predicting that human–equivalent AI is only a 
few decades away, and if you believe the hype, once that point 
is reached all bets are off. Some believe this event – which they 
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call the singularity – will usher in a new utopia in which super–
intelligent machines will solve the world’s problems. Others are 
equally convinced that super–intelligent AI poses an existential risk 
to humanity; AI, they declare portentously, will be humanity’s final 
invention. The utopians and dystopians are equally wrong, in my 
view, both about how long it will take to build machines as smart 
as humans, and the question of what will happen after that. 
The reason making really intelligent machines will take a 
long time is because it is a very hard problem. We don’t even 
understand what intelligence is – only that it is not one thing that 
humans or animals have more or less of. Nor do we yet understand 
how intelligence works in animals and humans; to paraphrase a 
famous SF short story, we don’t know how meat can think. But 
the good news, and this is my second reason for not promoting 
super–intelligent robots in this article, is that there is truly massive 
potential for really interesting and hugely useful smarter – but 
still not very smart – robots. It is a myth that robotics is somehow 
waiting for a breakthrough in AI before its true potential can be 
realised.
My predicted things that will be really big in robotics don’t 
need to be super intelligent. Wearable robots will need advanced 
adaptive (and very safe and reliable) control systems, as well as 
advanced neural–electronics interfaces, and these are coming. 
But ultimately it’s the human wearing the robot who is in charge. 
The same is true for teleoperated robots: again, greater low–level 
intelligence is needed, so that the robot can operate autonomously 
some of the time but ask for help when it can’t figure out what 
to do next (which we call dynamic autonomy). But the high–level 
intelligence remains with the human operator and – with advanced 
immersive interfaces as I have suggested – human and robot work 
together seamlessly. The most autonomous of the next big things 
in robotics is the driverless car, but again the car doesn’t need 
to be very smart. You don’t need to debate 
philosophy with your car – just trust it to take 
you safely from A to B.
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AUTOMATIC FOR  
THE PEOPLE
NICK HAWES 
A robot is a machine which automates a 
physical task. By identifying tasks which 
could be automatically performed by a 
machine, many traditional manufacturing 
industries have been able to use robots 
to improve the performance of their 
production lines. Once a task can be 
done by a robot you are able to rely on 
that task being done to a predictable 
level of quality for as long as it’s required. 
Industrial robots – the kinds of robots 
typically used in manufacturing – are built 
with this kind of predictability in mind: they 
are designed to repeat a fixed series of 
movements with sub–millimetre 
precision, enabling them to manipulate 
complex assembly parts in exactly the 
right way.
This level of precision and 
predictability is only made possible 
by placing industrial robots in highly 
regimented environments: environments where every grommet 
and widget lies in a known position and the movements of robots, 
conveyor belts and other devices are tightly synchronised. By 
knowing the position of everything in the environment, robot 
engineers can program the movements of industrial robots such 
that they can act out the correct behaviour time and again, without 
having to worry about checking whether anything in the world has 
changed.
BEYOND THE FACTORY FLOOR
Whilst this level of engineering and organisation is impressive, 
its use is strictly limited to the kinds of applications where such 
extreme levels of control can be put into place. And whilst the 
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first wave of robots (industrial robots) could be confined to 
controlled environments, the future robot economy is predicted to 
be largely driven by service robots, robots which work for humans 
or with humans outside of the world of industrial automation. The 
application areas targeted by service robot developers include 
care, security, logistics, cleaning, and many other domains where 
robots would be required to work in the ever–changing worlds 
occupied by humans going about their day–to–day routines. It 
will be impossible, or at least extremely impractical, to exercise 
industrial levels of control in these environments. Therefore, if 
we want robots to work in these applications, we must apply a 
different kind of technology.
Industrial robots exploit controlled environments to blindly repeat 
fixed actions, ignorant of their consequences. Contrary to this, 
service robots must be aware of their environment (and more), 
and use this awareness to decide how to perform their actions. 
In artificial intelligence (AI) and 
robotics, we refer to a system which 
can control its own future actions in 
this way as autonomous. Although 
autonomy in near–future service 
robots may be limited to just the way 
a robot is able choose its own route to 
drive through a building, or when to stop to 
avoid a human walking in its path, creating any 
kind of autonomous robot poses a significant 
range of challenges. As the ability for scientists 
and engineers to overcome these challenges 
is central to the development of a new robot 
economy, and the nature of possible solutions 
limit the abilities future robots will have, it 
pays to investigate the main elements of an 
autonomous system further.
SENSE, PLAN, ACT
To understand what is required to build an autonomous robot, 
imagine you’ve been asked to develop a wheeled robot that can 
cross a road. The industrial robotics approach would be to ensure 
there are times when no cars, or other dangers or obstacles, are 
present on the road (by installing a level crossing for example). 
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The challenge of building an autonomous robot that is capable 
of crossing a road can be broken down into three parts. First, the 
robot must be physically able to cross the road. In this case we 
will assume that our robot can drive from kerb to kerb, controlling 
its speed as it goes, and also monitoring its position on the road 
(an ability known in robotics as localisation). In many ways this is 
the easiest part of the problem as it relies mostly on traditional 
engineering and robotics technology. The harder parts must come 
before the driving starts. In order for the robot to cross safely, it 
must decide when it should start driving. This decision should be 
based on whether the robot thinks it is safe to do drive across 
the road or not, considering both its own safety and that of other 
road users. Crossing the road safely means leaving a suitable gap 
between the crosser and the traffic on the road. Therefore the final 
part of this challenge is to get the robot to sense where the traffic 
is in order to inform the decision about when to cross.
Before exploring the difficulties inherent in this problem in more 
detail, let’s first extract the key parts of this problem. First the 
robot must sense the traffic and its surroundings (e.g. its location 
on the road), next it must decide when or whether to cross, then it 
must act based on this decision (the actual crossing of the road). 
This sense–decide–act cycle is commonly used to encapsulate the 
capabilities any autonomous system must possess (where ‘decide’ 
may sometimes be replaced with ‘plan’ or ‘process’). However, 
the structure of this cycle should not be interpreted too literally. 
For example, a great many robotic tasks blur the boundaries 
between sensing, decision making and action (e.g. using feedback 
from a camera to get a robotic manipulator closer to an object 
for grasping), and the notion of a fixed cycle belies how real 
autonomous systems are typically implemented (with many 
different processes active in parallel and operating at different 
rates).
Returning to the road crossing robot, let us look into the 
component tasks in more detail. As the problem of driving across 
the road relies on relatively well–understood engineering, let us 
ignore it for now. Central to the rest of the system is the decision 
making problem of if and when the robot should leave the safety 
of the kerb and start crossing the road. Assuming this decision 
is made in a way that is similar to the way humans appear to do 
it, then the robot must examine the locations and speeds of the 
approaching traffic and determine if it can move from one side of 
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the road to the other in a gap between vehicles. This is the kind of 
problem that calculus, and computers excel at, so assuming that 
the robot has all the information it needs (and we shall see later 
on that this is a big assumption), it should be able to correctly 
determine when to start driving across the road. 
In order to populate the memory of the robot with the 
information it needs to perform these calculations, we must 
provide some method which allows the robot to sense (or more 
accurately, perceive) the position and velocity of any vehicle 
which could possibly reach the robot during crossing. Robots use 
a variety of sensors, but most measure the distance between the 
robot and the contents of its environment using either reflected 
light (e.g. laser) or sound (e.g. sonar). The main exception to this is 
the use of cameras to obtain images of the world around the robot. 
The sensing of distance values, or light frequencies and intensities, 
is the easiest part of this process. The harder part is to interpret 
these measurements in order to perceive what is implied by these 
measurements. In our example, this translates to enabling the 
robot to use a rapidly obtained series of 2D or 3D measurements 
to determine the locations of all the vehicles around it. There are 
many cues a robot could use (shape, size, presence on the road, 
motion, colour etc.), but few would reliably recognise all the 
possible vehicles our robot may encounter. More critically, all of 
these sensors suffer from occlusion, that is that if something gets 
between the robot and the target it is trying to sense, then that 
target effectively disappears (just like when someone steps in front 
of you when you’re trying to take a photo of something important). 
This means that many of important features of the road may not 
be visible to the robot at any given instance of time. For example, 
what appears to be one car may actually be two, or the presence 
of a slow moving lorry may mask the approach of a fast moving 
motorbike. 
CERTAINLY UNCERTAIN
In robotics and AI we would say that these perceptual limitations 
mean that the robot is reasoning under incomplete information, i.e. 
some important information is missing from its decision–making 
problem. Problems with incomplete information in robotics are 
almost universally recast as problems where reasoning occurs 
under uncertainty, where the robot represents, for example, 
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the probability that its laser reading contains one car, two cars, 
or one lorry and a motorbike (e.g. with probabilities of 0.6, 
0.3 and 0.1 respectively). This makes the decision–making task 
considerably harder, as the robot must consider all of these 
different possibilities, and the likelihood of them occurring, when 
making its crossing decision. It is due to reasons like this that many 
researchers consider perception to be the main problem holding 
back to development of useful autonomous service robots. But 
it is also the case that large advances in probabilistic reasoning 
techniques in recent years have enabled commensurate progress in 
robotics.
Perceptual difficulties are not the only source of uncertainty in 
the decision–making task for crossing the road. The robot must 
predict the future locations of the vehicles it has perceived, in 
order to work out in advance of the vehicles being in the position 
they will occupy when it will start crossing, whether it can cross 
safely or not. To do this it must have some kind of predictive model 
of vehicle behaviour. This model could be simple (e.g. predicting 
that all vehicles travel at the speed they were last observed at) or 
could contain whatever complexity the robot designer deems fit 
(e.g. modelling the behaviour of drivers when they spot our robot 
waiting to cross the road). Regardless of its contents, the success 
of our road–crossing robot hinges on how well its models correctly 
predict the future behaviour of vehicles. If they work well, then 
the robot can safely use them to determine when to cross. If they 
predict badly, then either the robot will waste time frozen on a 
kerb, or it will risk being reduced 
to a pile of nuts and bolts making 
a crossing which it predicts 
should be safe, but is not in reality. 
Hopefully this conveys the problem 
of developing an autonomous robot 
to operate in a world populated by 
other entities – also autonomous – 
which it cannot fully perceive or predict. 
The road–crossing problem is purposefully 
simple, but it gives rise to complexity once 
the details are examined. In order to really 
build a road–crossing robot you would need 
to explore the task in even greater detail 
(for example, addressing questions such 
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as how long should the robot 
think before deciding, how can 
you add the highway code to the 
robot’s models, how the sound 
of approaching cars can 
augment their appearance) 
and consider important 
variations of the problem 
(e.g. how do different weather 
conditions influence things, or 
what if the robot had an urgent 
need to cross the road – e.g. to 
put out a fire – that may cause 
it to behave in a riskier manner). 
If you’d like to stretch yourself 
further, why not try to imagine how 
you’d build a robot that could a) learn 
to cross the road better (faster, more safely etc.), b) teach (human) 
children how to cross the road, or c) design roads such that they 
could be safely crossed by other robots.
ROBOTS IN THE WILD
Two challenges: enable these parts to solve the problems that 
face them in the world (somewhat traditional AI) and also combine 
them into a single working system. This is where the new wave of 
robotic and AI is coming in.
Now we have a rough idea of challenges that confront the 
creators of the next revolution in robotics, we can ask where 
progress needs to be made in order for us to really see robots 
in our places of work. In general, efforts need to be made in two 
areas: components and systems. The components are the parts 
of a robot’s software or hardware that contribute some element 
of functionality to the overall system. From our example above, 
this could be a software component that detects cars in laser 
scans, estimates the future positions of cars given a prior car 
detection, or the decision–making component that calculates 
the probability of making a successful crossing at a point in 
time in the future. Researchers in AI and robotics are working 
on many problems similar to these, and will inevitably make 
much progress in the coming years. However, these fields are 
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notoriously reductionist. This is understandable since the problem 
of creating an (intelligent) autonomous system to perform even a 
simple task in the real world can be alarmingly complex. However, 
this reductionist approach means that most bits of science that 
would naturally contribute components to autonomous robots 
make simplifying assumptions which are not true when placed 
in a robot in the real world. For example, the field of AI planning 
which studies which actions an autonomous system should take to 
achieve a goal typically ignores the fact that the world can change 
independently of the system (including as it plans), and the field 
of computer vision (which is naturally placed to enable robots 
to understand the world through cameras) predominantly works 
in the two dimensions of a single imagine, ignoring that robots 
will need to care about both what an object is and where it is. In 
robotics, the technologies for creating maps which a robot can 
then use to navigate with have long assumed that they are creating 
maps of unchanging worlds, despite most environments rarely 
remaining unchanged (at some level) from day to day.
To overcome such assumptions, it is therefore crucial that more 
time and effort is spent creating complete autonomous robot 
systems, rather than building ever more elaborate (but potentially 
flawed) components. This will naturally come about as more 
industries look for service robot solutions and find the existing 
component technologies lacking. It is also happening more in 
academia thanks to large–scale robotics science funding from the 
European Commission who are placing an increasingly significant 
emphasis on complete (integrated) robot systems operating in real 
world (instead of laboratory) environments. 
WHERE NEXT
The challenges inherent in creating autonomous robots will 
naturally shape their development, uptake and use. You can 
already buy an autonomous robot to cut your lawn and a different 
one to sweep your floor, but you can’t buy one that does both. 
This is because these tasks require both different robot bodies 
and different robot brains, and we are a very long way away from 
creating a single robot which can do a range of things with the 
same hardware and software setup. The service robot industry will 
grow along the same lines as the domestic robot industry: special 
purpose systems capable of doing a single task autonomously. 
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Humanoid robots present an alternative viewpoint from this, as 
their form is such that they could physically perform a range 
of tasks similar to that of a human, but they still require control 
software to enable each task. In some ways, this potentially makes 
a humanoid robot a sensible investment, providing such software 
exists. This is the exact conundrum faced by potential purchasers 
of the Rethink Robotics Baxter robot, although this is supposed to 
be alleviated by programming by demonstration.
The tasks near–future service robots will do will be shaped by 
a mixture of their capabilities and the economics of their use. In 
terms of capabilities, variation is the enemy of autonomy. The less 
variable an environment or task is, the less effort it is (relatively 
speaking) to create an autonomous system to successfully perform 
in that environment or to reliably, repeatedly complete that task. 
Consider the difference between creating a road–crossing robot 
that only needs to cross cul–de–sacs on housing estates, and one 
that must cross any road a human might have need to cross (town 
high streets, winding country lanes etc.). Similarly, imagine a robot 
which must clean the corridors of a hospital. One which must only 
clean predominantly empty corridors (say at night) will be easier to 
create than one that must also operate during peak hours cleaning 
up spillages on demand. 
In terms of economics (but still within the constraints of 
capabilities), the tasks near–future service robots will perform 
must be such that the benefit of performing them repeatedly and 
predictably (as robotic automation affords) exceeds the cost of 
the investment in the robotic technology. Therefore applications 
where the first autonomous service robots will appear are those 
where the scale of the task provides this value (e.g. cleaning the 
floors in a large chain of fast food restaurants; security patrols in 
government or large corporate offices; warehouse logistics in large 
distribution chains) or it comes more directly from the value of the 
task itself (as in high–value manufacturing). 
In conclusion, when heading into our robot–supported future, it 
is important to be aware of the importance of autonomy–enabling 
software in allowing robots to work in human environments, even if 
the tasks they perform are limited at first. It will also be important 
for the public at large to be aware of the challenges in generating 
reliable autonomous behaviour in robots, as it is these challenges, 
more than anything, that will shape their performance and their 
impact on our society.
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THINKING WITH  
ROBOTS: THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF EARLY  
AUTOMATA
E. R. TRUITT 
Robots permeate our modern lives. Robots help us perform 
surgery, build cars, explore space, and clean house. Non–fiction 
and fiction authors sketch out our futures with robots, from 
David Levy’s Love and Sex with Robots (Harper, 2008) to 
Daniel H. Wilson’s Robopocalypse (Doubleday, 2011). Films and 
television explore our complicated relationships with artificial 
people: as exemplars of humanity in Battlestar Galactica and 
Blade Runner, as substitutes for interpersonal connection in 
Robot and Frank, and as comparands to the faceless workers 
of global capitalism in Metropolis. We use robots to undertake 
different kinds of work: to replace or augment human labour 
and to imagine new forms of human behavior, to evoke socially 
appropriate emotional responses, and to demonstrate important 
cultural boundaries. Yet robots — self–moving, artificial objects 
— have been contemporary for a very long time. These objects, 
sometimes called automata, appear as silent metal guardians, 
talking statues, and lifelike birds in narrative texts and courtly 
pageantry throughout the ancient, medieval, and early modern 
periods. In these eras automata perform utilitarian functions, just 
as they do now, but their more abiding purpose was to model 
or enforce social norms of behavior, political power, or personal 
relationships.
From their first appearance in ancient culture, robots have 
been imagined and built to serve humanity. Some of the earliest 
examples come from The Iliad. According to Homer, Haphaestus 
forged twenty servants, mounted on wheels, to serve the gods 
on Mount Olympus. He also made two golden handmaidens, 
endowed with speech, thought, and action; these assisted him 
in his workshop. Artificial handmaidens appear later in tenth and 
eleventh–century Sanskrit literature: they serve wine and spray 
perfumed water from their eyes, nipples, and fingernails. There 
is some evidence to suggest that the authors of these Sanskrit 
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romances may have drawn their descriptions of mechanical female 
attendants from actual courtly objects. Certainly the technical 
knowledge needed to make these objects was already available 
in nearby parts of the world. Al–Jazari, an engineer and courtier 
to the Urtuqid rulers of Diyar–Bekr in the early thirteenth century, 
wrote a treatise on automaton making that included a detailed 
design for a female wine servant. Al–Jazari based his Book of 
Ingenious Mechanical Contrivances on the ninth–century Book 
of Mechanical Devices by the Banu Musa, a family of scholars 
and engineers based in Baghdad. Al–Jazari’s design was of a 
female figure, over a meter high, mounted on an inclined plane 
and under a domed reservoir. The reservoir would be filled with 
wine, which trickled at a steady rate from the reservoir into a 
basin below. Once the wine in the basin reached a certain level, 
the weight would cause the basin to tip and pour the wine into 
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the wineglass in the girl’s hand. Once the wineglass was full, the 
additional weight caused the figure to roll down the inclined plane 
toward the drinker, with the wineglass offered in her outstretched 
hand. In her other hand, she held an embroidered cloth, which 
she offered to the drinker to wipe his mouth, once he lifted the 
wineglass. Just over a century later, in the mid–fourteenth century, 
European artisans began to design elaborate musical fountains 
that dispensed wine or scented water, and these were often 
incorporated into royal and noble feasts as part of the pageantry of 
aristocratic largesse.
Scientists also designed and created artificial objects to perform 
calculations, including calculations about the passage of time. 
The Antikythera Mechanism (ca. 80 BCE), likely the only surviving 
automaton from the ancient period, was a programmable machine 
about the size of a laptop. It contained numerous precise gears 
that modeled and indicated celestial movements, and may have 
been used to predict astronomical events, such as eclipses. In areas 
such as Syria and Persia, where the Greek intellectual tradition 
continued uninterrupted, astronomical calculation and timekeeping 
remained important. After the Arabic conquests of the seventh and 
eighth centuries brought these areas under Muslim political control, 
the functions of timekeeping and calculation were often combined 
with automata. In the early ninth century, the ‘Abbasid caliph Harun 
al–Rashid sent from Baghdad to Charlemagne at Aachen a water 
clock (clepsydra) with multiple moving figures. The clock was 
made of brass, and sounded the hours  
...with the right number of little bronze balls, which would 
fall into a basin and make it ring. (This clock) also had the 
same number of horsemen, and they would, through twelve 
windows, come forth at the end of the hours. With the force 
of their exit they would close the proper number of windows, 
which had before been open.
The clepsydra with the metal horsemen is only one example of a 
time–telling device with moving figures. A few centuries later, in the 
mid–twelfth century, the emir of Damascus, Nur al–Din ibn Zangi 
(ca. 1118–1174), commissioned a massive clepsydra for the eastern 
entrance to the Great Mosque of Damascus. A larger version of 
Harun al–Rashid’s gift, the clock face contained twelve doors with 
openings at either end; through each of these a bird appeared 
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above a basin. The birds marked the hours by dropping pellets into 
the vessel below. Above the doors a series of discs represented 
the solar and lunar cycles. Many of these features also appear in 
al–Jazari’s slightly later design for the ‘Castle Clock’. Over eleven 
feet high, the clock was a complicated astronomical calculator 
and time–keeping machine. It displayed the positions of the stars, 
marked the journey the sun across the ecliptic, and demonstrated 
the phases of the moon. The clock signaled the hours of the day 
via twelve apertures with small human figures inside them, and 
mechanical falcons that dropped balls into glass bowls to sound 
the hours. The clock also had several musical figures attached to it: 
two drummers, two trumpeters, and a cymbalist. A few centuries 
later, in Latin Christendom, the invention of the mechanical 
escapement, a more accurate way of marking the passage of time, 
led to the proliferation of monumental astronomical clocks—huge 
machines that were powered by massive falling weight drives, 
and often installed in wealthy churches. These clocks performed 
complicated astronomical calculations and represented the orderly 
movements of the heavens. The falling weight drives provided 
enough power for multiple trains of automata: roosters to crow 
every hour, mechanical bell–ringers, and religious figures, such as 
the Virgin Mary or Jesus, to embody the concurrent timeline of 
human salvation.
Objects like Harun al–Rashid’s clepsydra and al–Jazari’s 
handmaiden did more than tell time or pour wine. They 
demonstrated the power and wealth of the prince or sovereign, 
and they were intended to evoke wonder, amazement, desire, and 
also some fear. As early as the start of the Common Era, the rulers 
of Alexandria used large mechanical figures in public processions, 
festivals, and other elements of ritual and statecraft. Later, in the 
ninth century, just a few decades after Harun al–Rashid sent his 
gift to Charlemagne, the ‘Abbasid caliph al–Mam’un installed in 
one of his palaces an artificial tree, with gold and silver branches, 
and ornamented with mechanical musical birds. In the early tenth 
century, a Byzantine diplomat to the ‘Abbasid court described the 
‘Palace of the Tree’, as it was called, and marveled at the mimetic 
exactitude and rich beauty of the artificial birds that sang on its 
branches. This diplomat, Romanos Lekapenos, went on to become 
the Byzantine emperor several years later. And just a few decades 
after Lekapenos’ visit to Baghdad, a Latin diplomat in the mid–
tenth century, Liudprand of Cremona, described the elaborate 
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automata and apparatus of majesty at the court of the Byzantine 
Emperor in Magnaura Palace in Constantinople. The emperor’s 
magnificent throne and the automata that surrounded it recall the 
automata of ‘Abbasid pageantry, with a few additions. According 
to Liudprand, the emperor sat on the Throne of Solomon next 
to a bronze and gilt tree, “whose branches were filled with birds, 
also made of gilded bronze, which uttered different cries, each 
according to its varying species.” Massive mechanical lions flanked 
the throne, and at his approach the lions thrashed their tails, 
opened their mouths, and roared. And when Liudprand glanced 
up after his prostrations before the throne, he discovered that it 
had risen up to the ceiling and that the emperor, seated on the 
throne, had changed his clothing. The pageantry and spectacle of 
the Byzantine court was intended to convey the importance of the 
emperor as the divinely anointed ruler and to intimidate his visitors. 
Liudprand, the wily courtier, assures his reader, “I was neither 
terrified nor surprised, for I had previously made enquiry about all 
these things from people who were well–acquainted with them.” 
Mechanical objects were not incorporated into courtly spectacle 
in western Europe until the fourteenth century. The Valois kings of 
France, the dukes of Burgundy, and the crowned heads of England 
and Spain all used mechanical objects as part of their pageantry, 
and for different purposes. Some of the items, like lavish musical 
wine fountains, recall their earlier Greek and Arabic counterparts. 
Others, like the mechanical golden angel that crowned Richard II 
of England during his coronation procession through London in 
1377, operated on multiple symbolic levels. The angel, built by the 
Worshipful Company of London Goldsmiths, lowered the crown 
onto Richard’s head during a stop on his progress through Chepe, 
the center of the goldsmiths’ trade. The angel demonstrated to the 
onlookers that Richard’s right to rule as king came directly from 
God. Yet it also embodied the economic power of the goldsmiths 
in London, without whose support Richard could not hope to 
rule. Still other kinds of objects were intended for education and 
entertainment at royal banquets. 
At a feast to celebrate the coronation of the wife of Ferdinand 
I of Aragon in 1414, theatrical machinery was used as part of the 
entertainment. A device called a cloud, which worked by concealed 
mechanisms, descended from the ceiling to amaze the guests. 
During the feast, the figure of Death appeared in the cloud and 
captured a jester named Borra and hanged him. A witness wrote, 
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“You would not believe the racket Borra made, 
weeping and expressing his terror, and as he was 
pulled up he urinated into his underclothes, 
and the urine fell on the heads of 
those below. He was quite convinced 
he was being carried off to Hell. The 
King marveled at this and was greatly 
amused, as were all the others.” Poor Borra. 
His unfeigned terror highlighted the astonishing 
and sometimes frightening aspect of mechanical 
marvels, yet his discomfort and ignorance only 
added to the amusement of the guests at the feast. 
The most famous example of machinery deployed 
in the service of spectacle and Schadenfreude is found at the 
Burgundian castle of Hesdin in the fifteenth century. Since the early 
fourteenth century, the estate had contained an elaborate pleasure 
garden with an artificial lake, a pavilion with a mechanically 
gesticulating king, six artificial monkeys that made gestures, and an 
elaborate fountain that looked like a tree with gilded, musical birds 
on its branches. The ‘engines of amusement,’ as they were called 
in the estate’s record books, fell into disrepair during the Hundred 
Years’ War. They were sumptuously renovated, refurbished, and 
updated in the 1430s by Philip ‘The Good’ III, Duke of Burgundy. 
Because the duchy comprised several distinct geographic 
territories and lacked a common language, Philip employed 
spectacle and an imposing court as a way to bind together the 
disparate territories under his rule and create a sense of shared 
aristocratic culture. He kept a sumptuous and formal court, which 
was noted for its extravagance, and he employed numerous artists 
and artisans—jewelers, painters, sculptors, and carpenters—to 
create the ostentatious and inventive feasts and spectacles that 
marked his rule. Once he ascended to the dukedom, Philip spent 
well over a thousand pounds—an incredible fortune in today’s 
economy—re–plumbing the fountains, re–gilding the birds, and 
re–pelting the monkeys. He also installed an entirely new ‘Gallery 
of Delights’: a sort of fun–house in which unwary courtiers would 
be pummeled, mocked, sprayed with dirt and flour, and soaked 
with water. Many of the objects in the Gallery were intended both 
to subvert courtly norms of etiquette and to uphold them. As part 
of the formality of his court, Philip usually dressed in all black—a 
product of the most expensive dyes—and required his courtiers to 
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wear elaborate and richly coloured costumes, which highlighted 
his own understated clothing. Trick mirrors were set throughout 
the gallery, and the courtier’s usual concern for appearance was 
counter–productive; the more care for attire and coiffure, the 
greater the upset to dignity. Adding insult to injury, some of the 
mirrors would also cover with flour the person standing before it. 
The automata in the gallery and park at Hesdin underscored 
the formality of the ducal court by disrupting it in a controlled 
setting. For example, a mechanical figure told everyone that the 
duke commanded that they leave the gallery. Those who hurried 
to obey the duke’s command were pushed off a bridge and beaten 
by other figures armed with sticks. Those who tried to choose 
self–preservation over the rules of precedence were sprayed with 
water. And all through the gallery, close to ground level, were 
concealed jets that, at the duke’s command, would “wet the ladies 
from below.” As with all marvels, reaction to the devices depended 
on perspective. If one, such as the duke or an experienced courtier, 
was in on the tricks, then the automata were not terrifying; they 
were, instead, amusing and entertaining. In this way the ‘engines’ 
at Hesdin are very similar to the Throne of Solomon encountered 
by Liudprand of Cremona on his embassy to Constantinople. The 
experiences of courtiers and guests at Hesdin or the Byzantine 
emperor’s throne room became part of the performance for those 
who were more seasoned or knowing, just like Borra’s terror at the 
feast of Ferdinand I of Aragon. The distress, pain, surprise, or terror 
of those in the gallery heightened the enjoyment of any onlookers, 
perhaps in part from Schadenfreude, and also because their 
distress underscored the gulf between knowledge and ignorance, 
between inclusion and exclusion. 
Even before the Duke of Burgundy 
and his forebears installed mechanical 
marvels at Hesdin, reports of 
wonderful devices from distant lands 
kindled the imagination of medieval 
European writers, chroniclers, 
and scholars. Mechanical animals, 
musical fountains, and pitiless metal 
guardians appear in medieval 
literature as early as the 
twelfth century. Some of 
these figures—copper 
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knights or golden archers—guard palaces from intruders. Others 
display a more pointed kind of perception, intended to uphold 
social norms. In one example, found in a thirteenth–century French 
version of the story of Perceval, two artificial figures—a knight 
and a maiden—stand sentry outside the tent of a foreign ruler. 
The knight barred the entrance to all except the nobility, while 
the maiden signaled if a female visitor was a maiden no longer. 
In another example, this time from an Old French version of the 
Iliad, the Trojan nobility gather in the Alabaster Chamber, where 
they are entertained and subtly disciplined to enact perfect 
courtly behavior. Four beautiful golden automata—two young 
boys and two maidens—grace the hall. One of the maidens holds 
up a mirror so that the courtiers can make sure that their attire is 
correct, while the other one performs gymnastics and conjuring 
tricks. The second maiden’s performance is so captivating that it 
prevents the spectators from leaving too early, thereby committing 
a breach of etiquette. One of the male figures plays music that 
acts as a cover for private conversations and also banishes vulgar 
or unkind thoughts. The fourth automaton monitors all of the 
behavior of the people in the Alabaster Chamber and conveys 
to them, by confidential hand gestures, the ways in which their 
behavior is unacceptable, and how to change it. The purpose of 
these figures was to enforce particular norms — of appearance, 
behavior, and thought — and to help courtiers fit in. These earlier, 
imaginary examples do some of the same cultural work of the later 
mechanical marvels at Hesdin and at the royal courts of fourteenth 
and fifteenth century Europe: they police the boundary between 
inside and outside, between what is permitted and what is not 
allowed.
Using robots to model and instruct people in correct behavior 
and attitude continued in the early modern period. In the sixteenth 
century, King Phillip II of Spain commissioned a mechanical monk 
that performed the proper sequence of steps, gestures, and 
prayers for Catholic devotion. The monk was intended to perform 
pious discipline and to instruct the penitent observer how to pray 
in order to give rise to an ecstatic, trance–like state of religious 
devotion. Slightly later, in the Enlightenment, fine technicians 
designed and built musical automata that not only played music 
perfectly, but also performed the proper intervals of breathing and 
gesture that would indicate the musician’s emotional connection to 
the music. The goal was that the audience would learn the proper 
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physical response; then this knowledge would correspondingly 
engender an emotional response and, more broadly, greater social 
unity over shared cultural values. These examples demonstrate 
that humans have been imagining, designing, building, and 
using machines to perform and reproduce the entire spectrum 
of human ability—manual labor, complex intellectual work, and 
emotional experience—for millennia. As with earlier eras, our 
contemporary robots can reveal an enormous amount about our 
current preoccupations, desires, and fears, as they raise questions 
about the role of complex technology in our lives, problematise the 
boundary between natural and artificial, and embody the ethical 
ramifications of knowledge. 
NOTES FOR FURTHER READING:
The literature on pre–modern and early modern automata 
is more robust than the general interest in the topic would 
indicate. The examples from The Iliad can be found in Book 
18. For a primer on ancient automata and the Antikythera 
Mechanism, see Susan Murphy, Heron of Alexandria’s ‘On 
Automaton–Making’, History of Technology, Vol. 17 (1995): 
1–45; Tony Freeth, Alexander Jones, John M. Steele, and 
Yanis Bitsakis, ‘Calendars with Olympiad display and eclipse 
prediction on the Antikythera Mechanism,’ Nature 454 (31 
July, 2008): 614–17; and Karin Tybjerg, ‘Wonder–making 
and philosophical wonder in Hero of Alexandria,’ in Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science 34 (2003): 443–466. 
Automata are found in two medieval Sanskrit romances; 
see Yasastilakacampu, edited by P. Sivadatta and Kasinath 
Pandurang Parab (Bombay, 1901); Srngaramanjarikatha, 
edited and translated by K. M. Munshi (Bombay, 1959). On 
the importance of pleasure gardens in secular Indian culture, 
see Daud Ali, ‘Gardens in Early Indian Court Life,’ Studies in 
History 19 (2003): 221–52. The Frankish account of Harun 
al–Rashid’s gift is in the Chronicles of the Frankish Kings 
(Hanover, 1895), ann. 807. Al–Jazari’s treatise on automaton 
making, The Book of Ingenious Mechanical Contrivances, is 
available in English in Donald Hill’s translation (Dordecht, 
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1974), and D. Fairchild Ruggles (Philadelphia, 2008) and 
Finbarr Barry Flood (Leiden, 2001) have written about 
the importance of automata and timekeeping devices in 
medieval Islamic culture. Liudprand of Cremona’s account 
of his journey to Constantinople is available in English 
as The Embassy to Constantinople and Other Writings, 
translated by F. A. Wright and edited by John Julius Norwich 
(London, 1993). On automata and mechanical marvels in 
late medieval courtly culture, including the accounts of 
Richard II’s coronation pageant and Ferdinand I’s banquet, 
see Scott Lightsey, Manmade Marvels in Medieval Literature 
and Culture (New York, 2007). On medieval automata more 
generally, see E. R. Truitt, Medieval Robots: Automata, 800–
1450 (Philadelphia, forthcoming), and on the robots 
of the early modern period and Enlightenment, 
see Minsoo Kang, Sublime Dreams of Living 
Machines: The Automaton in the Western 
Imagination (Cambridge, 2011), 
Adelheid Voskuhl, Androids in the 
Enlightenment: Mechanics, Artisans, 
and Cultures of the Self (Chicago, 
2013), and the work of artist and 
scholar Elizabeth King (www.
elizabethkingstudio.com).
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OUR WORK HERE  
IS DONE: ROBOT  
FUTURES IN FICTION
JON TURNEY 
In ten years Rossum’s Universal Robots will produce so 
much corn, so much cloth, so much everything, that things 
will be practically without price. There will be no poverty. 
All work will be done by living machines. Everybody will be 
free from worry and liberated from the degradation of labor. 
Everybody will live only to perfect himself. 
R.U.R. 1920
A robot economy isn’t just like our economy, but with robots 
substituted for humans. Things would soon change very fast. 
Robin Hanson
What shall we think about robots? Our experience of them is of 
two kinds. Some people now research, operate, or work alongside 
real robots. There must be quite a few of them. Worldwide sales 
of industrial robots are well over 100,000 annually. But this actual 
experience of real machines is probably outweighed by the 
enormous number of robots in fiction. 
These are, on the whole, quite different from the real ones. 
Science fiction, in books and magazines and then on film, has taken 
up the ancient myths of creating artificial beings and automata 
with inexhaustible enthusiasm. They have been worked and re–
worked into a series of plots which have become clichés because 
of their enduring appeal. 
These normally involve robots which are more or less 
humanoid, and hence bear little resemblance to most of the ones 
technologists have made so far – excepting those which have 
been deliberately fashioned to look like science fictional robots as 
attention–grabbers or, in a few cases, to explore aspects of human–
machine interaction. However, amid the universe of SF stories, 
there are still a few which can illuminate an important question 
posed by the advent of machines which can perform labour 
previously done by people: what shall we do when work is taken 
care of?
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Work is not an aspect of life which science fiction often deals 
with convincingly or well – something it shares with literature 
outside the genre. The definitive Encyclopedia of Science Fiction 
has no entry under ‘work’. But when work does go on in science 
fiction stories, some or all of it gets done by robots.
It is relatively rare for work as such to drive the story, though. It 
more often forms a backdrop to a plot driven by one of the robot 
themes we can all recognise. A few words about those help put 
some observations about work in context.
It is generally accepted that science fiction set in plausibly 
extrapolated futures is best read as commentary on the present. 
In the same way, it seems fair to say that science fiction about 
humanoid robots – or other artificial people – is about people. The 
themes here underpin the treatment of robots at work.
So science fiction took up the ancient question of whether 
humans can create artificial beings via robots and androids. The 
almost obsessive concern is how like a human such a creation 
can be – and hence what it means to be human in the first place. 
In popular culture, androids being as yet too far beyond our 
technological horizon, the focus is on robots. But not just 
any robot. By and large, humanoid robots are news. Ones 
which just look like machines aren’t.
66  OUR WORK HERE IS DONE. Visions of a robot economy
 Part 3. Robots of the past and of the future
There are several larger themes which stories of robots as 
machines somewhere on the way to becoming people seem forever 
destined to explore. What are the ultimate relations between 
humans and the technologies we create? Will they dominate us 
(robot rebellion), succeed us (robot evolution), become part of us 
(cyborg evolution)? If they become our equals, must we cease to 
treat them as machines, and accord them rights?
It is the third theme which is spun into new variations in the 
context of work. Robots which are genuinely capable of work, 
but also unambiguously not human, can function as willing slaves. 
This is the most straightforward option, hence in some ways 
the least interesting. Literary interest ensues when ambiguity is 
restored. Are their owners blind to these slaves’ needs? Do they 
suppress their own awareness, becoming themselves less human, 
in order to benefit from mechanical labour? Humanoid robots 
and androids, like aliens, figure in numerous explorations of slave 
culture, colonialism and class societies. This is fertile ground 
because so far all real historical experience has turned on either 
doing work oneself or appropriating the labour of others, either by 
direct domination – and dehumanisation – or by supposedly less 
oppressive employment. 
So in parallel with exploration of the human–machine axis, robots 
in fiction also lend themselves to exploring divisions between 
capital and labour, masters and servants, and also the division of 
labour itself. Here there is a complication. An important feature 
of human work, and of many – but not all – actual robots is our 
invention of the division of labour. Humanoid robots are typically 
depicted as general–purpose machines, although they may 
undertake specialised tasks. (Digital computers, on the other hand, 
are inherently general purpose devices.) Real industrial robots are, 
often, almost literal realisations of the synecdochal insult which 
figures factory or farm workers as ‘hands’. At any rate, they are 
isolated arms, with enough degrees of freedom to spray a car 
body panel, say, or weld a joint. Fictional robots are more often 
humanoid creations, for all the reasons already stated, although 
they may perform specialised tasks. Indeed, in many robot stories, 
apparently all–purpose robots are depicted occupying a single 
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niche in the division of labour, without other apparent change 
in the society which has produced them, allowing the author to 
consider the character of the labour in question. What does the 
ideal servant, soldier, nanny, nurse, or sex worker actually need to 
be able to do?
Science fiction has explored this portion of robot story space 
both well and badly. There are many examples of robots doing 
particular jobs, but human characters normally interact with them 
one at a time. This is a way of evading the broader implications of 
the kind of capability that a robot secretary, say, or even a robot 
waiter or cab driver, imply. One example, from the exemplary 
author of robot stories Isaac Asimov, can stand for many others. 
In his late novel Bicentennial Man, Asimov re–works the robot 
becoming (as good as) human theme yet again, relating the long 
career of a robot butler who gradually assumes more and more 
human qualities, eventually starring in a court case in which he 
is accorded full human rights. But although the story covers 200 
years, the rest of society appears unaffected by the advent of 
such advanced robots, or the technological descendants which 
would presumably appear over such a time span. This rather 
glaring deficiency may be due simply to lack of interest, or to a 
combination of Asimov’s literary limitations together 
with a poor sociological imagination, but deficiency it 
certainly is. 
More interesting are stories in which robots filling 
particular niches are used to consider the qualities of 
particular kinds of work. A robot carer, for example, 
is doing emotionally charged work even if the tasks 
it carries out are largely mechanical – and will no 
doubt be invested with human qualities by its 
users even if it does not have them. Robot authors 
– depicted of course by writers who tend to feel 
that writing stories is fulfilling work – invariably 
appear as lacking in the kind of perception needed 
to write anything which is any good. As in a brief 
glimpse of the process of novel writing in 1984’s 
Ministry of Truth, automation would devalue the 
product:
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Julia was twenty–six years old... and she worked, as he 
had guessed, on the novel–writing machines in the Fiction 
Department. She enjoyed her work, which consisted chiefly 
in running and servicing a powerful but tricky electric motor... 
She could describe the whole process of composing a novel, 
from the general directive issued by the Planning Committee 
down to the final touching–up by the Rewrite Squad. But she 
was not interested in the final product. She ‘didn’t much care 
for reading,’ she said. Books were just a commodity that had 
to be produced, like jam or bootlaces.
This aside on the reduction of what would once have been 
creative labour to a mechanical procedure, points toward an area 
for speculation distinct from the robot/human dichotomy. It is 
concerned with other distinctions: between work and play; work 
and leisure; commodity production and craft skill. Industrialism 
offers alienated labour for a wage, but permits other kinds of 
work in the interstices of life. Its complement, consumerism, 
dehumanises through alienated leisure. 
The themes running through stories of the rise of the robots 
which pick up these questions are economic, social and cultural. 
What is labour for? If robots take care of agricultural and industrial 
production, then theories of value fall apart. In the limit, robots 
offer costless production, and total economic transformation.
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If work is no longer needed for subsistence, social transformation 
follows. If there is no need to work to live, then why work at all? 
The economic and the social transformations are bound together 
because the rise of the robots means there is no need to keep 
humans in paid employment. It may seem harder to imagine this 
when old right wing assumptions about shirkers, strivers and 
scroungers and the deserving and undeserving poor are being 
given new life. It even seems harder to credit speculations about 
automation leading to reduced working hours or early retirement 
when those in work experience their lives as time poor. However, 
fiction is still prepared to entertain the quasi–utopian idea: that 
the advent of capable robotics means that – after a transition 
of some kind – there is enough to provide for everyone’s needs, 
employed or no, and no reason to deny the means of subsistence 
to those who choose not to work. But what will they do with their 
time? How will they organise their lives? Stories about robots and 
work in this vein are fairly easily led into reflections – profound or 
otherwise – about the meaning of life.
These themes seem an important aspect of the fictional 
treatments of robots. However, while I offer no comprehensive 
survey of the vast number of robot stories, it does seem clear 
they are not actually treated that often. But a small number of 
exemplary stories do show how they play out.
 As with all the great themes of science fiction, which generally 
descend from earlier myths and stories, the starting point is hard 
to choose. The use of mechanisation, if not robotics, to allow 
creation of a society in which labour no longer dominates lives, is a 
feature of Edward Bellamy’s somewhat socialistic utopia in Looking 
Backward (1888), for example, although he does not give details 
of the factories involved, simply making it clear that everyone 
is guaranteed a living with minimal working hours and early 
retirement.
There are endorsements aplenty of this idea, and dystopian 
variants in which everyone is thrown out of work by machines, from 
then on. However, when we come to robots as such, the obvious 
starting point is the work which introduced the term – Carel 
Kapek’s celebrated 1920 play R.U.R. As is well known, the word he 
used – supplied by his brother Josef – was Czech for servitude or 
forced labour, pointing directly to the idea of willing slaves as the 
key to freedom from work.
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Although the products of Rossum’s Universal Robots are 
technically androids, their, as it were, robotic qualities are well in 
keeping with the themes of innumerable other robot stories. As the 
originator, Capek was in a position to muse on all the main themes 
at once. And so he did, invoking the Frankensteinian question 
about playing God, the limitations of a being without a soul, and 
staging the first of all those robot rebellions.
As robot suggests, R.U.R. also introduces the theme of 
roboticised work. In short, the conditions of industrial labour are 
inhuman, so Rossum’s firm fashions inhuman workers. They will 
take care of production in future, liberating people from work 
altogether. 
As Domin, who manages the robot production line, explains 
exultantly, 
In ten years Rossum’s Universal Robots will produce so 
much corn, so much cloth, so much everything, that things 
will be practically without price. There will be no poverty. All 
work will be done by living machines. Everybody will be free 
from worry and liberated from the degradation of labour.
Everybody will live only to perfect himself.
He is aware a robot take–over of production arises from the 
capitalist logic that the best worker is the cheapest, and that this 
will be disruptive. But the result will be worth the cost.
The servitude of man to man and the enslavement of man 
to matter will cease. Of course, terrible things may happen at 
first, but that simply can’t be avoided. Nobody will get bread 
at the price of life and hatred. The Robots will wash the feet 
of the beggar and prepare a bed for him in his house.
There are also not too subtle hints of the hubristic conviction 
underlying this humanitarian prospect.
We cannot reckon with what is lost when we start out to 
transform the world. Man shall be free and supreme; he shall 
have no other aim, no other labour, no other care than to 
perfect himself. He shall serve neither matter nor man. He will 
not be a machine and a device for production. He will be Lord 
of creation.
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And hubristic it clearly is. This utopian vision is rapidly overtaken 
by events. Robots do all the work. People stop reproducing, 
through an unexplained biological internalisation of the 
demoralising effects of seeing robots taking care of business. And, 
in the end, there is a war in which the robots are victorious and 
humankind is eliminated.
The full trajectory of the humans–supplanted–by–robots 
narrative was thus sketched when robots made their first literary 
appearance. Amid the countless repeats with (often not very 
much) variation since, there have been a few more considered 
points about the effects of robot production.
Kurt Vonnegut’s debut novel Player Piano (1952) uses the 
eponymous device as a metaphor for the displacement of a valued 
skill – playing music – by a machine. The work which is redundant 
in the novel is strictly factory work. The result of minimal labour 
factories, created on the back of a recent war effort, is a society 
divided between a small cadre of employed managers and 
engineers and a majority of unemployable workers. It was inspired, 
Vonnegut said, by his own experiences working for GEC after 
World War Two. 
The former industrial workers have to choose between joining the 
army or doing make–work for the Reconstruction & Reclamation 
Corps (the Reeks & Wrecks). They are earning but otherwise find 
life unrewarding. The plot turns on a rebellion by humans against 
the machine, seeking to restore the dignity of labour. It fails.
A variant on the Player Piano style dystopia is Frederik Pohl’s 
1954 novella The Midas Plague. This offers a satirical inversion of 
consumer society. Robot factories produce so much stuff that the 
government enforces consumption quotas. The poor are obliged 
to meet them by cashing in their ration stamps. A bureaucratic 
state administers the rationing system, and allows some to earn the 
privilege of asceticism. They also have the time to do interesting 
things. The poor are too busy consuming to do anything else – 
alienated labour has definitely been replaced by alienated leisure.
The protagonist marries above himself, creating tension between 
him and his spouse, who cannot adjust to the treadmill of 
consumption he lives on. 
 In a drunken inspiration he sets the household robots to help 
them consume their quota – wearing out their own share of 
furniture and clothes. When this idea spreads, society begins 
to change – because the robots have their ‘satisfaction circuits’ 
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adjusted to encourage them all to consume. The production system 
is saved by institutionalising this essentially pointless consumption.
So robot–assisted production is not a total disaster, but not 
a total success either. The same is true of a rather more subtle 
later story, Nancy Kress’ short story Nano Comes to Clifford Falls 
(2006). As the title indicates, this centres on the newer technology 
of nanotechnological assembly rather than macro–robotics, but it is 
turned to the same end – automated production of, well, whatever 
you want. 
The story is set in a small, isolated town which serves as a 
microcosm of the effects of this plenitude. They can be worked 
out a little more realistically because the device of delivering 
a small set of nano–assemblers to the town only abolishes one 
kind of labour – there is no machine intelligence apart from the 
programming of the nanomachines in this society, apparently, so 
administration, services, and care work are still confined to humans. 
This is emphasised by the protagonist, Carol, being the single 
mother of three children, her husband having deserted her. She 
watches warily as the townsfolk embrace the new tech, and larger 
social structures slowly disintegrate. “It was kind of like everybody 
won the lottery all at once”. 
The people who work in the local factory no longer have jobs. 
Most other people, from teachers to police officers stop going to 
work as well, and normal life unravels. But there are the beginnings 
of reorganisation, small scale, self–governing, with overtones of 
survivalism. Carol ends up living and working on a farm which 
has become a more or less self–sufficient community, populated 
by “people who fled nano, like me”, and those who embraced it 
“because it lets them do whatever they wanted to do before”. The 
latter include actors, scientists, “one of them studying something 
about the stars. We also have a man writing fiction, an inventor, 
and, finally, a real teacher. Also two organic farmers, a sculptor, a 
man who carves and puts together furniture all without nails, and, 
of all things, the United States Chess Champion.”
If the moral of this selection of variously fulfilling work isn’t clear 
enough, Kress has her narrator spell it out in not quite capital 
letters. “I think nano is a sorter. The old sorting used to put the 
people with money and education and nice things in one pile, and 
the rest of us in another. But nano sorts out two different piles: 
the ones who like to work because work is what you do, and the 
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ones who don’t.” So there are still some optimistic, if not utopian 
possibilities from the end of wage labour. 
So SF presents visions of passing labour over to robots, which 
are equivocal, to say the least – even if the transfer is restricted to 
industrial labour. Are there no genuine utopians, then? Or is Fredric 
Jameson correct that the utopian impulse has waned in the face 
of the difficulty of imagining alternatives to capitalism? Well, there 
is one fully–conceived system in which the place of work seems 
properly utopian – delineated in the late Iain Banks’ series of novels 
set in the galaxy spanning Culture.
Imagining a full production system which supports a more or 
less utopian social structure requires a little more imaginary 
technology. The Culture is a complex creation – proceeding from 
the premise that venturing into space would inevitably promote 
less hierarchical social arrangements because of the difficulty of 
controlling others in a three–dimensional geography.
As the various societies that emerge develop, they solve the 
problem of production – together with their plethora of artificial 
intelligences, which we can equate roughly with robots in this 
context.
As Banks describes the result in an essay outlining how his 
society works…
Briefly, nothing and nobody in the Culture is exploited. It 
is essentially an automated civilisation in its manufacturing 
processes, with human labour restricted to something 
indistinguishable from play, or a hobby.
He acknowledges that making machines with human–like 
capabilities raises the problem of exploitation anew, but he finesses 
that, too, by careful application of technology.
No machine is exploited, either... any job can be automated 
in such a way as to ensure that it can be done by a machine 
well below the level of potential consciousness; what to us 
would be a stunningly sophisticated computer running a 
factory (for example) would be looked on by the Culture’s AIs 
as a glorified calculator, and no more exploited than an insect 
is exploited when it pollinates a fruit tree a human later eats a 
fruit from.
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And those who want to work, and to do work that is rewarding, 
are catered for as well. Apart from the hobbies or play – and art 
and games are both depicted in the novels – that happens partly 
by integrating their efforts into the production system. Again, 
Banks elaborates:
Where intelligent supervision of a manufacturing or 
maintenance operation is required, the intellectual challenge 
involved (and the relative lightness of the effort required) 
would make such supervision rewarding and enjoyable, 
whether for human or machine. The precise degree of 
supervision required can be adjusted to a level which satisfies 
the demand for it arising from the nature of the civilisation’s 
members. People – and, I’d argue, the sort of conscious 
machines which would happily cooperate with them – hate to 
feel exploited, but they also hate to feel useless. 
This seems a fair summing up of the dilemma which SF keeps 
worrying away at. If we abolish work, we abolish exploitation, but 
also the reward of exercising skill and ingenuity to contribute to 
the human community. The most tantalising question highlighted 
by these stories is whether we can dispense with one without 
sacrificing the other. It is still only a story, but it is heartening that 
at least one author says emphatically that the answer is yes.
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SILICON VALLEY’S GOD 
COMPLEX
IZABELLA KAMINSKA
If you believe in the notion 
of God, chances are you 
believe that God to be all 
powerful, all knowledgeable 
and omnipresent. 
What’s more, being entirely 
subservient to and dependent 
on that being, you probably 
also believe yours is not to 
reason why but to do and die 
according to His will alone.
Resistance to the God power is futile in any case because 
rebellion leads only to the prospect of eternal incarceration in the 
fiery pits of hell. As a result it is only thanks to God’s benevolence 
and mercy (which comes at his own discretion) that any quality of 
life can be assured at all.
What then is the difference between God and the ultimate 
capitalist monopolist? One who has, for example, come to 
dominate and own all resources, capital, patents, technological 
infrastructure and property?
BEWARE, BECAUSE SILICON VALLEY  
IS DEVELOPING GOD COMPLEX
Not that anyone should be surprised. If anyone’s partial to 
delusions of grandeur and privilege it’s going to be a bunch of tech 
billionaires working on artificial intelligence, bioengineering and 
autonomous craft.
But the idea does lead to an interesting thought experiment. 
Consider what really is a technological company’s motivation these 
days? 
What happens once everyone on earth becomes beholden to one 
company’s devices, technology and IP? What can a technology 
company possibly hope to achieve next? More power? More 
dominance? More rent extraction?
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What if there’s simply no more market share or money to be had? 
The corporate’s already more powerful than most major sovereign 
states. And its reach is international and all pervasive. What then 
might it crave next? Worship and adulation from its customers and 
users? Complete devotion to its vision? Godhood itself?
It’s true that if anyone in the world has the power to turn 
themselves into God it is a modern technology titan like Google or 
Apple. The former even has famed inventor, futurist and seeker of 
eternal life Ray Kurzweil working within its ranks on such fantastical 
projects as robot armies and artificial intelligence.
Fitting, really, that the company’s motto is ‘Don’t be evil’. And, 
for that matter, that Apple is named after the biblical fruit of 
temptation born of the tree of knowledge of good and evil itself.
Of course, if a tech giant was ever to achieve that degree of 
power, it would also imply the end of money, since everything 
by then would begin and end with the company in question. 
Instead of money it would be devotion and worship which would 
be exchanged for material gifts, information or access rights to 
heaven.
At this point, ‘God Inc’s’ only concern would be the possibility 
of its monopolistic grip on everything being broken one day. If 
perchance, someone else discovered the elixir of immortality as 
well.
Wouldn’t our super monopolist then have an interest in 
suppressing all paths that could lead to that eventuality? Would 
it not have an equal interest in keeping everyone else utterly 
misinformed?
In fact, would it not, perversely, have an interest in purposely 
obscuring and suppressing the abundance it itself had created. 
Handing out scraps for us mere mortals to fight over in a bid to 
keep us too distracted or poor from pursuing the knowledge we 
need to compete?
Okay, it’s a far–fetched tale. But so too are reports of contrived 
wage pacts between technology titans, patent wars and DDoS 
attacks on competitors – none of which stops any of them from 
being true.
The idea that the stage may be set for the emergence of exactly 
such a power, isn’t consequently too outlandish.
Awesome technology breeds awesome power. And today’s 
technology is more God–like than anything we’ve seen before. 
Unless that power is consciously prevented from being allowed 
to concentrate, whether by government, the masses or anti–trust 
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authorities, it’s not at all implausible that all roads will lead to the 
formation of a technological power almost indistinguishable from 
God.
In that context, the curious thing is that according to economist 
Robert Gordon, the rate of technological advancement has been 
slowing rather accelerating over the last decade. Gordon says this 
is because most of the “low hanging technological fruit” has by 
now been picked. Future advancement depends on impossibly 
complex discovery, meaning technological stagnation is the much 
more likely path from now on.
But is it really so?
One needs only to read about Google robots, self–driving cars, 
drones and 3D printing to arrive at the conclusion that this is 
very clearly not what’s happening at all. In contrast to Gordon’s 
prediction technology seems very suddenly to be on the move 
again, and violently so. 
While it’s tempting to ponder what’s behind the revival, it’s 
possibly more important to figure out what was behind the 
slowdown in the first place.
Remember, also, that Gordon was extrapolating forwards from 
trends recorded up until 2007. 
In whose interests, after all, would technological stagnation or 
regression have been? A Luddite’s? A power hungry monopolist’s?
Or perhaps mostly in the interests of those who stand to lose 
irrespective of whether the gains of technology flow towards just 
one hand or are distributed more widely. Namely, the established 
elite.
All of which makes this latest spell of technological advancement 
so particularly interesting. None of these anti–technology interests 
have gone away. If anything they’ve become more pronounced.
So why is it that technology seems finally to be breaking free?
There are really only two possibilities. One is that the 
information age has allowed knowledge to be shared on such an 
unprecedented level that technological progress is now impossible 
to repress. The second is that a handful of companies have pulled 
so far ahead of the pack, and accumulated so much wealth, they 
can now burn cash on fanciful projects without any concern for risk 
or return.
Either way, if the hype delivers on even half of its predicted 
potential, the Asimovian age of self–driving cars, drones, self–
learning machines, nanotechnology, manageable matter and bio–
engineering could soon be upon us.
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If the results are not monopolised and rationed by just one hand, 
this could lead to economist John Maynard Keynes’ famous 1930 
prediction of an era of economic abundance and leisure time for 
all.
The problem for us economic creatures, however, is that both 
structurally and psychologically we are unprepared for the scale 
of the social change that awaits us if this is achieved. As Keynes 
himself noted, once the economic problem is solved, mankind will 
be deprived of its traditional purpose, exposing it to a potential 
nervous breakdown unless something else is found to fill the void. 
Abundance denial may at this point prove more appealing and 
digestible to the masses.
This is ultimately because a scarcity–focused mind–set is very 
hard to overturn. Society has been hard–wired over millennia to 
reward those working towards overcome scarcity with status 
and privilege. Abundance changes this entirely. ‘Adding more’ no 
longer qualifies as something worthy of reward, implying a radical 
rethinking of how society must allocate wealth and value from 
thereon.
Small surprise some would prefer to ignore the value shift 
entirely, and cling to old–fashioned ways of doing things – no 
matter how harmful they may be for the greater population – just 
because that’s what we’ve always done, or because the idea that 
value doesn’t have to be inextricably linked to toil is far too alien.
The loss of jobs to technology is consequently viewed as a 
hardship, not a liberation from the shackles of labour. A supply side 
shock is interpreted as a depression, not a gift. More worryingly, 
a lack of investable opportunities for abundant capital is viewed 
as a conspiracy to undermine established hierarchy and not as an 
opportunity to spread wealth without social cost.
Seen from this light, the 2008 financial crisis, 
which can arguably be traced back 
to the collapse of the dot–com 
bubble, can be judged as the 
culmination of a decade–long 
battle between two opposing 
forces. One representing 
the established capital 
elite, who strive to 
preserve the status quo, 
favouring technological 
progress only as long as 
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it benefits their social standing. The other, their challengers, who 
favour technological progress at any cost, whether it threatens to 
concentrate power or to redistribute it more widely.
By 2000, it arguably became clear to the established elite that 
if the rules of capitalism were allowed to play out to their natural 
conclusion, they would be losers no matter what.
Which is why from 2000 onwards incumbent powers had more 
of an interest in thwarting technology than championing it – 
something most easily done by creating high entry costs to market 
and buying out challengers whenever they arose.
Indeed, viewed from that perspective, it’s easy to conclude that 
what the stratospheric valuations during the dot–com bubble were 
really signalling was that by that point in the technological cycle, 
an all–or–nothing monopolistic race to the top had already begun. 
Until it was proved otherwise, all stocks could consequently exist 
in a quantum state of infinite or zero value.
For valuation, this posed something of a Hofstadter–Moebius 
loop – the contradictory condition which caused a breakdown in 
Arthur C. Clarke’s HAL9000 super computer. A company could 
hold both infinite social value or none at all, depending entirely on 
the popularity of its stock, and its capacity for use as an acquisition 
currency, rather than as an income generator.
As soon as a cohort of select companies broke into the lead, this 
all–or–nothing nature of the value system was exposed. Prices of 
everything other than the leaders’ stock were vapourised. Which 
of course was a profound shock to those who found they had been 
backing the wrong horse.
It was also too great an existential crisis 
for an old order which ultimately desired 
little more than the preservation of the 
current hierarchy, especially when 
pursuing ‘more’ increasingly came with 
the risk of losing everything. 
And so it was that by 2001 capital’s 
interests became entirely disconnected 
from technological progress.
Instinctively capital oriented instead 
towards the control of anything 
solid, rentable, or scarce. Out went 
investments in technological stocks that 
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could undermine incumbent power and in came investments 
collateralised by good old–fashioned bricks and mortar or anything 
tangible like cars, commodities or infrastructure.
What followed was the understandable tendency for capital 
to organise (albeit unwittingly) to stifle capacity, innovation 
and multi–factor productivity instead. A period of mega M&As, 
leveraged buyouts, self–inflicted resource squeezes and bubbles 
was initiated. Industrial consolidation was epitomised by RBA’s 
$98.5 billion acquisition of ABN AMRO in 2007 and AT&T’s $72.7 
billion acquisition of BellSouth in 2006; leveraged buyouts by KKR 
and TPG’s $48 billion leveraged acquisition of TXU in 2007. The 
self–inflicted resource squeeze, meanwhile, by the reserves crisis of 
Royal Dutch Shell in 2004 and the bubble economy by the general 
outperformance of house prices and commodities.
All this, of course, in the context of a globalisation trend – the 
only permissible form of wealth distribution to an old order more 
interested in preserving domestic hierarchies than international 
ones.
The line between real consumption demand and investment 
demand became blurred as a result, obscuring the real potential for 
return in the process.
For a long time markets mistakenly believed a growth model 
focused on asset price appreciation and rent extraction (rather 
than real economic earnings) could be sustainable for the long 
term. But, of course, just like a game of Monopoly ends when 
players run out of money to pay the dominant landlord, so too 
must an economic value system that waives technological progress 
in favour of drawing rents from its privileged ownership of scarce 
resources or property.
Though, this was by no means the only factor contributing to the 
collapse. An equally important – but under–appreciated role – was 
played by the rise of the networked collaborative society, typified 
by the Wikipedia and open source movement. This, for the first 
time, began to challenge old capital’s ability to repress technology. 
Those doing the disrupting, after all, were doing it on their own 
time, motivated by passion not financial gain. This detached the 
creative destruction process from the cost of capital completely.
Demonetised and price insensitive, technology was now free to 
contribute to the global stock of knowledge–based wealth and a 
value system linked to open rather restricted access, rather than 
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a conventional bottom line, making breakthroughs very hard to 
monetise within the rules of the established zero–sum capital 
system.
Inevitably, technological efficiencies born out of the collaborative 
movement began to impact incumbents soon enough, either by 
undermining revenues directly, as per the challenge posed to 
the conventional media, entertainment and publishing industry 
by public content, or through margin compression thanks to 
the elimination of information asymmetries, leading to greater 
consumer bargaining power.
All well and good, apart from the fact that by crushing revenues 
it also crushed jobs, and with it the ability of normal leveraged folk 
to make their mortgage payments. When Federal chairman Alan 
Greenspan raised rates in 2004, he magnified these pressures, 
choking the asset–backed growth model and in so doing paving 
the way for global financial crisis of 2008.
In the name of stability, as we all well know, it fell upon the 
government to socialise the resulting asset–backed losses – and 
thus to prop up the value of capital which might otherwise have 
been destroyed completely. To this day many consider that 
act anathema. But really, the lack of inflationary consequences 
suggests the capital wasn’t necessarily valueless at all, but rather, 
more suited to collective ownership than private ownership from 
the onset.
This, plus continued support for ‘social value’ from central 
banks, has helped to create an economic environment in which 
technological forces can thrive again. But, as Larry Summers 
recognises with his secular stagnation theory, it has also renewed 
the incentive for old capital to protect its privileged positioning 
through the monopolisation of scarce resources and assets.
How effective the latter’s campaign will be depends entirely 
on how quickly technological forces will be able to compensate 
for the cornering in question, and make the scarce un–scarce. 
Something which in itself depends on the government’s ability to 
support social value without encouraging the emergence of a God–
like technological monopolist by accident instead.
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THE SECOND SHIFT IN  
THE SECOND MACHINE 
AGE: AUTOMATION, GENDER, 
AND THE FUTURE OF WORK
GEORGINA VOSS
2014. Becoming an HVA is a one–time deal, they told her: 
almost impossible to ever be the same weight, have the same 
haircut or hold the same pose ever again, so what gets captured 
in hologram is preserved in amber forever. Not that it’s something 
she necessarily wanted to go through twice – as an actress she’s 
well–versed in performative perkiness, but it’s a whole other thing 
to be upbeat and cheery when you have to be as still as a statue. 
Shoulders back, spine straight, hands clasped in front of her, lips 
and cheeks and eyes doing the heavy lifting of projecting emotion 
with not a twitch of movement elsewhere. Her muscles were in 
agony by the end of the day. Still, immortality of a sort – “No–one 
will ever know your name” they told her, but of course her timeless 
inflexible twin would greet her every time she passed through the 
departure gates at Heathrow, reminding her to bag up her liquids.
1. INTRODUCTION 
If 47 per cent of total US labour will be automated in the coming 
two decades then who, exactly, will have to find new jobs? Fears of 
technological unemployment are not new: driven by technological 
change, there is a long history of Schumpeterian ‘industrial 
mutations’ which make forms of work, and workers, redundant. 
Much of these discussions centres around the relationship between 
technology and skills: whilst nineteenth century manufacturing 
‘deskilled’ by substituting skills for simplified tasks; twentieth 
century electrification increased demand for both skilled blue–
collar workers to operate machinery, and white–collar production 
workers. The 1960s computer revolution paved the way for ‘Lousy 
and Lovely’ jobs: high–income cognitive work and low–income 
manual occupations, and associated growing wage inequality. 
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Through adaptation and education, human labour has – so far – 
prevailed; new types of jobs slither up through the cracks of the 
emerging economic structures. Many fears around robots and 
technological unemployment have focused on the differences 
between robots and humans, the way the former is often presented 
fictively as the means to replace the latter, the skills–gap between 
the two. Humans are messy, fleshy beings who come in a limited 
range of sizes, weight and strength with limbs that only bend in 
certain directions, and annoying tendencies to “fulfil a range of 
tasks unrelated to their occupation” – eating, sleeping – affecting 
their cognitive perception.
But humans are not a homogenous group, and labour and skills 
are not equitably distributed. Women experience work differently 
from men, both in terms of who performs it, how it is valued, 
and even what ‘work’ is considered to be. In the past decade, 
the gender gap in global labour markets has worsened: female 
unemployment rates are higher than male and are expected to 
stay that way until at least 2017. Technologies impact differently on 
female labour: mechanisation disaggregated the cottage industry 
of weaving, installing male spinners as textile machine operators 
whilst their wives and children “often toiled for these piecemeal 
labourers”.
Dry analysis of the proficiencies which robots are predicted 
to take up focuses on neutral skill sets – ‘Social Intelligence’, 
‘Perception and Manipulation’ – abstracting from who possesses 
or is in a position to learn them, what types of jobs they are 
associated with, and how they might vary along gender lines. What 
might the robot uprising look like for women?
2. ROBOTS IN THE MARKET ECONOMY 
Work is split down gender lines, with women being generally 
more limited in their employment choices than men. ‘Pink collar 
jobs’ are characterised by low pay, low status, stress, and routine 
and monotonous work. They are clustered into semi– and low–
skilled roles , and are often subservient to more highly–skilled 
positions: secretaries to managers, paralegals to lawyers, factory 
worker to foreman. More high–status work can be clustered into 
‘pink ghetto’ spaces where women can’t progress beyond senior 
management into the boardroom. 
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This segregation has rarely been based on physical attributes 
– historically, women have taken on physically intensive tasks 
in sites such as agriculture. Instead, it has been shaped around 
expectations of the role that women are expected to play in 
society. Pink collar work is not women’s work which happens to be 
low status – it is low status because women do it. Women are more 
likely than men to leave work due to family commitments, and 
more likely to do unpaid childcare and housework. Combining this 
with paid work in the market often necessitates finding a job which 
is flexible or part–time; despite the rise of workplace flexibility 
policies, large swathes of the labour market simply do not offer 
this type of elasticity. Certain sectors – notably STEM and finance 
– remain highly male–dominated with associated working cultures. 
What flexible labour is available is often aligned with precarious 
temporary contract work which is less likely to carry protections 
such as unemployment benefits; in 2011, almost 60 per cent of 
zero–hour contract workers were female.
The characteristics of repetitive low– and middle–skill pink collar 
tasks – “organising, storing, retrieving or manipulating information 
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or executing exactly defined physical movements in production 
processes” – are also those most likely to be done by machines. 
Computerisation has thus far focused on routine work involving 
explicit rule–based tasks, and current generations of robots are at 
their most efficient, far more so than human workers in constrained 
environments. With dark irony, these middle–service jobs which 
were created by technological advancements may now be replaced 
by further technological change. In East Asia, assembly jobs in 
clothing and electronics have mostly been taken by women who 
left low–productivity agricultural employment; whilst this has 
increased their economic independence, it has also made them 
more vulnerable to jobs losses from increasing mechanisation and 
automation.
But it is not only routine jobs which are at risk. For some time, 
non–routine roles have been seen as the final bastion for fleshy 
humans whose brains are jam–packed with cunning neurons 
and actuators to perform abstract tasks that require persuasion, 
negotiation, even creativity; activities that previously have 
been hard to specify as instructions in code. Non–routine tasks 
also have manual aspects: visual and language recognition and 
situational adaptability around environmental changes (for 
example, preparing spaghetti carbonara for four, or moving from 
a tiled floor to a carpeted one). And they are also under threat: 
sophisticated algorithms could, according to one forecast, replace 
140 million knowledge workers whilst advancements in sensors 
and manipulators increasingly allow robots to perform non–routine 
manual tasks such as performing surgery and operating driverless 
cars.
Yet human labour persists, and so do the gendered patterns 
which underpin it. Engineering and science are deemed to have 
low susceptibility to computerisation due to the high degree of 
creative intelligence that they are purported to require; likewise, 
occupations dominated by social intelligence – education, 
healthcare, management, finance, arts, media – are also low–risk. 
These ‘safe jobs’ are, however, predominantly white–collar jobs in 
areas still characterised by high wages and high levels of education 
in areas that are – as before – male–dominated. And as before, it 
is the low–status service facing jobs in these areas which are likely 
to vanish first: whilst paralegals – over 80 per cent of whom are 
female – are at high risk of replacement, lawyers – over 70 per cent 
of whom are male – are not. Instead, new breeds of professional 
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white–collar management roles encompassing technological 
know–how are emerging. Arguing that “robots need managers 
too”, Lauren Weber describes how the managers who previously 
trained temps to fill boxes, now need to oversee both the robotic 
automation processes as well as the mechanics on hand who tackle 
errant machines. 
Many of the jobs resilient to computerisation are not just those 
held by men; but rather the structure and nature of these jobs 
are constructed around specific combinations of social, cultural, 
educational and financial capital which are most likely to be held 
by white men. Other factors also intersect in labour markets: race, 
like, gender is also a socially constructed category which contains 
inherent power differences in social systems. In many cities, white 
women earn more than men of colour overall; and white women 
and women of colour have different experiences of local labour 
markets, with the former benefiting from the social constructions 
of race (for example, that white women are more likely to be seen 
as professionals). The different effects of computerisation on 
men and women are not only about gender differences, but are 
symptomatic of larger power structures across society and the 
ways in which certain forms of labour are valued. 
2018. The advantage of ‘puppeteering’, as they call it, is that it’s 
invisible; the disadvantage is that it’s invisible and the pay is awful. 
The beige suits are meant to make you sink into the background 
whilst the duck–egg blue MoppSy cleans the floors and the rose–
pink FluffSy does the same on the bookcases; like they tell you at 
training, the machines are the stars of the show, not you. All you 
have to do (the area manager says) is lay down the trail of stickers 
so they know which path to take, carry the machines up and 
down stairs, and listen for ‘unwelcome noises’. In practice, it’s like 
supervising a petulant child that sometimes does what you ask but 
mostly leaves corners untouched and a trail of grease and water 
around hard surfaces. Engineering skills are a must for puppeteers 
– FluffSy’s tend to cark it when humidity levels are too high, and 
you can’t wait for an overpaid tech–support guy to come out all 
the way across the city when each house needs to be cleaned 
to a two–hour guarantee. Best to crack open that awkward side 
panel, poke around in the FluffySy’s guts with some fine copper 
thread and, if you really have to, hack the system to override the 
temperature–safety constraints. Time is money! 
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2. ROBOTS ON THE SECOND SHIFT
Work is not confined to capitalist labour markets. An enormous 
amount of work that women do happens on the ‘second shift’ – 
unpaid cleaning, tidying, cooking, childcare and general household 
management which women do the bulk of, in addition to their paid 
‘day’ jobs. This is ‘reproductive labour’ which helps to enable paid 
labour in the market–based workforce to take place by taking care 
of the household. It is often invisible, because it happens out of the 
public eye; and viewed as low value because it happens beyond 
the market economy and has culturally been viewed as tasks which 
should be performed by women who are married to men as part 
of the ‘free’ services which are part of being a wife. Reproductive 
labour is often closely allied to affective labour – work which 
creates value by shaping emotional experiences, and which is often 
also found in other ‘women’s’ roles around care–giving.
 There is a long–standing relationship between the second shift 
and technologies. Initially driven by the demise of the servant class, 
devices such as vacuum cleaners, food processers and sewing 
machines began to find their way into the home from the late 
1910s onwards. As mains electricity became prevalent and women 
left the home for paid employment, these devices multiplied and 
shifted in function to include hairdryers, toasters and coffee–
makers. They were sold on their labour saving properties, with 
adverts promising women that the devices would “automatically 
give you the time to do what you want to do”. Whilst forms of 
labour were changed – for example, electric washing machines 
taking over from washboards, tubs and wringers – the introduction 
of domestic technologies actually resulted in women spending 
more time on housework as standards grew higher. The more 
people who had washing machines meant higher expectations 
that clothes would be washed more often. As the devices were 
not autonomous or trouble free, their users still needed to provide 
them with service support through monitoring and maintenance.
But labour in the home is not always confined to its occupants, 
and reproductive labour also takes place under market conditions. 
As women entered (paid) work, much of their second shift labour 
was turned over to less affluent women, many of whom are 
migrants and women of colour. Like other forms of pink collar 
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work, this market–based domestic labour continues to be low paid, 
low valued, precarious, routine, and often extremely physically 
intensive. Barbara Ehrenrich describes how the female workers for 
cleaning services companies are required to follow rigidly fixed and 
ordered patterns of work to be performed as rapidly as possible: 
When you enter a room, mentally divide it into sections 
no wider than your reach. Begin in the section to your left 
and within each section, move from left to right and top to 
bottom.
The technologies used in industrialised domestic work are 
not elegant devices designed to fit into a stylish home, but 
cumbersome machines which use the physicality of human bodies 
to compensate for their own limitations: heavy, fourteen–pound 
vacuum cleaners which are worn, back–pack style such that the 
mobility of the human worker only serves to propel the machine 
around the house. 
The market for personal and household device robots is growing 
by 20 per cent annually, with machines taking on tasks including 
mopping, lawnmowing and gutter–cleaning. But service support 
will still be needed – though robots will endeavour to clean up 
mess, human workers will still be required to clean up after the 
robots. Roombas, for example, are contradictory machines which 
inspire great anthropomorphised affection from their 
owners whilst also being remarkably inefficient at 
actually reducing domestic labour – Roomba–
owners have reported that they accommodate 
for its weaknesses by tidying the house before 
setting the machine free on the floors, and 
also following it around as it works to ensure 
that it doesn’t get trapped under chairs. It 
is difficult to imagine that such fondness 
will be transferred to the human domestic 
workers whose role it will be to support 
the machine; who, by the nature of 
their work are low–status, invisible and 
intended to stay ‘below stairs’ and out of 
the way by their employees.
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2090. Testing takes place in a small drab room that smells of 
sweat; lots of different small drab rooms, of course, but all alike in 
their own sweaty way. For obvious reasons, it got nicknamed many 
years ago as Voight–Kampff or VK – ‘You been VK’d yet?’ – and 
even the company men call it that. It usually only takes about half 
an hour and is, ironically, administered by machines. ‘Have you 
always dreamt of a white wedding?’ ‘You’re in a café and you get 
served full–fat milk with your tea, although you asked for semi–
skimmed. Do you complain or just drink it?’ That long rambling 
question about how to comfort a screaming toddler comes up 
about a quarter of the time. Your answers determine whether 
the Agency will place you with a job, but no–one knows whether 
getting through means that you’ve passed the test or failed it. 
4. ROBOTS IN THE LABS 
Robots do not emerge from engineering labs as sleek neutral 
entities, ready to impose on an unsuspecting labour force. 
Beyond their technical capabilities, the roles and the ways that 
they interact with humans are carefully engineered into their very 
being – and much of this design is framed, both intentionally 
and unintentionally, around stereotypical cultural norms about 
who ‘men’ and ‘women’ are and what they do. Human–Robot 
Interactions (HRI) research explores what types of interactions 
robots are intended to have with humans. A starting point for 
these investigations is that to function with maximum efficiency, 
robots must take on certain characteristics which allow 
people to fill in the gaps and build a mental model 
of who the robot is – what does it do? How will it 
respond? This is described as Computers as Social 
Actors theory, in which humans 
ascribe agency and personality to 
computer–mediated interactions 
– in other words, that humans 
instinctively treat computers like 
humans. But which humans? If 
a robot is intended to induce 
affection, it will be designed one 
way; if fear, another – even if the 
core purpose of the machine 
remains the same. Roboticists 
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are advised that ‘companion robots’ for children should not be 
designed to carry features which are likely to frighten them, such 
as an overwhelmingly large size or “creepy appearance”.
What induces fear, affection or trust in humans is, however, 
loaded with user expectations, which in turn are embedded in a 
variety of culturally–specific norms and stereotypes. People quickly 
form mental models based on what they know best, namely other 
people: age, race and gender provide the most salient social cues, 
and are deeply fundamental parts of how people understand and 
respond to each other. If a robot is expected to embody female 
traits, how will it be designed? And what expectations are being 
collected under the category of ‘female’?
Physical traits are obvious ways of denoting gender, although 
the ways in which this has played out in robot design scenarios 
appear to have been dropped in from the 1950s. In a field which 
continues to be male–dominated, gender is often approached 
using what Jennifer Robinson dryly describes as “common sense 
knowledge…of femininity in relationship to masculinity (and 
vice versa)”. ‘Female’ robots have been so denoted through 
pink lips, long hair and a higher pitched voice, and by name and 
gender verbal introduction. Robot designer Tomotaka Takahashi 
complained of the difficulties of engineering his Female Type robot 
because he argued that the feminised version would have to have 
a slimmer torso, which presented a challenge in terms of fitting 
the internal mechanisms into the body. Finally, gender can also be 
prompted by occupational identity: even if it has a gender–neutral 
appearance, users will still assign a gender based on what tasks the 
robot is doing.
Once robots have been cued as male or female, user expectations 
will fill in the gaps with men and women particularly likely to 
anthropomorphise voices that correspond to their own gender 
identity. ‘Female’ robots are seen as more likeable, trustworthy, 
persuasive and communal; whilst ‘male’ robots are perceived as 
being more threatening and agentic, although the praise they 
give is taken more seriously. Men also tend to feel psychologically 
close to robots that have a ‘male’ voice, and are less willing to take 
instructions from the car’s SatNav if it has a ‘female’ voice.
As “a robot may be mistakenly viewed as medically competent if 
it is dressed in a lab coat and wearing a stethoscope”, so gendered 
robots have certain skills ascribed to them. ‘Male’ robots are 
assumed to be better at repairing technical devices whilst ‘female’ 
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robots are assumed to be more suited to domestic and caring 
services. Roboticists themselves have fallen in line with these 
lines of thought. In their 2005 paper, eliciting information from 
people with a gendered humanoid robot, members of the Human–
Computer Interaction Institute at Carnegie Mellon University built 
design scenarios based on the notion that “women are more 
knowledgeable about dating forms and social practices, and they 
have more social skill than men do”. 
What is worrying is how these reactions are blandly, neutrally, 
co–opted into design processes simply as a way of inducing a 
certain type of user reaction. Gender norms are not challenged, but 
instead reproduced in the name of machine utility. Security robots 
which are coded as ‘male’ are deemed more useful – and thus 
acceptable – than with a ‘mismatched’ identity. Male roboticists 
predict that their female robots will find work in classic sites of 
affective labour in the service sector: in bars, information booths 
and ‘upmarket coffee shops’. Some have contended that creating 
robots which appear distinctly ‘male’ or ‘female’ is preferable in 
certain contexts:
A mechanic’s helper robot, if stereotypical, would be 
male. If we wanted this robot to have minimal and efficient 
conversation with users about what tools they need, how 
to assist, and so forth, then the mechanic’s helper should 
be male. Suppose that we wanted users to provide more 
information, to explain themselves, to be redundant. This 
might be a design goal if the robot was not a mechanic’s 
helper robot, but a general assistant and not specifically 
designed for the task. Then, the robotic assistant should be 
anti–sterotypic for the task, ie. Female for the mechanic’s 
helper.
Members of the robotics community have raised concerns 
that their peers are uncritically reproducing, reinforcing and 
perpetuating stereotypes attached to gender and work. Whilst 
some have described how developing ‘female’ assistive robots 
would be useful for facilitating bonding with infants, others have 
voiced their worries that children raised with these female robotic 
caregivers may then have their beliefs influenced about the nature 
of gender roles; for example that women are naturally nurturing 
and “derive immense joy from menial household chores”.
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5. CONCLUSION
The impact of robots on the future of labour for women 
looks particularly grim – not because of any inherent feature 
of the technologies themselves, but because their predicted 
sites of application appear to sustain and even exacerbate 
existing gendered structural inequalities in the labour markets. 
Recommendations around improving gender conditions in these 
markets focus on wider policy interventions including better 
infrastructure to relieve the burden of housework; provision of 
care services for children and the elderly; and public campaigns to 
challenge gender stereotypes. Computerisation appears to offer 
solutions for the first two of these, but only as a techno–fix – the 
intervening technologies of assistive and domestic robots are still 
likely to require support from traditional tranches of female service 
workers, albeit with added technical skills. They do little to consider 
the labour conditions of these workers: are they pink, blue or white 
collar jobs? Do they afford their own flexibility around childcare 
or paid maternity leave? Nor do they specifically address wider 
social and physical infrastructural elements necessary to address 
these problems more equitably such as electricity supply or state 
support for these services. Dishearteningly the current strand of 
robotics research, with its focus on the use of stereotypes to shape 
human–robot interactions, appears to actively uphold gender 
typecasting. Technologies themselves are not inherently arbiters 
of employment or job loss but are made so through the political 
context in which they emerge. It should be no surprise that the 
shiny surfaces of our new robot workforce do not dazzle our eyes 
with a bright new future, but simply reflect back existing gender 
inequalities and power imbalances.
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WHY MACHINES  
ARE NOT SLAVES
EDWARD SKIDELSKY
In 1891, Oscar Wilde made an unlikely foray into political 
economy. The result was The Soul of Man under Socialism, surely 
one of the strangest contributions to the genre ever published. 
Among its many striking projections is a vision of machines as a 
new slave class:
Machinery must work for us in coal mines, and do all sanitary 
services, and be the stoker of steamers, and clean the streets, 
and run messages on wet days, and do anything that is tedious 
or distressing. … The fact is, that civilisation requires slaves. The 
Greeks were quite right there. Unless there are slaves to do the 
ugly, horrible, uninteresting work, culture and contemplation 
become almost impossible. Human slavery is wrong, insecure, 
and demoralising. On mechanical slavery, on the slavery of the 
machine, the future of the world depends.1 
There is much that is true and prescient here. In agriculture and 
manufacturing, mechanisation has led to the disappearance of 
much (not all) “ugly, horrible, uninteresting work”. The service 
sector, traditionally a human preserve, is rapidly following suit. 
Secretaries, receptionists, cashiers and bank clerks have all 
recently joined the roll call of the obsolete. Others will no doubt 
follow shortly. It is now possible for a citizen of the affluent world 
to spend many days pleasantly without having to interact with a 
human being at all.
Most economists are comfortable with this development. They 
dismiss as a naive error the claim that machines are ‘stealing 
our jobs’. Under competitive market conditions, they say, the 
purchasing power liberated by automation should be sufficient to 
re–employ any lost labour in new (and probably more interesting) 
enterprises. For a long time, this thesis seemed to hold true. 
Throughout the 50s and 60s, employment remained high even as 
productivity grew. However, two recent developments have served 
to temper optimism.
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The first is the phenomenon of ‘jobless growth’. Productivity 
in America grew by an average of 2.5 per cent annually from 
2000 to 2009 – the fastest rise since the 1960s, thanks mainly 
to the computer revolution. Yet during this same period, no 
new jobs were created. In fact, employment sank by 1.1 per cent, 
despite a population increase of 30 million.2 Similar trends have 
been observed across the developed world. The conclusion is 
inescapable: machines are stealing our jobs. Nor is this surprising 
when one reflects that recent gains in productivity have accrued 
mainly to the very rich, who have sunk them in investments. Two 
decades of growth did little more than pump a speculative bubble. 
Mechanisation has not only destroyed some jobs, it has 
degraded others. This is particularly evident in the service sector. 
Call operators, shop assistants, receptionists, even doctors and 
teachers, are subject to 
an increasingly 
harsh regime of 
supervision 
and control, 
facilitated by 
computer 
technology. 
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(The phenomenon has been dubbed ‘digital Taylorism’ in honour 
of the pioneer of scientific management, F. W. Taylor).3 Procedures 
are standardised. The scope of judgement and trust is narrowed. 
‘Best practice’ is ‘rolled out’ across the board. The effect on all 
concerned is depressing. Labour is de–skilled and its bargaining 
power eroded – a factor in growing income inequality, as Frederick 
Guy shows in this volume. And patients, students and customers 
are made to feel that they are objects of a purely impersonal 
process, for which no one is responsible and no one cares. 
All this is far from Wilde’s vision of servile machines ministering 
to leisured humans. What went wrong? The problem is partly one 
of economic organisation. If work really is dwindling, it would seem 
sensible to provide people with an income independent of it – a 
so–called basic or citizens’ income. But this has not happened. We 
remain wedded to a modified version of the old Soviet doctrine: 
“He who does not work, neither shall he eat.” As a result, the leisure 
that should have been available to all is visited upon the few in the 
grim form of unemployment. 
But even if we could solve the organisational problem, Wilde’s 
vision of mechanical slavery would still not be realised. For the fact 
is that machines are not slaves, or anything like slaves. They are 
incapable – for deep, not just technical reasons – of adequately 
replicating human service. They can do it, but they do it badly. 
(Anyone who has tried to ring NHS Direct or eat sushi from a 
conveyer belt will know what I mean.) Why is this? Why are 
machines, which worked such wonders in manufacture, of such 
doubtful utility when it comes to service? That is the question I 
want to answer.
POESIS AND PRAXIS
What exactly does the distinction between goods and services 
amount to? The distinction goes back at least to Adam Smith 
and is enshrined in most national accounts. However, mainstream 
economic theory pays it little heed. From its point of view, goods 
and services are both commodities subject to the general laws 
of supply and demand. The differences between them are purely 
cosmetic. 
I think there is an important distinction to be drawn here, though 
it doesn’t quite correspond to the conventional distinction between 
goods and services. The distinction that interests me is between 
two forms of human action, which we can designate using the 
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names first given to them by Aristotle: poesis and praxis.4 Poesis 
is standardly illustrated by the production of a vase, shoe or some 
other artefact, but it is not limited to this sort of thing. Cleaning 
a house or creating political turmoil in Iraq also count as poesis, 
though what they aim at is not a material object but a state of 
affairs. In general terms, an action is poesis if it is a means to an 
end external to itself, so that it could be replaced, in theory if not in 
fact, with some other action. If one could clean a house by reciting 
a magic formula, one would presumably do so. The important thing 
is that the house gets cleaned. 
If poesis has an external end, the end of praxis is simply good 
praxis itself. Games and the performing arts are the clearest 
examples. Whatever else he aims at, a chess player must at least 
aim to play chess well, otherwise he doesn’t count as playing it 
at all. Cooking for friends, giving advice and giving a gift are also 
praxis, for they aim, in the first instance, at success in the specific 
kinds of activity they are. Praxis is an expression of particular skills 
and dispositions on the part of the agent. In Dante’s happy phrase, 
it is the disclosure of the agent’s own image.5 Hence it cannot be 
delegated. You cannot farm out to some third party the choosing 
and giving of a gift, or if you do, the gift is no longer a personal 
token of affection but something more like a bribe. And that is a 
case of poesis, not praxis.
It should be clear from this why poesis but not praxis can in 
principle be automated. Poesis permits any number of 
means to a given end. Once the end is attained, the 
means drops out of view, like scaffolding taken 
down after the job. A clean house is what it is, 
regardless of whether it was done with a 
broom, a vacuum cleaner or a robot. You 
would not feel cheated knowing that it 
was done one way rather than another. 
But where action is its own end, 
mechanisation spells loss. A dinner at 
a friend’s house, however delicious, 
is diminished in one’s estimation 
by the knowledge that it was 
bought from Waitrose. The 
meal remains the same, 
but the gesture is 
altered.
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The poesis/praxis distinction is the interesting core of the 
manufacturing/service distinction. It explains why most 
manufactures can be mechanised without loss whereas most 
services cannot. Cost and quality being equal, no one cares 
whether a chest of drawers was made by robot or by hand. But 
imagine discovering that a favourite Horowitz recording was in fact 
generated on a computer after his death. Something would surely 
be lost, even if the deception was perfect. Appreciation of piano 
music rests, writes philosopher Denis Dutton, upon “an unstated 
assumption: that it is one person’s ten unaided fingers that produce 
the sound. The excitement a virtuoso pianist generates with a 
glittering shower of notes is intrinsically connected with this fact.”6 
Unlike most pop music, a classical CD is essentially the record of a 
human act. It is a product of praxis, not poesis, though it is classed 
as a good, not a service, in the national accounts.
The services of the teacher, doctor and nurse also fall under 
the heading of praxis. However, there is an ambiguity here, which 
creates an opening for the mechanisers. Because education aims at 
a state of knowledge, it can be thought of as a ‘mere means’ to this 
state, pursuable in a multitude of different ways. That is a mistake, 
though. A surgeon might cause you to understand calculus by 
fiddling with your brain, but he could not be said to have taught 
you calculus. Teaching aims not just to foster a certain state but 
to foster it in a certain way. It is essentially rational instruction; it 
proceeds by means of explanations, examples, descriptions and 
stories. Mechanised teaching, with its apparatus of multiple–choice 
tests, MOOCs and so forth, is inherently second–rate, though it 
may be unavoidable in certain circumstances. In the same way, 
doctoring and nursing are not just means to the end of health but 
forms of care. They can be mechanised up to a point, but only at 
the expense of quality. 
Not all services are praxis. Cleaning, as has been said, is a form 
of poesis, as are most routine clerical jobs. Many of these services 
have already been mechanised, without any great loss. Others 
resist mechanisation for purely technical reasons. It is hard to 
build a robot that will sweep in corners or under the bed. But it 
will happen sooner or later, and when it does, only the redundant 
cleaners will bemoan it.
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THE EROSION OF PRAXIS
I have said that certain services are intrinsically unsuited to 
mechanisation. It does not follow that they are incapable of 
mechanisation. The first is a normative, the second a factual claim. 
There are no principled barriers, technological or economic, to the 
mechanisation of education, medicine or art. On the contrary, there 
is every incentive to press ahead with it. Replacing labour with 
capital is, after all, what capitalism is all about. 
The supposed recalcitrance of services to mechanisation was 
the basis of a famous economic theorem, known as ‘Baumol’s 
cost disease’ after its author, W. J. Baumol. The theorem’s original 
reference was to the performing arts, but it applies to all services 
in which ‘the human touch’ is ineliminable. Its basic idea is very 
simple. In a progressive economy, sectors that cannot realise 
the benefits of technology will find themselves at an increasing 
disadvantage relative to sectors that can. In live performances, 
Baumol wrote,
the performers’ labors themselves constitute the end 
product which the audience purchases … Whereas the 
amount of labor necessary to produce a typical manufactured 
product has constantly declined since the beginning of the 
industrial revolution, it requires about as many minutes for 
Richard II to tell his “sad stories of the deaths of kings” as it 
did on the stage of the Globe Theatre. Human ingenuity has 
devised ways to reduce the labor necessary to produce an 
automobile, but no one has yet succeeded in decreasing the 
human effort expended at a live performance of a 45 minute 
Schubert quartet much below a total of three man–hours.7 
Baumol’s conclusion is somber. Given stagnant productivity, 
the only way for theatres and music companies to keep down 
prices is to squeeze the wages of their artists. This squeeze might 
be endured for some time, thanks to the ‘psychic benefits’ of 
the profession, but not for ever. Ultimately, the best people will 
leave the arts for more remunerative jobs. The only solution is 
for governments to finance the arts, and social services more 
generally, at a level commensurate with their rising costs. Happily, 
they can afford to do this, since the same rise in productivity that 
generates the cost disease will also fund the taxes required to 
combat it. Whether the tax–paying public can be persuaded to 
accept this solution is, of course, another matter.8 
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Baumol viewed the cost disease as endemic to the service sector, 
which is why he could see no solution to it other than increasingly 
generous government subsidies. An old–fashioned humanist, he 
could not foresee music, healthcare and education being subjected 
to the Fordist methods prevalent in industry. But that is what has 
happened. Existing forms of service have been mechanised, and 
tastes have shifted from less to more highly mechanised forms. 
Both trends tend to the erosion of praxis and its replacement by 
poesis.
The mechanisation of a service usually proceeds in a number 
of steps. First, procedures are standardised, often with the help 
of computers (‘digital Taylorism’), and with the unspoken goal of 
replacing skilled by unskilled labour. This then sets the stage for 
the elimination of labour altogether. Modern day banking is a case 
in point. Bank managers once issued loans and overdrafts on their 
own authority, relying on their local knowledge and professional 
good sense. Later, they were confined to relaying the decisions 
of a centralised computer system. But this could only ever be an 
interim stage, for a person whose sole function is to communicate 
the verdict of a machine is in principle replaceable by a machine. 
Today, the role of the bank manager has all but disappeared, and 
we communicate with our banks either over the internet or via call 
centres in India. 
Retail has followed a similar trajectory. 
Shopkeepers once made decisions about 
what to stock and how to price it and 
many other things. Some still do, but 
they are a tiny fraction of the total. In 
supermarkets, these powers were long 
ago arrogated to central management, 
leaving those on the shop floor with the 
routine task of checking out purchases. 
Once this step was taken, the next followed 
as a matter of course. Why not ask customers to 
check out purchases themselves? Many shoppers 
are probably grateful for this latest development. 
It is less dismaying to deal with an actual 
machine than with a human being reduced the 
condition of one. 
These examples raise a couple of points of 
more general interest. In both banking and 
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retail, mechanisation has not only reduced the total quantity of 
work but shifted whatever remains onto the consumer. It is we who 
must navigate our bank’s website or scan our purchases through 
the automated checkout point. It is also we who must book our 
tickets online, assemble our furniture, paint our houses, and many 
other tasks that used to be performed by professionals. One should 
not be nostalgic for the poverty that made these forms of service 
widely affordable. But it is nonetheless striking that the life of a 
middle–class Indian is far richer in personal services than that of his 
British counterpart, though perhaps poorer in material goods.
It is a measure of the unpopularity of mechanised service that 
those who can will pay a large surcharge to avoid it. Most banks 
offer their wealthier customers a ‘premium’ service with a personal 
account manager – i.e. the same bank manager who was once 
available to everyone. And though small, independent shops still 
exist, their prices put them beyond the reach of most shoppers. We 
are seeing the emergence of a two–tier market: personal services 
for the rich, mechanised services for everyone else. The spread of 
the terms ‘boutique’, ‘concierge’ and ‘bespoke’ to refer to all kinds 
of high–end service is a revealing index of this development.
The last few decades have not only seen the mechanisation of 
existing forms of service but a shift of taste from less to more 
mechanised forms. Baumol was of course right about Schubert 
and Shakespeare, but he failed to foresee that classical music 
and drama as a whole would sink in popularity relative to other, 
more easily mechanisable cultural forms. The modern pop single 
is a substantially computer–generated product. A singer may 
be called in to supply the ‘vocals’, but the rest is the work of 
technicians. Their skill level is high, but not as high as that of 
classical musicians. And you don’t need as many of them. Even 
live performances are now mainly pre–recorded, with singers and 
musicians adding only the occasional embellishment, if indeed 
they are singing or playing at all. The labour costs of this kind of 
music are low (even taking into account the salaries of the star 
performers), meaning that prices are correspondingly cheap: a 
factor, among others, in its mass popularity.
The burgeoning taste for reality TV can also be understood as 
a response to Baumol’s cost disease. Here the trick is to replace 
the paid labour of actors with the unpaid labour of members of 
the public, whose vanity makes them willing collaborators in their 
own exploitation. Again, such television is cheap to produce – a 
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guiding consideration in this era of tight competition and declining 
budgets. 
Even in our taste in scholarship is being surreptitiously shaped 
by the imperatives of mechanisation. The critic Franco Moretti 
has pioneered a technique he calls ‘distant reading’. This consists, 
in a nutshell, of running computer searches over thousands or 
millions of digitalised texts with a view to establishing correlations, 
trends, etc.9 No single book is read in the way it was intended, 
from beginning to end. In the hands of a Marxist maverick like 
Moretti this technique yields some startling results, but its deeper 
tendency is to transform literary studies from a humane discipline 
requiring subtlety, learning and skill into an essentially industrial 
operation, ripe for economies of scale. As such, it is calculated to 
appeal to university funders and administrators, who have shown a 
marked enthusiasm for Moretti’s approach.
“Lass uns menschlich sein!” said Ludwig Wittgenstein: “let us 
be human!” The thought is simple, but not banal. Being human, it 
implies, is not vouchsafed merely by membership of the species 
Homo Sapiens. It is something we must strive for, something we 
can lose. Today, the struggle to be human is in large part a struggle 
against the mechanisation of service, or more precisely of praxis. 
Let’s hope we emerge victorious.
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TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE, BARGAINING 
POWER AND WAGES
FREDERICK GUY
Have the new technologies of the information age contributed to 
the rise in earnings inequality? 
Earnings are part of income – specifically, they are income 
obtained from work, as opposed to income from the ownership of 
property or from transfer payments received from the government. 
Sometimes I’ll simply call them ‘wages’, though earnings also 
include the salaries and more exotic forms of compensation 
achieved by, for instance, corporate executives and investment 
bankers. 
Relative earnings are determined in part by supply and demand 
conditions in the labour market, and in part by the success that 
different workers – as individuals or in groups – have in bargaining 
for a greater share of output. In this chapter I am concerned 
with the latter: how has modern technology affected the relative 
bargaining positions of the 
low paid and the high paid? 
The bargaining I’m talking 
about is sometimes a formal 
process of offer and counter 
offer, but in other cases it’s 
just a way of describing the 
ability of an employee to get the 
employer to pay a bit more. 
The technology in question 
is mostly information and 
communications technology 
(ICT). Organisations can’t 
function without some 
form of ICT – and here 
we must include writing, 
and typewriting, as well 
as telecommunications, file 
cabinets as well as digital storage. 
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The current, microelectronics–based generation of ICTs has over 
the past thirty years fundamentally transformed relationships 
within organisations.
 I’ll consider three different ways in which the application of a new 
ICT can affect the bargaining power of an employee. Adopting the 
language of agency theory, we can call the employee the agent, 
and call whoever is supervising the employee the principal. A new 
use of ICT in an organisation may improve the ability of a principal 
to monitor exactly what an agent is doing; improved monitoring 
leads, for reasons I will explain below, to a reduction in wages. It 
may also increase the range of financial consequences associated 
with choices that a particular worker must make on the job, and 
this will in turn increase that worker’s wages. Finally, application 
of new technologies may make it easier for workers – individually 
or in groups – to disrupt a production process or value chain, and 
thus harder for them to use the threat of disruption to bargain for 
higher wages. 
All three effects can work both ways: reduced monitoring/
increased wages, and so on. Peter Skott and I have argued, 
however, that since the late 1970s these effects have gone mostly 
one way for workers and the other for executives, and for this 
reason ICT has contributed to rising earnings inequality. The typical 
‘flexible’ business of today is one in which most workers are more 
closely monitored, make fewer choices of consequence to their 
employers, and have fewer opportunities to hold up production, 
than their mid–twentieth century equivalents; the executives who 
run the same companies make choices with far more riding on 
them; all of these changes are the result of the same new ICTs, 
and often the same applications of these ICTs. Skott and I call this 
power–biased technological change (PBTC). Unlike the supply–
and–demand explanations for increased earnings inequality, PBTC 
is something that can’t be offset by improved education and 
training; what steps might be required to offset it are beyond the 
scope of this chapter.
Let us consider examples of each of these three effects, starting 
with monitoring. Until a few years ago, employers of long–distance 
truck drivers had only a vague idea of where their employees were 
most of the time: the trip between A and B could be disrupted 
by traffic – or a simple stop for tea, and the employer was none 
the wiser. Today, the driver’s employer can buy a black box which 
monitors the engine continuously; it can follow the location of 
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the truck using GPS; it can even follow the black box data in real 
time via satellite. These monitoring solutions cost money, but they 
are widely used. Prior to these technological developments, for 
an employer to obtain comparable information about a truck’s 
whereabouts would have required employing a second driver and 
vehicle to follow the first – a prohibitively expensive measure.
We see the same sort of technologically–facilitated monitoring 
in the many areas of customer service which have been switched 
from face–to–face interactions (in, say, a bank branch), to call 
centres; in call centres, as we know, ‘calls may be monitored for 
quality purposes’, which is to say for the purpose of monitoring 
employees. Again, this is technology making it much cheaper 
for the employer to check whether an employee is using time 
effectively and using it in the employer’s interest.
Consider, also the retail till. Here we can compare two 
generations of monitoring technology, introduced 
roughly 100 years apart. The cash register was 
invented around 1880; although it underwent 
ongoing technical refinement, through generations 
of cumbersome mechanical, to less cumbersome electro–
mechanical, and finally to electronic devices, its basic 
capacities remained unchanged until about 1980: it monitored 
the total amount of money the operator had taken in from 
customers (cash intake had to equal the machine’s total of the 
printed receipts given to customers). This made it harder for an 
employee to steal cash from the employer, and thus facilitated the 
growth of large stores and chain stores, which depend on having 
employees collect cash at various locations throughout opening 
hours. It was still easy, however, for employees to collude with 
friends in the theft of goods: the employee could ‘accidentally’ 
misplace the decimal, ringing in a 90 per cent discount. Around 
1980, bar codes and mini–computers suddenly gave the cash 
register new monitoring powers, and these ‘under–rings’ became 
impossible.
All of these improvements in monitoring – of truck drivers, 
of customer service workers, and of retail clerks – have been 
followed by reduced relative wages for employees in these areas. 
This cannot be simply a matter of skill bias – the skills required to 
drive a truck, to pick up and deliver goods, have not changed. The 
association between cheaper and better monitoring, and lower 
wages, is consistent with the body of economic theory known as 
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agency, or principal–agent, theory; it is convenient 
here to think of it in terms of one simple variant 
agency theory, efficiency wage theory. Efficiency 
wage theory deals with situations in which paying 
higher wages is a way of getting employees to 
work harder so that, up to a point, paying higher wages leads to 
higher profits. I say ‘work harder’ as shorthand for ‘acting in the 
interest of the employer while on the job, even if it’s not in the 
employee’s personal interest’: this includes greater effort, but can 
also include things like not stealing. The theory tells us that, other 
things being equal, employees who are costly to monitor will be 
paid more. Where new technologies – in particular, information and 
communications technologies (ICTs) reduce the cost of monitoring, 
we should expect wages to fall.
Monitoring what an employee does¸ however, only helps the 
employer to the extent that the employer knows what they want 
the employee to do: to work without unauthorised tea–breaks, to 
ring in the correct prices, and so on. Often, however, the employee 
knows things that the employer does not: local or specialist 
knowledge about the different possible ways to do the job, and the 
likely outcomes. This brings us to another dimension of the agency 
problem: how much does the employer have riding on choices the 
employee makes? One explanation for the high pay of company 
executives, for instance, is that so much rides on their choices: a 
bad merger decision can severely damage a company (Royal Bank 
of Scotland and ABN AMRO; Co–op Bank and Britannia; Hewlett 
Packard and Autonomy…) and if you were a shareholder you’d be 
willing to pay executives a lot, if you thought that was a way of 
getting better decisions.
Mid–twentieth century companies came to be viewed, in the 
1980s, as inflexible, bureaucratic dinosaurs. Managers today like 
to think their companies are, in contrast, agile, lean, learning 
organisations. We need to take this management chest–beating 
with a grain of salt, but there is also more than a grain of truth in 
it. Largely because of the ICTs at their disposal, mid–twentieth 
century organisations were very slow to change. This meant 
that there were fewer big–stakes choices facing their executives: 
companies weren’t so often sliced and diced into saleable parts, 
with the associated big deals of mergers, acquisitions, and 
divestments; competitors were also slow–moving, and product life 
cycles were longer. Top executives, with much less riding on their 
daily choices, were paid much less than they are today.
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The cumbersome, paper–based, coordination and control 
technologies of the mid–twentieth century also left a great deal 
more to the discretion of lower–level employees. The worm’s eye 
view of a company’s coordination and control system is that it 
is a set of rules – procedures, plans, budgets, job descriptions 
– with which one has to work. Below the executive level of an 
organisation, the weakness of coordination and control systems 
can actually empower individual middle managers, and even 
production workers. 
In what way were the old coordination and control systems weak? 
We think of the mid–twentieth century as the heyday of Taylorism, 
or Scientific Management: of doing things by the book. It was all 
that, but the book was often wrong. A plan is never better than 
the information systems that inform it. Even a fairly good plan 
or budget becomes bad as market conditions and technology 
change, unless the systems are such that executives can continually 
update the plan and put the updates into effect throughout the 
organisation. Plans are necessary to keep different employees 
and departments working in a coordinated way toward the same 
end, but when the plan is a bit out of kilter, the profitability of a 
company often depends on those in the lower – and middle – ranks 
choosing to do something that looks sensible, rather than following 
the book. 
Today, the same monitoring systems that keep an eye on the 
productivity of individual truck drivers, retail clerks and call centre 
workers, also provide information which enables executives to 
fine–tune the instructions these workers, and their supervisors, 
are given – what is the best route, the most efficient way to pass 
goods over the scanner, the most effective script for each type of 
customer inquiry or complaint; as a result, there are many more 
cases in which the employer knows exactly what choices they want 
an employee to make. This changes the agency problem for those 
employees: when the employer did not know what choice the 
employee should make, it was worth the employer’s while to give 
the employee some kind of incentive to use their local or specialist 
knowledge to make a choice that was in the employer’s interests. 
Often, that incentive was the prospect of continued employment, 
with wage rises and promotions, if the employee’s choices proved 
to be sound over time. To the extent that the employer knows 
precisely what the employee should be doing, the agency problem 
reduces to just monitoring the employee’s behaviour. 
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Since the same technologies that improve the specification of 
instructions also improve the monitoring of employee behaviour, 
improved ICT puts a double squeeze on the earnings of employees. 
At the same time, improved ICTs make the organisation into a 
more flexible instrument for the executives. This gives executives a 
greater range of choice, and also contributes to a more demanding 
competitive environment – since the executives of competing 
companies have benefited from these same improvements. In many 
industries, the marketplace becomes a turbulent battleground 
between highly paid executives, with their armies of low–paid 
employees marching in close order. There are, of course, many 
employees who are not on either end of this dichotomy – skilled 
employees whose choices matter, but who are not executives 
deploying large numbers of employees and resources: these are 
the people in the shrinking middle of the earnings distribution.
Let us turn, now, to the vulnerability of production to deliberate 
disruption. This vulnerability came from another aspect of the 
inflexible production and information systems of the early–mid 
twentieth century: flows of goods and of information, essential to 
the interdependent operations of a company or a value chain, had 
to go through many bottlenecks. Individual 
workers – and, more critically, organised 
groups of workers – were able to obstruct 
these flows, slowing or halting very 
large production processes. The 
threat of such obstruction was 
the source of considerable 
bargaining power.
Take the mass production 
of cars, which requires the 
synchronised production and assembly 
of thousands of precision parts. As 
this process developed in the decades 
following 1910, a car company such as 
Ford or General Motors would employ 
hundreds of thousands of workers, 
producing parts and sub–assemblies 
and then entire vehicles. This led to a 
situation in which the workers in a single 
GM transmission plant in Michigan were 
able, in 1937, to bring numerous large 
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factory complexes to a halt simply by sitting down at their stations, 
refusing to move and refusing to work. Having demonstrated 
their ability to disrupt such a vast and profitable value chain, the 
workers’ union was in a position to bargain for higher wages. 
Something similar was seen in the network industries of the day. 
Telephone companies then depended on manual switching of calls, 
and all calls had to be routed through a few points. America’s long–
distance telephone operators could (and did) bring services to a 
halt simply by standing up (since, unlike the car factory workers, 
they sat down to work) in unison. Similar actions were repeated, 
or threatened, in other industries and in other countries: there 
several decades in which unions were powerful and the earnings of 
production workers rose in real terms.
As dramatic and powerful as these instances of collective action 
were, early–mid twentieth century systems also had bottlenecks 
that were quite sensitive to the disruption by individuals. Ford’s 
first automobile assembly line opened in 1913, but by 1914 Ford 
was paying assembly line workers what seemed extravagantly 
high wages for unskilled work. The reason, simply, was that the 
need for assembly line operations to be carried out in sequence 
at a common pace made the failure of a worker to report, on time 
and sober, very costly to Ford; it was worth paying an efficiency 
wage to secure such reliability. Nor was it only physical parts that 
flowed down a single, interruptible path: the information critical 
to coordination and control was written on paper, which followed 
fixed paths from desk to desk, filing cabinet to filing cabinet: many 
a clerk was in a position to either slow down the vast corporate 
mechanism, or to speed it up.
Today’s technologies of coordination and control – the fruit of 
the microprocessor revolution – have made it practical to replace 
many of these bottlenecks with multiple paths. More flexible mass 
production processes mean that if one factory is disrupted, another 
can change the product to fill its place. Telephone calls and 
other electronically transmitted information can be automatically 
switched down any of numerous paths between sender and 
receiver. A customer service request does not await action by a 
particular individual, but is queued in an electronic system. The 
actions of dispersed employees in an organisation, rather than 
being committed to written records and then to summaries of 
those records, filtering in this way slowly upward through the layers 
of hierarchy, are now logged automatically to become raw material 
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for the management information system. Improved information and 
communications systems have also lowered the cost of outsourcing 
functions as varied as office cleaning, manufacturing, and IT. This 
means that in many companies, spheres of work once in the hands 
of teams of in–house specialists can now be put out to competitive 
tender from a number of alternative providers. 
All of these multiple paths deprive production workers and 
middle managers – as individuals and as groups – of opportunities 
to use hold–up, the threat of disruption, to bargain for higher 
wages. At the same time, the proliferation of possible paths, the 
continuing choices between outsourcing and in–house provision, 
have further expanded the set of choices facing executives, 
increasing their pay in the ways discussed above.
To sum it up: the improvements in information and 
communication technology since the 1970s have enhanced the 
ability of corporate executives to monitor what employees are 
doing, to specify what employees should be doing, and to move 
information and materials flexibly down multiple paths. All of these 
developments have reduced the bargaining power of a large set 
of production workers and middle managers. All of them have also 
made the corporation a more flexible instrument for its executives; 
a marketplace of such flexible corporations, in competition, is a 
more turbulent place. 
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WORKERS’  
EXPERIENCES  
OF THE ROBOT  
REVOLUTION
TESS REIDY
Computers are replacing humans across many industries, and, 
well, we’re all getting very uneasy. We are losing the checkout 
assistant to the self–service scanner, the airport ticket desk to 
a kiosk, and the factory floor worker to the machine. Surely the 
robot driving instructor and the touch–screen waitress aren’t far 
off? Whilst technology is responsible for creating jobs we might 
never have imagined five or ten years ago, it has also eliminated 
many more. For the time being, it seems that, in most instances, 
computers are substituting humans in routine intensive jobs – that 
is, occupations mainly consisting of tasks following well–defined 
procedures that can easily be performed by computer programs. 
 Alan Milburn, the Government’s social mobility advisor, points 
out in his report State of the Nation 2013, that 
inequality and poverty keeps on rising partly as 
a result of increasing automation of production 
processes. Others fear that policies such as the 
living wage could make it more expensive to 
hire workers, meaning it is actually cheaper to 
buy the technology to replace them. London 
Underground’s recent announcement that 
tube ticket offices will go and 750 jobs will be 
lost is one example. Whatever the view, the fact 
remains that many people from a variety of jobs 
are experiencing significant transformations in the 
way they work and education is not keeping 
up. People need to be taught how to be 
flexible and adapt their skills if 
technology means constant 
change.
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 Since leaving school aged 16, Helen Smith, now 40, has been 
working as a customer service advisor for a high street bank. 
Above all, she wanted a secure job and one in which she could 
speak to people and provide a helpful service. 
 Many high street banks are pushing customers to use ATM 
machines that can now handle a large number of deposits, 
withdrawals and transfers – tasks that used to take a significant 
fraction of a cashier’s time. Over the last year, Smith has seen a 
reduction in the number of counters in her branch and a move 
towards encouraging the customers to use automated machines 
instead. “We have a lot of customers that don’t particularly like 
it – and I do understand that,” she said. “We have customers that 
get quite angry and abusive towards the staff in the branch. So for 
example, we say ‘how can we help you’ and they say ‘you can find 
me a f***ing teller’”. 
 “The long–term fear that I and a lot of my colleagues have, is that 
reducing counters means less staff, so what does that mean for our 
jobs?” she asked. 
If there are less people using the branches because they are 
being pushed to use other automated methods then does 
that mean the branches closing? We are being encouraged 
to push customers to bank in a certain way and so are we 
talking ourselves out of a job? 
 
In November 2013, Barclays Bank announced cuts of more than 
1,700 staff from customer–facing branch–based roles. Cashiers, 
personal bankers, operational specialists, 
branch managers and assistant manager 
roles will be cut throughout 2014. The bank 
claims that the way people access banking 
services is changing rapidly, with more using 
smart phones and other technology. Unite the 
Union have criticised the plans, branding it a 
‘colossal mistake’. They say customer service 
could suffer as a result. Dominic Hook, Unite 
national officer said: “These employees deliver 
high levels of service that customers of the 
bank benefit from. Such a massive reduction 
will be very detrimental to the bank and will 
also be hugely challenging for the remaining 
staff. Consumers want to engage with 
113OUR WORK HERE IS DONE. Visions of a robot economy
Part 4. Robots and Justice
knowledgeable, highly experienced, professional staff. Members in 
branches will be facing a period of considerable uncertainty in the 
current harsh economic climate.”
 Like Smith, supermarket checkout assistant, Leanne Appleyard, 
32, feels uncertain about her job. In the last six months, all the 
major supermarkets have cut back on traditional checkouts to 
make way for self–scan tills amid claims that they are faster and 
more convenient. 
 Appleyard says it worries her when people choose the self–
service tills even though she is free to serve them. “I often have to 
call people to let them know I’m free, I don’t think they can see that 
I’m here sometimes, but it surprises me that I have to wave at them 
to let them know.” 
 As for her future, she said: “I don’t think people are losing their 
jobs because of it at the moment, but I do wonder how much it will 
change.” 
 For many, self–checkout machines neatly illustrate the limits of 
computers’ abilities to mimic human skills. In a survey, 84 per cent 
of respondents admitted to needing staff assistance when using a 
self–service checkout, while 60 per cent preferred using traditional 
staffed tills. More than 40 per cent of shoppers experienced 
technical problems, triggering the voice warning of an ‘unexpected 
item in the bagging area’. This happens a lot, said another 
checkout assistant, Vimal Gupta, 24. 
Some people do not know how to use the self–service tills 
properly. They put the items on the wrong side and then it 
doesn’t work. I think they find it frustrating, so it’s easier if we 
do it for them,” he said. “But generally, if they know how to 
do it then it works fine.
 The shop workers’ union Usdaw is critical of these changes.
There are a number of potential issues with self–service tills, 
including the fact that they differ from one store to another, 
they can be temperamental and that the queuing system 
isn’t always obvious. If one shopworker is put in charge of a 
number of self–service tills and if they are helping a customer 
there can be a delay in helping another. This can cause 
customer frustration and it is generally the shopworker who 
bears the brunt of any resulting abuse and undue stress.
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 Meanwhile, in the public sector, IT is also changing the way 
people work. Sue Mustoe, 50, has been a secretary at a GP’s 
surgery for more than 25 years. She chose the job because she 
likes talking to patients. Over the last few years this aspect of 
her job has started to disappear because of developments in 
technology designed to save time, improve patient care and 
eliminate paper records. 
 As of the last three months, patients can now, if they want, 
make an appointment at home by logging in to the online surgery 
system and then walk through the door, check themselves in on an 
automated check in service, and go and see the doctor. After their 
appointment, patients can order prescriptions on a screen, which 
then get sent electronically to the chemist, and so, throughout all 
this, not actually speak at all to the secretarial staff at the desk. 
“This loses the personal touch and it’s the one downside of the 
system and I suppose it’s the one element I don’t like as much, but 
fortunately, many of our patients choose to speak to us as people 
here as they are not quite so keen to do everything automatically,” 
she said. 
One element, which is implicit so far, is the value of human 
contact. Loneliness and isolation is a huge and growing problem 
and technology can both help and undermine. For instance, 
Skype is bringing people together and robots helping severely 
disabled people to communicate, but also having a few words 
of conversation in the bank or at the doctors surgery can keep a 
person afloat – or will we one day have robot ‘friends’?
 Despite this, Mustoe does think there are advantages to the new 
systems. “It frees up the receptionists up a lot to do other things 
that need to be done,” she said. “When there is a queue it is ideal 
that people will come out of the queue and check themselves in.”
 Doctors and secretaries can now see online which hospital 
has the shortest waiting list and make appointments for patients 
straight away, so it is all done electronically and the patient gets 
the notification on the same day. According to Mustoe, “That part 
of it is a much better system and it also gives the patient a choice 
of where they want to go.”
 Mustoe says that doctors can now dictate letters and notes 
straight onto a computer system. 
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In the past, tapes were always being passed around and we 
used to leave messages for the doctors in books and then we 
would have to wait for the doctor to come in to our office and 
look at them. Now, instead of having to wait for the doctor to 
come in, we can leave them electronically so this means the 
doctors are reading the messages as and when they come 
in. I think it’s probably better for everyone. Old–fashioned 
appointment books used to take forever to go through.
 
Although it helps that hospital notes are available almost instantly 
and can be looked up on a screen or booked online, one of the 
disadvantages with this is that it is harder to actually speak to 
someone to discuss problems if they arise. “Phones ring for ages,” 
said Mustoe.
 For Mustoe, while the system is working, the advantages are 
there. But when the computers go down it descends into chaos. 
We haven’t got a list of patients because it’s all on the 
computer and so we wouldn’t have a list of appointments. 
That’s happened before. 
Elsewhere in the public sector, processes are changing. Custody 
Sergeant Nick Perks, 45, has been working for the police for ten 
years. He thinks that developments in technology have improved 
his work as it allows the police to keep information for longer 
and share it between the different agencies. “I can open custody 
records here as opposed to faxing them over to other stations,” he 
explained. 
The computer systems have got better and better as time 
has gone on, and now, anyone can access prisoner logs 
and update them at the same time, so we can work on the 
same documents without having to close them, so it’s much 
quicker.
 The main benefit for Perks is that information is easily available 
to everybody in the force. Officers now have remote access to up–
to–date systems, so that if they are out on the street they can look 
at photos of people on the spot and see who they are. “You don’t 
have to go back to the station so it does make it more efficient,” he 
said. “Plus, we’ve got a new national radio system, so if you have 
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a big event such as a protest where many forces are involved you 
can all use the same radio system.”
 Overall, Perks thinks these systems have sped up police work and 
improved the way the force operates. The only downside, he says, 
echoing the experience of doctors’ staff, is when the computer 
systems fail; there is no paper back up. “So as long as it works it’s 
fine. The reliability of it is absolutely crucial – it must work or else it 
all falls apart.” 
 Jay Khan, 36, has been a minicab driver for four years. 
We have GPS on all our cars and so the office know where 
all drivers are at all times unless we are in a dead signal zone. 
We have to let them know if they are going to go to the 
shops or go or stop off for a coffee.
“This way they know where we are and they don’t even have to 
talk to us,” said Khan, who thinks the new system is far better than 
the old radio system.
 The taxi firm has also introduced a text service that sends 
customers a message when they book a car and lets them know 
when it arrived. “Texting everyone makes the customers feel safer 
so they know the make and model of the car rather than getting 
into any old car,” he said. 
Elsewhere, technology is also having a positive impact on the way 
people work. Nicola Jennings has been a cartoonist and illustrator 
for a national newspaper since 1987. Developments in technology 
in her profession have changed the way she works entirely. It has 
given her the freedom to work remotely – and the freedom to undo 
mistakes. “I can work anywhere in the world now, it has changed 
dramatically because I can just email the work in and also because 
the newspaper and magazines are online, as well as in print, I am 
now working in a multimedia medium and a 3D medium rather than 
just a 2D medium so now there is the potential for art animation as 
well, rather than just a still images. So it’s very exciting,” she said.
 These days, Jennings draws on an expensive digital tablet on 
the computer using software that emulates pen and ink. “Some 
of it I still do the old–fashioned way, but if I’m animating, I use the 
computer. It’s much sharper if you use real pen and ink and then 
I scan it onto the computer because it’s so fabulous to be able to 
undo. It’s very exciting indeed.”
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 Jennings thinks that, in the main, you can tell the 
difference between work done on the computer and that 
drawn on paper. “You can usually spot it,” she said. 
With the computer software you can make an 
illustration look absolutely exactly the same as if 
it was hand drawn but because the computer 
has different possibilities you end up going 
with that and therefore the computer gives 
you a slightly different style.
 
 Unlike others, Jennings is confident that 
a computer could never replace her talent 
and skills. “With software you can pick any 
photograph, distort it and caricature it, but 
you still have to be a caricaturist to know what 
to distort, what feature to exaggerate and what 
expressions to read,” she said. “You have to read the 
face and read the character in order to pull the face in the right 
direction. This human touch will never be achieved by a computer.” 
 She added: 
Okay, so if you only making someone’s ears enormous, 
like Prince Charles, you can’t go wrong, but if people start 
distorting the face and don’t do it correctly in line with the 
personality then it very, very easily becomes grotesque and 
inaccurate so you have to be quite a good caricaturist just to 
do that.
 
The experience of Jennings and others, whose jobs are being 
gradually changed due to IT or bypassed altogether as people 
are faced with a wholly computerised service, demonstrate mixed 
feelings towards this change. For some, it is exciting, far more 
efficient and saves them a lot of time. Others are nervous as they 
find themselves facing an uncertain future. They are all, however, 
thoughtful observers of the changes that technology is posing 
– even where their interests and jobs are being threatened – an 
image quite different from the political and economic debate 
that characterises those who oppose technology as modern day 
Luddites fearful of progress. 
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But, above all, they tell us that human beings, as it turns out, are 
not easy to improve upon, as for the time being at least, people 
want human contact and customers are choosing the checkout 
worker over the self–service till, the receptionist instead of the 
touch screen and the cashier ahead of the machine. Can computers 
beat them? Maybe one day, but I don’t think it will be soon.
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THE OPTION VALUE  
OF THE HUMAN
STEVE RANDY WALDMAN
INTRODUCTION
It has become fashionable to worry about the robots. Or 
‘capital–biased technical change’, in the language of economists. 
What will happen to us, how will we live, how will we organise 
ourselves if many of our jobs can be better performed by artifacts 
than by humans? The problem, obviously, is distributional. If all 
our work is done for us, then in theory, we should be able to live 
at least as well as we do right now, but in perfect leisure. But for 
that to happen, we must each be able to lay claim to wealth we 
have no direct hand in creating, generated by capital that the 
majority of us do not own. 
In what follows, I offer a case grounded in history that is deeply 
pessimistic. Technological change has never, in practice, been 
accompanied by universal distribution. It creates specific winners 
and losers. One might hope that, fairly quickly, innovations would 
diffuse to the benefit of all. But that does not happen, because 
exploitation of innovation requires scarce resources as well as 
non–rival ideas. First–movers deploy new technology in ways 
that would not be sustainable if deployed universally, but whose 
reversal would be intolerably painful. They become compelled 
— by circumstance, not by ill–intention — to defend the new 
arrangements in ways that must prevent universal access. Durable 
stratification is the result. 
History need not be destiny, however. If future technological 
innovation is accompanied by institutional innovation that renders 
benefits broadly shared from the start, then the emergence 
of defensively hegemonic first–movers could be avoided. One 
way to accomplish this despite displacement of labour from the 
production process would be to remunerate people for activities 
with high ‘option value’, that is for activities that do not directly 
contribute to the production of current goods and services but 
which might prove valuable under various contingencies, ranging 
from collapse of the automated production process to invention 
of speculative technologies or authorship of uncertainly valuable 
cultural artifacts.
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CONDEMNED TO REPEAT IT?
The whole robots thing is very glitzy. But this is not a matter of 
science fiction. Labour–displacing technical change, shocks to the 
value of a pair of hands, are nothing new in the world. What is new 
is not what is happening, but whom it is likely to affect.
There is a story that is mostly a lie. That story goes like this. Until 
the nineteenth century, nearly all of us worked in agriculture. The 
Industrial Revolution came, tractors displaced most humans, and 
everybody worried about how they would survive. But, as a fact of 
nature, labour demand expands to absorb labour supply, and the 
objective productivity enabled by new technologies meant that 
the new jobs would for the most part be better and better paying 
than the old. Perhaps there were some rough transitions, but 
jobs appeared for the willing hands. Agricultural workers became 
factory workers, whose capital–augmented productivity translated 
to high wages and broad–based improvements in the standard of 
living.
The beginning and the end of that story are all true. In what are 
now the ‘advanced economies’, ancient patterns of agricultural 
production were disrupted, displacing many humans and leaving 
them worried about how they might survive. Eventually, wealthy, 
mass–affluent liberal democracies appeared and thrived, for a 
while. But in between those two events were mass–migrations 
to cities and across borders; two devastating World Wars (and 
many smaller conflicts) that significantly curtailed labour supply; 
unemployment crises, worker unrest, and authoritarian political 
movements. Successful adaptation, in every developed economy of 
the mid–twentieth century, was accompanied by the development 
of welfare states and legally privileged labour unions which 
‘artificially’, from a certain perspective, helped sustain demand 
for the volcano of consumer products implied by near–full 
employment of technically–augmented workers.
But at least there was eventual success! Or not. Viewed globally, 
the outcome of industrial transition looks at best ambivalent. 
At the beginning of the last millennium, the world was truly flat. 
There were rich and poor, kings and paupers, everywhere, but 
the material lives of Africans and Asians and Europeans were not 
so different. The last few centuries brought the so–called Great 
Divergence, in which a relatively few countries representing a 
small share of the global population successfully industrialised 
while the rest of the world was arguably left worse off, excluded 
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somehow from the highly–productive 
employment their empty hands were 
supposed to compel, dominated 
instead by foreign powers and 
domestic elites. In the mendacious 
telling, each one of these nations 
had separate histories, and patterns 
of success and failure are explained 
by vague factors like ‘the quality of 
institutions’. But in historical fact, 
there was, shall we say, a great deal 
of contamination between these 
experiments. Most of the countries 
we now view as failures were, during 
much of the Great Divergence, literally 
colonies of the successes, and nearly 
all now trade in global markets. The 
Industrial Revolution was a global, 
not a national event, and it had more 
than its share of losers. If we examine 
the global experience, we’d find that ‘prosperity’ as measured by 
GDP per capita has expanded to some degree nearly everywhere. 
People everywhere have cellphones. (Hooray.) But it is not at all 
clear, when social and political factors are taken into account, 
that the Eurocentric Industrial Revolution was, overall, a positive 
development for the typical African. And it is indisputably true 
that the benefits of technological development have been very 
unequally shared.
So the hazard we now face is nothing new. Over the past few 
centuries, labour–displacing technology divided the world between 
communities of insiders that controlled and enjoyed the fruits 
of enormously productive technology, and outsiders who found 
themselves with no claim to insiders’ wealth. Somehow and 
somewhat mysteriously, most outsiders were persistently frustrated 
in their attempts to reproduce the success of early winners, or 
even to defend prior social arrangements against destabilisation 
or colonisation in the brave new world that emerged. Now labour–
displacing technology threatens to repeat precisely the same trick 
within the national communities that were the winners of past 
technological transitions.
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ADDICTION THEORY
In a certain sense, the failure of the Industrial Revolution to bring 
about a broadly shared prosperity is a puzzle. Technological ideas 
really do cross borders pretty freely, and did so long prior to the 
internet. Why weren’t industrial technologies universally adopted? 
If it takes less human labour to make more goods and services, 
why don’t we just create so many goods and services that all the 
labour is still absorbed and we are all phenomenally wealthy? 
That’s (roughly) what happened in the postwar prosperous West. 
Why didn’t it happen everywhere? 
The current fashion is to blame ‘bad institutions’, a phrase so 
vague as to be indistinguishable from confirmation bias. The losers 
lost because they had bad institutions, which no true Scotsman 
would abide. Empirical work on the subject finds that the best 
operationalisation of ‘good institutions’ has nothing to do with 
what most people think of as institutions, but instead measures 
the degree of sociocultural connectedness with ex post winners, 
specifically the degree to which colonisers intended to actually live 
in the countries they now dominated. When colonisers colonised 
merely to extract, the story goes, they imposed bad institutions. 
When they planned to reside in the colonies, they erected good 
ones. But that story invites a more parsimonious account, the 
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sociocultural winners won and the losers lost, regardless of the 
geographies they ultimately inhabited. In places where losers 
mixed with winners, some crumbs fell from the table.
Plus, there is an obvious point that is rarely discussed among 
polite economists. Given the Earth’s resources and technology 
as it existed in the mid–to–late twentieth century, it would 
have been physically impossible for the entire world to have 
enjoyed the standard of living that prevailed in the United States, 
Western Europe, Australia, and Japan. Three–quarters of the 
Earth’s population were effectively excluded from modernity. 
For that not to have occurred, we would have required roughly 
four times the oil, steel, etc., than we actually extracted. It is a 
mistake to assume, as the 1970s ‘limits to growth’ movement 
did, that resource constraints permanently bind. Technologies, 
of extraction, efficiency, or substitution can and usually do relax 
them, eventually. But that sort of progress takes time, usually a few 
human generations, and the mechanism by which it is propelled 
is high prices. In a counterfactual twentieth century during which 
industrial development was universally shared, the prosperous 
West would not so quickly have achieved the standard of living 
it did achieve. Instead, resource prices would have shot upwards 
and much more attention would have been devoted much earlier 
to efficiencies and alternatives that in actual historical fact we are 
only now beginning to explore.
Technological development is, in econospeak, an asymmetric 
shock. Somebody does it first. The relatively small community of 
‘first–movers’ enjoy an odd sort of paradise, for a time. They get 
to implement the possibilities opened up by the new technology 
under the resource prices that prevail prior to widespread adoption 
of the invention. ‘Rock oil’, before kerosene lamps and then internal 
combustion engines, was a cheap resource whose prevalence or 
limits were not of great concern. In economies at the technological 
frontier, internal combustion engines became a centerpiece of 
industrial development based on prices that could not have 
survived universal adoption. Lifestyles and habits and long–lived 
physical infrastructures were transformed based on prices that, 
from a certain perspective, ought to have been understood as 
ephemeral and anomalous. In actual fact, low resource prices were 
not so ephemeral. Petroleum was as cheap in the 1990s as it had 
been in the 1890s (adjusting for inflation, of course). One response 
to that, common on the economic right, is to laud markets and 
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human ingenuity. The doomsayers were wrong! Resource scarcities 
failed to appear because new sources were continually discovered. 
Unfortunately, in arithmetic terms, the ‘decision’ by three–
quarters of humanity not to industrialise over the period played 
a much larger role in stabilising oil prices than the recruitment 
of new oilfields. The process by which oilfields were discovered 
and brought into production for global markets was a mix of 
decentralised, emergent market activity and intentional action by 
governments and large corporations. The process by which most of 
the world chose not to industrialise was perhaps much the same.
So here is a tragic and sadly realistic account of sociotechnological 
development: something is invented. ‘First–movers’ rush in to 
exploit the invention. In doing so, they become very wealthy. They 
gain market power (by virtue of superior experience, networks 
effects, etc.), and political power. The communities in which they 
reside and the lives of individuals within them are transformed by 
the new wealth and technology in ways that would be painful to 
reverse. Without malicious intent, these communities then deploy 
their wealth, power, and prowess to secure low–cost access to the 
resources on which they depend, access which in practice would 
be threatened by universal replication of their own experience. The 
result is a highly polarised, zero–sum world, in which the prosperity 
of outsiders must be suppressed if the lifestyles of insiders — now 
embedded in everything from habits to physical infrastructure — is 
to be sustained.
ROBOTS AND RESOURCES
But all of this is ancient history. What does it have to do with 
the coming of the robots? Everything, I am afraid. The basic 
dynamic we have described applies to communities smaller than 
industrialising (or not–industrialising) nations, and it applies in the 
present as much as in the past. We will not all find ourselves with 
replicators fulfilling our desires on–demand and robots performing 
services that we require. Some of us will have these things first. 
These ‘lucky ones’ will find they have little use for human labour, 
but they will still require very many other resources. And they will 
not feel ‘rich’. We never do for very long! Whatever miracles the 
new machines perform, their lucky owners will rearrange their lives 
so that those miracles come to seem absolutely indispensable. 
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They will form communities within which the miracles are 
commonplace, in which lack of access to such miracles is a kind 
of pathetic and foreign poverty. We see this now, and we mock 
it — unfairly — when the odd investment banker explains to The 
New York Times why it is impossible for him to live on less then 
500,000 a year. It is not really optional, if you are a managing 
director at Goldman Sachs, to have an apartment that costs several 
million dollars and to send your kids to expensive private schools. 
Or, more accurately, it is optional, in the same sense that having 
indoor plumbing and electrical power is optional for ordinary 
Americans. After all, thinking globally, lots of people, perhaps most 
of the planet, do without!
The fruits of technological change will, as always, be unevenly 
distributed. The communities that enjoy those fruits first will 
quickly adjust to them. They will become preconditions of civilised 
living rather than surplus luxury and wealth. There will be people at 
the margins of those communities struggling painfully to keep their 
place, for whom the living, however comfortable by the standards 
of other communities, will not feel easy at all.
But if the lifestyles enabled by those new technologies are, as 
they are likely to be, resource intensive, people in these first–mover 
communities will face strong incentives to restrict access. This 
will not be a matter of sadism. It will not be an overt, conscious 
choice. But these communities will be exposed to stress from rising 
resource prices, and will respond strategically within markets and 
political systems to protect supply chains upon 
which they depend. If the robots need 
molybdenum and molybdenum is scarce, 
robot–dependent communities will work 
to ensure exclusive and inexpensive 
access rather than see prices bid to 
intolerable heights under universal 
adoption. Inflation will be the enemy, 
not other humans, but inflation is what 
happens when other people have the 
purchasing power to bid for resources 
that you yourself desire.
You might argue — you should! — that 
this theory overpredicts dystopia, and so 
flies in the face of the basically optimistic 
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experience of the so–called developed world. Why during the 
twentieth century didn’t small communities create and entrench 
lifestyle differentials for themselves analogous to the lifestyle 
differentials that persisted between the first world and the third 
world? How did the period of postwar mass affluence come to 
exist at all, if the dynamic I describe of addiction and exclusion is 
real?
History is not a theory. It depends upon its details. It happened 
to be true that, while the technologies of the Industrial Revolution 
displaced labour from farms, they also concentrated large numbers 
of workers into vulnerable factories, creating conditions under 
which effective labour movements could arise. It happened to be 
true that, at the level of security technology that prevailed, large 
numbers of aggrieved individuals could become disruptive in ways 
that the political system and even the most wealthy communities 
could not afford to ignore. World War II happened, which 
disrupted parochial and stratified communities in favor of national 
communities, and which required soldiers, who were promised 
claims on future wealth in order to be motivated to fight. Addiction 
and exclusion define a very real dynamic, but not the only dynamic.
However, an automated factory does not create conditions for 
an effective labour movement. Technologies of distant violence 
and social control are much better developed then they were half 
a century ago. To the degree that technologies of production 
were complements of human labour, the asymmetry of access 
to new goods and services was mitigated by the fact that large 
groups of workers could claim significant shares of what they 
produced. When technologies are genuine substitutes for labour, 
much smaller groups might claim their fruits, and then become 
accustomed to styles of living that would be unsupportable if 
widely enjoyed. That is the outcome we should fear, and prevent.
SOCIOECONOMIC COHESION
In all of this dreary hypothesising, technology is never really the 
villain. Technological development, especially labour–displacing 
technological development, is a good and wonderful and fantastic 
thing. It makes us richer, it frees our hands from drudgery and 
toil and affords us possibilities to create in ways that needn’t be 
reduced to commodifiable value. Labour–displacing technology 
could and ought to be liberating!
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Dystopian outcomes occur by virtue of the asymmetry of 
access to the fruits of technological development. If industrial 
development had occurred globally and simultaneously, resource 
prices would have risen early, and Western standards of living 
would have risen more slowly. But they would still have risen, as 
we developed efficiencies and substitutes and more effective 
extraction techniques. And they would have risen universally, 
without any need for dirty wars across the world to protect a 
minority’s not–universally–sustainable way of life. It would have 
been a shame, in its way, if the ‘muscle car’ era would never have 
been affordable and so was skipped entirely, if the energy directed 
towards building powerful V8 engines had instead brought us tiny 
fuel–efficient hatchbacks two decades earlier, if cities continued of 
necessity to be designed compactly around good public transport 
for the many who could not afford to fuel even a Corolla. But it 
would have been a small price to pay if it meant that Africans, like 
Americans, would have enjoyed civilised, well–ordered industrial 
societies.
The key to ensuring positive social outcomes from technological 
change is to prevent the emergence of powerful communities that 
get far ahead of the rest of humanity in their enjoyment of and 
adjustment to technologically created possibilities. This doesn’t 
mean there cannot be wealthy individuals. The hazard comes when 
socioeconomically distinct, politically potent groups 
emerge which live very differently from the broader 
public in ways that require unusual access to scarce 
resources. It is one thing to be richer or poorer in 
a basically middle class society. It is quite another 
thing to fall from civilised society to barbarism, from 
affluence to underclass. Technological development 
becomes dangerous when human affairs become 
segregated and stratified. The answer to the problem 
of addiction and exclusion is not Luddism, but simply 
socioeconomic cohesion.
It has become taboo to even discuss socioeconomic 
cohesion as an object of public policy because we 
are so far along a different path. In global terms, it is 
almost impossible to imagine or to advocate a world 
in which the material possibilities of a typical African 
or even of a typical Chinese would be comparable to 
those of a typical German or American. Even within 
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the rarified heights of the developed world, the lifestyles and 
circumstances of the affluent have increasingly diverged from 
those of the broad population, and physical and social segregation 
by affluence has increased. Under these circumstances, 
technological development really does become something to 
fear. Technological changes may be asymmetric ‘shocks’, but their 
distribution is far from uniform. The technological frontier lives 
and advances primarily among those who are already advantaged 
relative to the broad public, who may already have and use 
disproportionate political power to inhibit inflationary competition 
for resources on which they depend. The robots (or at least access 
to the goods and services they produce) will come to America 
before they come to Africa. They will come to Palo Alto before 
they come to Detroit. As advanced communities pull further and 
further ahead, the prospect of a fall becomes more and more 
terrifying, increasing the willingness and perceived righteousness 
of insiders’ efforts to protect their positions, whatever the costs 
to outsiders. The prospect of living like a typical American or 
European may already be as unthinkable to an emerging elite as 
the prospect of living like a typical African would be to citizens of 
the developed world.
If that doesn’t sound to you like a good world, the only way to 
prevent it is to take responsibility at a policy level 
for socioeconomic outcomes to slow or even 
reverse economic stratification. Labour–displacing 
technology could be a wonderful thing, if its 
fruits were broadly shared by a unified human 
community. But, absent countervailing policy, 
labour–displacing technology is likely to exclude 
the vast majority of humans, even within developed 
world, from sharing in the increased prosperity 
it could in theory enable. Instead, gains will be 
concentrated among a small minority whose 
habits and lifestyles would be threatened by 
a broader prosperity, and so who somehow 
contrive to suppress that. If recent history is 
a guide, most of that suppression won’t take the 
form of overt, outright oppression. Instead, losers 
will be ‘pathologized’. Somehow there will emerge 
social conditions under which most of the excluded 
will find themselves unable to succeed despite 
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ostensibly open neutral contests for access to technological 
prosperity. It will be their fault. They just won’t be good enough. 
The Nigerians and Namibians have their bad institutions. Now, 
Charles Murray observes, the once–strong institutions of formerly 
prosperous middle America are fraying. White working class 
communities are the new ‘tangles of pathology’, as Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan famously described ‘negro ghettos’ in the middle 1960s. 
Now as then, insiders will cluck with perfectly good intentions 
about the ‘cultural problems’ that plague and condemn the new 
outsiders. So intractable! And that is why we are ‘coming apart’. Or 
at least, that will be the story.
THE OPTION VALUE OF THE HUMAN
Predictions of dystopia are most useless when they are correct. 
The purpose of a pessimistic forecast should be to help inspire 
conditions under which it will be rendered inaccurate. Our initial 
conditions are not so good. Impossible gulfs remain between 
‘advanced economies’ and much of the world. Analogous gulfs 
are growing within developed countries between the top of the 
wealth distribution and erstwhile middle classes. There may be 
less than meets the eye even to apparent convergences between 
nations, given the degree of inequality within fast–growing, 
‘successful’ emerging markets. Looking at individuals, a prosperous 
class that is multicultural and transnational seems to be diverging 
from everyone else. (There may be some genuine convergences 
within the international ‘everyone else’, experienced as upward 
mobility among workers in emerging markets and stagnation or 
retrocession among workers in developed economies.)
History is a sunk cost. Divergences, once embedded in habit and 
infrastructure, usually can’t be undone by spreading the static 
wealth, at least not without destructive, violent conflict. The pain of 
adjustment is simply intolerable to the dependent, vulnerable ‘rich’. 
It is perceived as an existential threat. If we are to avoid, or more 
accurately, to remedy, highly–stratified societies, the only practical 
strategy is to try to direct the fruits of growth disproportionately 
towards the bottom and middle of the wealth distribution, so 
that there is upward convergence over time (without requiring 
complete stagnation for any group). Unfortunately, that has 
proven difficult to arrange historically. The next wave of labour–
displacing technology will make it particularly difficult under 
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present economic institutions, under which the fruits of production 
are distributed on the basis of labour provided or capital held. 
Labour providers will be paid less (in aggregate), concentrating 
the fruits of production among disproportionately wealthy capital 
holders. If we are to avoid a Blade Runner–esque, highly–stratified 
mass dystopia with well–guarded pockets of elite hyperaffluence, 
we will need to alter our economic institutions full stop. The fruits 
of increased production will have to be distributed (in part) on 
grounds other than capital held or labour provided.
One important possibility is an unconditional basic income, or 
better yet truly universal cash transfers whereby technologically 
advanced nations would supply (small) incomes not just to 
their own citizens, but to every human on the planet whose 
governments permit it. Universal cash transfers represent a 
particularly attractive policy. They divert some of the fruits of 
growth from the top of the global wealth distribution to the very 
bottom (supporting upward convergence). They also promote 
employment in the donor country, as the funds exported in donor–
country currency must be spent on donor–country goods, or else 
(if the funds accumulate externally) put downward pressure on 
the donor country’s exchange rate. China’s mercantilistic currency 
management can be understood as a synthetic transfer to Western 
consumers in support of domestic employment and politically 
influential exporters. Advanced countries can play that game too, 
in support of their own social peace and the prosperity of bottom 
billions. It’s a positive sum game, as it addresses objectively unmet 
material needs of the global poor, while broadening the wealth 
distribution and offsetting technological disemployment within 
advanced economies. As the robots come, domestic demand 
will be increasingly insufficient to generate full employment. So 
why not import (or really create) global demand? Think of it as 
an ongoing Marshall Plan, which enabled a devastated Europe 
to purchase US exports, to the long–term benefit of both. There 
are still a lot of unmet needs on the planet. Politically, providing 
very small (by advanced–economy standards) universal incomes 
intended to help the truly poor in less developed countries may 
be an easier sell than offering the substantial domestic incomes 
required to generate the same demand, as sizeable basic income 
proposals engender resentment of the self–identified industrious 
toward alleged dependents and scroungers. The transfers could be 
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financed by a variable combination taxes, borrowing, and outright 
money printing. That would lead to some combination of inflation 
and increased employment, which is exactly what broad–based 
growth looks like. Widely distributed purchasing power provokes 
general price inflation, but prices rise most for goods and services 
for which there is high demand and/or resource constraints, 
spurring innovation to produce what the bulk of humanity (rather 
than an affluent sliver) wants and needs. 
Ultimately, however, labour–displacing technology may advance, 
especially in tradeable manufactures, to the point where domestic 
employment cannot be supported by export demand. Pretty 
soon, to a good first approximation, there will be no one but the 
robots in factories. Employment, to the degree it is still available 
at all, will be restricted to services that cannot easily be traded 
internationally. Domestic transfers will be required at that point, 
both to engender sufficient demand for employment in services 
and to provide some support to those who, whether voluntarily 
or not, will fail to work at all. Those transfers might take the form 
of labour subsidies or negative income taxes, to help humans 
compete with the robots by reducing their relative cost to 
potential employers. They might take the form of an unconditional 
basic income. They might attach to some evidence of difficult–
to–monetise cultural production, or caregiving, or childrearing, 
or other forms of not–market–regulated yet socially desirable 
behavior. One way or another, social transfers will have to happen 
if we wish to prevent a dynamic of divergence, addiction, and 
exclusion that leads ultimately to a very unpalatable society. But 
what is the best way to arrange them?
It is worth asking, in a world where robots can 
do every sort of routine job, what is it that we 
would want humans to do with their spare 
time? One answer comes from the theory of 
financial derivatives. A human being who is 
not performing immediately productive work 
is like an out–of–the–money option. Out–
of–the–money options are worth nothing 
at all, pure zilch, if exercised immediately. 
And yet people are willing to pay a great 
deal to own them. Their value comes from 
the possibility that, in an uncertain and 
ever–changing world, they will somehow 
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become directly valuable. When we write an option, we enhance its 
value by increasing the likelihood it will come ‘into the money’, but 
also by increasing the payoff it will provide should it do so. Options 
are most valuable when the world is rapidly changing, which it 
likely will be even after the robots take our jobs.
As routine work is taken over by robots, we might 
reconceptualise the economic role of humans as responders to 
unusual contingencies. We will have expert systems, but we will still 
want human experts in almost everything (in order to make sense 
of the expert systems if nothing else). We will need to remember, 
not just in a bookish sense, but also in a muscle–memory sense, 
the vast range of human skills that will be rendered uneconomic in 
mainstream production. So we should subsidise all kinds of craft–y 
production, from blacksmithing to yarn–spinning to carpentry 
to unmechanised farming, in case we should someday have use 
of them. We should run some mid–twentieth century assembly 
lines and supply chains, which would serve simultaneously as 
museum pieces, laboratories, universities, and insurance policies. 
We currently fund academics to invent branches of mathematics 
for which we have no current use. Given lots of available humans, 
we should do a lot more of that, and see whether those abstruse 
new subfields don’t turn out to be useful. We should encourage 
lots of offbeat invention, make laboratories and experts and 
resources available for people to seriously try, but usually fail, to 
invent ultracapacitors or cold fusion. We should cede the realm 
of the ordinary almost entirely to the robots, and try to shape the 
humans into an outrageously diverse portfolio of options such that 
in any and every contingency that might arise, we have a wealth of 
skill and resources to fall back on (and eventually use to build new 
robots once a former unlikely contingency becomes an ordinary 
necessity).
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Like out–of–the–money options, the typical individual may ex 
post offer no direct value. But some unpredictable few of these 
people will turn out to be immensely valuable. We pay for the 
possibilities they offer, not for the certain, measurable marginal 
product in old–fashioned labour models.
For the option value they provide, as long as they are active in 
their own unlikely spheres, we should pay the humans well.
CONCLUSION
Human lifestyles are sticky backward. When a human community 
experiences technological change or unusual wealth, its habits, 
institutions, and physical infrastructure typically adjust to the new 
circumstance such that a reversion to prior ways of living would be 
catastrophically painful.
Lifestyles carry with them a resource footprint. When a 
community adjusts to a lifestyle that depends on intensive use 
of scarce physical resources, continued low–cost access to those 
resources become an existential requirement. If adoption of a 
resource–intensive lifestyle is asymmetrical — that is if some 
small community of ‘first–movers’ adopts and adjusts to a new 
lifestyle based on low prices reflecting only their own demand — 
that community becomes extremely vulnerable to the inflation 
that would result if the resource–intensive lifestyle were adopted 
universally. Securing the first mover’s supply chain necessarily 
involves excluding outsiders from successfully replicating insiders’ 
lifestyle change. This circumstance may not be permanent: 
advances in extraction, efficiency, or substitution may eventually 
enable expanded access without threat to first–mover lifestyles. 
But while exclusion prevails, we should expect to observe 
restrained resource prices alongside communities of people who 
would like to adopt the resource–intensive lifestyle but somehow 
find that they cannot.
The Great Divergence between advanced economies and the 
rest of the world can be attributed to asymmetrical adoption of 
and adjustment to the technologies of the Industrial Revolution. 
However, the process is ongoing as some communities within 
advanced economies become accustomed to yet more resource–
costly lifestyles made possible by early access to technology or 
unusual distributional success. Automation and other labour–
displacing technical change threatens to exacerbate this dynamic 
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by expanding resource–intensive production while reducing the 
number of people capable of laying claim to the output and the 
price of labour for low–productivity services. If these smaller 
groups become accustomed to ways of living that could not be 
universal even within the erstwhile developed world, we should 
expect the same result as before: a divergence within, restrained 
resource prices alongside people who would like to adopt more 
resource–intensive lifestyles but are somehow excluded from 
participation.
The only remedy for this dynamic is socioeconomic cohesion: 
not permitting first–movers to become adjusted to lifestyles very 
far beyond what could be universally supported under present 
resource–use technologies. Where divergence has already 
occurred, our best approach is to ensure that the fruits of new 
technological development and economic growth are directed 
disproportionately towards permitting those left behind to 
enjoy better lifestyles rather than to creating new gaps between 
advanced adopters and excluded outsiders. Obviously, that is all 
politically challenging. Given that automation is likely to diminish 
the ability of outsiders to make labour–based claims upon 
resource–intensive production, we will need to alter the basis 
on which claims to production are distributed if they are to be 
distributed more broadly. In addition to traditional social transfers 
(including basic incomes and truly universal cash grants), I suggest 
we should reconceptualise what it is that people should be paid 
for. In addition to compensation for any direct role in production, 
people should be paid for ‘option value’, for maintaining diverse 
skills and expertise and engaging in experimentation that could 
become valuable under some contingency, even while that 
contingency is unforeseen.
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